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The past five to ten years has seen the emergence of a new term on the humanitarian and 
development economics landscapes, resilience. While this term holds considerable promise, 
international development practitioners and the academic community have yet to reach 
consensus on a consistent definition of resilience and few, if any, theory-based methods for 
estimating resilience in a development context have been developed. This dissertation introduces 
an econometric strategy for estimating individual or household-level development resilience 
from panel data and applies this strategy to two different contexts. The first, more theoretical, 
paper proposes a conditional moments-based approach to development resilience estimation and 
illustrates the method empirically using household panel data from pastoralist communities in 
northern Kenya. The results demonstrate not only the method and its potential as a targeting tool 
for resilience-building interventions, but also help explain the behavioral paradox of apparent 
herd overstocking in pastoral communities. 
The second paper of the dissertation applies the development resilience approach to 
evaluate the impact of an index insurance product on resilience. Taking advantage of an 
experimental, multi-round, household panel dataset, the paper employs an instrumental variable 
approach to evaluate the impact of an index-based livestock insurance product in Northern 
Kenya on development resilience in terms of both household herd size, the primary productive 
asset in the region, and child health. The results indicate that index-based livestock insurance 
increases household resilience to drought in terms of household livestock holdings. Insurance is 
  
also associated will substantially higher nutritional resilience in the children of drought-affected 
households. 
The final paper of the dissertation evaluates the empirical relationship between livelihood 
diversification—both on-farm crop diversification and income diversification—and well-being, 
measured as monthly household expenditures per adult equivalent, in rural Uganda. Results 
indicate that income diversification is negatively associated with resilience. Crop diversification 
is associated with increased resilience, but only when considering poverty thresholds above the 
rural absolute poverty line. Diversification into cash crops and non-farm income does not 
increase resilience. These results indicate that crop diversification (although not diversification 
into cash crops) should be considered in similar contexts as a tool for increasing resilience, 
although not necessarily for the poorest households. More generally, it demonstrates the 
importance of applying a development resilience approach when evaluating the potential benefits 
of risk management strategies and resilience-building activities. 
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PREFACE 
I. Introduction 
Over the past twenty years, scholars have made considerable progress in understanding 
poverty and its counterpart, well-being.  In economics, seminal contributions include theoretical 
explanations for persistent poverty; approaches to understanding the interplay between risk, 
vulnerability, and poverty; and methods for calculating intertemporal and multidimensional 
poverty. Despite the richness of the poverty dynamics/traps and vulnerability literatures, the past 
five to ten years has seen the emergence of a new term on the development economics landscape, 
resilience. While this term holds considerable promise, much of the economic literature on 
development resilience to date has failed to incorporate many of the poverty and vulnerability 
measurement lessons of the past twenty years.  
The goal of this dissertation summary is threefold; 1) to critically examine the poverty 
dynamics and vulnerability literatures in order to identify both critical elements and central 
issues; 2) to build a consistent lexicon for the economics of development resilience that 
highlights the conceptual foundations of development resilience and a resilience approach to 
well-being estimation; and 3) to clarify the contribution of my dissertation to these literatures. 
This document is organized as follows: The second section contains the literature review, which 
is organized conceptually around the three topics mentioned above and is focused on the 
theoretical insights they provide. The third section highlights how I bring together the strengths 
of these various research fields and discusses my general contribution to the literature. Finally, 
the fourth section briefly summarizes each of the three chapters of my dissertation.  
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II. Literature Review 
Our current understanding of how poverty evolves over time, particularly in the face of 
shocks, comes from three distinct but related literatures: the poverty dynamics and traps, 
vulnerability, and resilience literatures. The following section works through each of these 
literatures, with an eye to highlighting the key strengths and lessons of each.  
Poverty dynamics and traps 
While the literature on economic growth and poverty reduction is vast, I will focus here 
on theoretical micro-economic contributions from the past twenty or so years, with a particular 
emphasis on models that incorporate dynamics and/or risk explicitly. Although a bit older, Loury 
(1981) describes the potential theoretical impacts on human capital investment of stochastic 
income and incomplete credit markets for educational loans. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) 
provide the first, as far as I am aware, empirical study of farmer risk aversion in the context of 
incomplete insurance markets and informal idiosyncratic risk sharing, finding that utility-
maximizing farmers with higher levels of risk exposure self-insure against covariate weather 
shocks through the selection of lower mean production, lower variance portfolios. The authors 
examine ex ante behavior during a single period only. Building on this, Banerjee and Newman 
(1994) outline perhaps the first micro-economic model of poverty traps resulting from (credit) 
market failures and demonstrate that, in a simple two period model, poor households pass on 
poverty to their children. Similarly, Barham (1995) describes a three period model in which 
liquidity constraints among poor households (also a form of credit market failure) limit human 
capital investments and therefore trap future generations in poverty. 
In his seminal paper, Dasgupta (1997) explores how nutrition and income are mutually 
(and deterministically) reinforcing, and describes the possibility of two distinct stable equilibria: 
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adequate nutrition to sustainably meet needs through economic participation and perpetual 
malnutrition. Dasgupta argues that these “lock-in effects” may be found even without credit 
market failures, although he acknowledges that market imperfections certainly exacerbate 
poverty traps. Dercon (1998) proposes a model of asset accumulation in the face of credit 
constraints and risk, and implements it empirically using a very small panel (80 households) in 
rural Tanzania. He theorizes that credit market imperfections and the indivisibility of livestock 
assets cause barriers to entry into animal rearing (which he considers a high-return investment), 
causing poorer households to continue low return, low risk non-farm activities and eventually 
leading to growing inequality. 
Baulch and Hoddinott (2000), in their introduction to a special issue of the Journal of 
Development Studies, describe the multiple “dimensions” of economic mobility and poverty: 1) 
metrics of interest, 2) temporal concerns, and 3) additionality. They highlight problems, in a 
stochastic world, with cross-sectional poverty measures that fail to differentiate between the 
“sometimes poor” and the “always poor” although they point out that even with multiple rounds 
of data 1) measurement error leads to an overstatement of the number of transitorily poor 
households and 2) the heterogeneity of the transitorily poor may hide important distinctions in 
terms of welfare, suggesting a permanent income approach may be more appropriate in some 
circumstances. Further, Naschold and Barrett (2011) demonstrate that much of the empirical 
evidence on transitory poverty is overstated due to the relatively short windows between rounds 
in many panel datasets. With regards to measures, Baulch and Hoddinott (2000) emphasize that 
different welfare measures may lead to very different conclusions about the magnitude of 
chronic or transitory poverty. They differentiate between short term poverty dynamics and long 
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term economic mobility, the latter of which they argue also must incorporate initial conditions, 
shocks, macroeconomic conditions, the impact of asset stocks on welfare.  
Carter and May (2001) expand the standard single-period poverty line intertemporally 
using a formula for discounted present value and classify households as dynamically poor if the 
“maximal discounted stream of [the household’s] future livelihoods” (p. 1989) given its initial 
asset endowment is below the multiperiod poverty line. Although the authors do not include 
measures of shocks specifically, they do include a stochastic component which allows them to 
classify families as either stochastically or structurally poor (or non-poor). Zimmerman and 
Carter (2003) explore a dynamic, stochastic model with subsistence constraints and revitalize 
Lipton’s (1993) concept of a Micawber threshold around which asset dynamics bifurcate 
between asset accumulation and decumulation. The authors demonstrate that poor but rational 
actors will alter consumption patterns to smooth assets in response to shocks (and with missing 
insurance markets). Lybbert et al. (2004) study stochastic well-being dynamics among Ethiopian 
pastoralists, building on the hypothesis that “history dependence” may drive poverty dynamics in 
situations of multiple equilibria, they offer an empirical estimation of multiple dynamic wealth 
(in terms of livestock assets) equilibria using a non-parametric approach which is able to capture 
non-linearities in asset dynamics. On the other hand, Kraay and McKenzie (2014) argue that, 
despite the value and advancement of the literature, there is a lack of evidence for the existence 
of poverty traps in practice—remote rural areas, such as the one studied by Lybbert et al., 
perhaps being the primary exception. 
Prior to 2006, the poverty dynamics and measurement literatures were focused on ex post 
poverty measurement, identifying who was poor in the past. Carter and Barrett (2006) pull 
together the previous literatures on asset accumulation and stochastic versus structural poverty, 
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laying the groundwork for a “forward-looking” (ex ante) poverty measure that builds on the 
strengths of the vulnerability literature (discussed below) as well. Hoddinott (2006) furthers the 
literature on poverty dynamics and asset accumulation, pointing out that the previous literature 
inadequately examined intra-household aspects of poverty dynamics. He also recasts the 
consumption versus asset smoothing debate by noting that households simply decide which 
capitals (including between human capital and physical assets or between the human capital of 
children and adults) to conserve and which to draw down in response to shocks. 
Vulnerability  
Although much has been written on vulnerability in recent years, the literature primarily 
began as a series of (sometimes still unpublished) working papers responding to critics that the 
poverty measurement literature was too backward-looking and that the poor themselves consider 
vulnerability to be an important aspect of poverty (Kanbur & Squire 1999). One of the earliest of 
these was Pritchett, Suryahadi and Sumarto (2000), who propose, as far as I am aware, the first 
probabilistic measure of vulnerability. The authors define vulnerability as the probability (or 
risk) that a household will fall below the poverty line in the future (three years). This focus on 
the near future distinguishes the vulnerability literature from much of the poverty dynamics 
literature. While the authors do construct a headcount measure, they do not examine depth of 
vulnerability per se. Christiaensen and Boisvert (2000) highlight that the well-being can be 
measured using a variety of “focal variables,” a probability distribution, a well-being threshold, 
and a probabilistic vulnerability threshold. They also suggest an FGT-type aggregator can be 
used to measure the depth of vulnerability. Chaudhuri, Jalan, and Suryahadi (2002) also consider 
vulnerability as the probabilistic interpretation of a stochasitic process. Although they suggest a 
framework for measuring vulnerability, their reliance on cross-sectional data means that the 
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estimates are actually ex post estimates of the probability of a household being in poverty and 
cross-sectional variation is assumed to resemble variation over time. 
The pieces above can all be grouped into one approach to vulnerability measurement, 
which Hoddinott and Quisumbing (2003) refer to as the vulnerability as expected poverty (or 
VEP) approach. The VEP approach has multiple strengths, particularly its forward-looking 
nature and explicit focus on risk and shocks. Hoddinott and Quisumbing (2003) identify two 
other approaches to vulnerability measurement in their review, vulnerability as low expected 
utility (VEU) and vulnerability as uninsured exposure to risk (VER). Gisele and Morduch (2002) 
are perhaps the earliest proponents of the VEU approach. Their framework uses Monte Carlo 
simulations combined with bootstrapping to nonparametrically generate a household’s future 
well-being distribution. In general, the VEU and VER approaches to vulnerability measurement 
are further removed from the poverty measurement literature, and my work builds primarily on 
the VEP approach. 
Resilience 
As the vulnerability literature was developing in the early 2000s, the concept of 
resilience—previously a concept in the ecology and ecosystems literature (Holling 1996)—began 
to draw the attention of researchers working on social problems, from socioecological systems 
(Carpenter et al. 2001, Folke 2006), including pastoral systems (Robinson and Berkes 2010), to 
planning (Davoudi 2012). As cyclical shocks, disaster risk reduction, and climate change became 
more of a focus of the international development and humanitarian communities, the concept of 
resilience became increasingly central in donor thinking (e.g., USAID 2012). Some argued that 
the focus on resilience risked to leave vulnerable populations behind by ignoring the power 
dynamics that contributed to poverty and vulnerability (Cannon & Müller-Mahn 2010), while 
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others argued that the concept of resilience allowed development actors to refocus on the most 
vulnerable populations (Levine 2014). 
Despite significant focus in the past five years, the development community has still not 
reached a consensus on the definition of resilience, how it relates to vulnerability, whether 
resilience should be considered an attribute or an outcome, and whether resilience is a latent 
concept or is measured by observable well-being outcomes. Important work in this direction has 
been carried out by the Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group, who proposed a set 
of resilience measurement principles, including connections between resilience and vulnerability 
(Constas, Frankenburger, & Hoddinott 2014). Constas provides a convenient framework for 
thinking about different definitions (or interpretations) of resilience: resilience as a  
multidimensional construct, resilience as a predictor, resilience as a property, and resilience as a  
paradigm (Constas (2016) as cited in d’Errico, Garbero, and Constas (2016)). 
In terms of empirical applications, Béné et al. (2014) provide a review of the early 
application of resilience to the field of international development, and begin to develop the 
concept of resilience as a set of capacities. The view that resilience was about agency and quite 
separate from vulnerability was further developed by Béné et al. (2016). Barrett and Constas 
(2014), on the other hand, view resilience as an outcome and emphasize the need for a resilience 
measure that allows for nonlinear well-being dynamics.  
Recent empirical papers, most of which are focused on the Horn of Africa or the Sahel, 
have used latent variable techniques to construct food security resilience indices (Alinovi, Mane, 
& Romano 2010; FAO 2015), principal component analysis to construct vectors of resilience 
capacities (Smith et al. 2015), household welfare dynamics to measure resilience (Vaitla et al. 
2012), imputed counterfactual measures to categorize households based on predicted 
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consumption (Alfani et al. 2015), classifications of households by the speed to which they 
bounce back from shock (Tesso, Emana, & Ketema 2012), and developed a methodology for 
using panel precipitation data to examine the effects of climate shocks on Ethiopian households 
(Vollenweider 2015). Yet despite the view that that resilience must be based around shocks 
(Régibeau & Rockett 2012), few of these empirical papers integrate shocks into their analysis.  
III. Synthesis and Contribution 
The key contribution of my dissertation is a pulling together of these three literatures into 
an empirical framework that acknowledges the importance of assets, path dynamics, and 
stochasticity—as highlighted in the poverty dynamics literature—together with probabilistic 
well-being measurement and prediction. A probabilistic, moments-based approach explicitly 
models mean, variance, and potentially even higher order moments of well-being, much as 
proposed by supporters of vulnerability approaches. This is particularly important as 
development actors increasingly focus on activities that promote resilience by helping farmers 
manage risk. Assessing the impact of these activities on mean well-being without an 
understanding of the conditional variance of well-being limits our ability to understand the risks 
vulnerable populations face and how best to address these risks. 
At the same time, incorporating lagged well-being acknowledges the importance of initial 
asset or well-being conditions. Higher order polynomial lagged well-being terms allow for 
nonlinearities in these path dynamics, as emphasized in the poverty traps literature. Finally, the 
probabilistic development resilience approach I develop in my dissertation, building on the VEP 
approach discussed above, allows researchers and policy-makers to predict out over time, 
making the resilience approach a potentially powerful targeting tool. At the same time, the 
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approach explicitly controls for observed shocks and climactic stress, which is necessary to 
assess resilience in the face of shocks. 
IV. Dissertation Papers 
Paper 1 – Estimating Development Resilience: A Conditional Moments-Based Approach 
For the first paper of my dissertation, Chris Barrett and I develop an empirical strategy 
for estimating resilience based on theoretical work by Barrett and Constas (2014). The issue of 
resilience measurement involves two distinct but related tasks: development resilience estimation 
and aggregation. Resilience estimation is the process by which researchers identify who is 
resilient and who is not. Several methodologies have been proposed in the literature on resilience 
measurement and we review desirable resilience model characteristics, such as stochasticity and 
nonlinearity, as discussed above. 
This dissertation chapter demonstrates how to empirically implement the moments-based 
approach proposed by Barrett and Constas (2014), which allows us to identify who in a given 
population is resilient and who is not, as well as how specific interventions impact resilience or 
how certain characteristics are correlated with household resilience. Although individual- or 
household-level resilience scores are necessary for understanding the micro impacts of policies 
and behaviors, it is useful to be able to aggregate these various household level scores into an 
overall resilience index that is decomposable (and comparable) across subgroups.  
The second part of the paper tackles the resilience aggregation issue, building on the 
seminal poverty measurement work of Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984). As in the first 
section, the aggregation section begins by laying out desirable characteristics for an aggregate 
measure and then demonstrates how an appropriate resilience index can be constructed. Finally, 
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we describe how we can predict resilience in order identify targetable characteristic for 
interventions aimed at boosting the resilience of vulnerable households. We conclude the paper 
with an example of resilience estimation and aggregation using data on livestock holdings from 
Northern Kenya, demonstrating how the empirical strategy discussed in the paper can be carried 
out in practice. 
Paper 2 – The Impacts of Index Insurance On Resilience In Northern Kenya 
In this paper with Munenobu Ikegami, we implement the empirical strategy discussed in 
Paper 1 (above) to evaluate the impact of a livestock insurance program in Northern Kenya on 
participant well-being. Taking advantage of five rounds of panel data from Kenya, including a 
2011 insurance payout following extreme drought, we evaluate the impact of livestock insurance 
on household well-being and resilience in Marsabit. 
The East African context is a particularly interesting setting in which to implement an 
empirical analysis of resilience, given that stochastic poverty traps have been discussed in the 
East African pastoral context for over a decade (e.g., McPeak & Barrett 2001). In order to 
dampen the alarming impacts of drought on livestock-dependent households, an index-based 
livestock insurance (IBLI) program was piloted in Marsabit District (Northern Kenya) beginning 
in January 2010. Households in the IBLI program area decide whether or not to purchase the 
product, as well as how many animals to insure. Should drought cause the normalized difference 
vegetation index (NDVI) to fall below a certain level — a level associated with high animal 
mortality (Chantarat et al. 2013) — the insurance holder receives a payout. IBLI can therefore be 
considered a resilience-building program because it aims to protect against catastrophic livestock 
mortality by allowing households to insure their most important assets against shock. 
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Building on previous work by Barrett and Constas (2014), we propose a third order 
polynomial parametric regression model of stochastic well-being in order to evaluate the impact 
of the insurance product on resilience. The well-being dependent variables of interest are child 
anthropometry (in terms of mid-upper arm circumference) and household livestock holdings (in 
terms of tropical livestock units ). The dynamic model describes current well-being as a function 
of lagged well-being and a series of explanatory variables. Since the insurance uptake decision is 
likely endogenous to any measure of household welfare, we exploit the random distribution of 
coupons, which in this context can serve as an exogenous shifter of insurance demand, as an 
instrument for insurance participation. We also use predicted catastrophic livestock mortality 
data as a proxy for weather shocks. 
We find that insurance in the previous season increases a household’s resilience in terms 
of livestock holdings, whether a drought occurred or not. We explore how changing the well-
being threshold impacts the results and find that the positive impacts of past season insurance on 
TLU resilience are statistically significant for thresholds of 20 TLU and above. Shifting the well-
being threshold allows us to determine that IBLI it does not effectively increase the resilience of 
the poorest households with the smallest initial herds. It does, however, dramatically increase the 
resilience of slightly better-off households and appears to allow them to invest more in their 
herds while avoiding protective over-stocking.  
Given the small sample size of young children and the survey design, we are not able to 
exploit the instrumental variable for our analysis of the impact of insurance on child health. We 
do however see a positive association between insurance and child health resilience during 
droughts. There appears to be no relationship between past season’s IBLI coverage and 
probabilities of subsequently becoming severely acutely malnourished in non-drought years.  
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Paper 3 –Livelihood Diversification and Well-Being in Uganda: A Development Resilience 
Approach 
In this final paper, I use a large-scale, nationally representative household survey to 
explore the relationship between livelihood diversification and development resilience in terms 
of household per adult equivalent expenditures in rural Uganda. Despite the fact that 
diversification is often cited as an important risk management strategy with potential for 
increasing resilience, this paper provides one of the first empirical assessments of the 
relationship between crop and income diversification and resilience in the face of shocks. 
I begin by reviewing the literature on diversification, including theories about whether 
farming households are pulled into diversification as they enter into higher return activities, or 
whether they are pushed into diversification as a strategy for managing risks and coping with 
shock. I briefly discuss various measures of diversification used in the literature, before 
proposing a transformed Herfindahl index to measure crop and income diversification at the 
household level.  
Holding total income, as well as shares of wage and self-employment income, constant, I 
find that income diversification is negatively associated with increased resilience. For the least 
resilient households, crop diversification is also negatively associated with resilience. Once the 
poverty threshold is increased, however, crop diversification is positively and statistically 
significantly associated with increases in resilience. This is not as a result of diversification into 
cash crops, which are associated with decreases in conditional mean expenditures and with 
decreased resilience, as well.  
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CHAPTER 1 
ESTIMATING DEVELOPMENT RESILIENCE:  
A CONDITIONAL MOMENTS-BASED APPROACH 
 
Jennifer Denno Cissé and Christopher B. Barrett
 
 
I. Introduction 
Over the past several years, natural disasters, food price and macroeconomic shocks, and 
conflict have prompted recurring humanitarian emergencies in many of the world’s lowest 
income countries. In direct response, international development and relief agencies have become 
preoccupied with the concept of resilience, committing increasingly large amounts of funding, 
programming, and research toward “building resilience.” They struggle, however, to develop 
methods to implement the concept empirically so as to guide policy and project design, measure 
progress, and evaluate interventions. At the same time, the concept of development resilience has 
the potential to draw together the strengths of several distinct economics literatures on the 
estimation of stochastic well-being dynamics. The opportunity is thus ripe for methodological 
contributions to help advance both operational and research agendas.  
In his seminal work on poverty measurement, Sen (1979) discusses the need for both 
poverty “identification” (i.e., determining who is poor) and “aggregation” (i.e., establishing how 
characteristics of the poor can be combined into an aggregate indicator) to guide policy. The 
emergent development resilience agenda has similar measurement needs. Toward that end, we 
introduce an econometric strategy to estimate individual or household-level development 
resilience, so as to identify the targetable characteristics of those who are (and are not) resilient, 
and then demonstrate how to aggregate those micro-level estimates into policy-relevant measures 
2 
useful for targeting and impact evaluation purposes.  This approach usefully synthesizes the 
distinct poverty dynamics, risk, and vulnerability literatures active within economics more 
broadly.  
We follow the Barrett and Constas (2014, p.14626, hereafter BC) conceptualization of 
development resilience
1
 as “the capacity over time of a person, household or other aggregate unit 
to avoid poverty in the face of various stressors and in the wake of myriad shocks. If and only if 
that capacity is and remains high over time, then the unit is resilient.” By couching resilience in 
terms of stochastic well-being dynamics, BC point towards a definition that can be implemented 
empirically. To do so, we draw on the risk literature to estimate multiple conditional moments of 
a welfare function specified, following the poverty traps literature, to include potentially 
nonlinear path dynamics. Like the vulnerability literature, the aim is a forward-looking, 
probabilistic measure of well-being that can be used for targeting and program evaluation. Then, 
like the poverty measurement literature, we demonstrate how the individual-specific estimates 
can be aggregated into a decomposable measure useful for policy and operational purposes, such 
as targeting scarce resources or evaluating the potentially-heterogeneous impacts of policies and 
programs on different sub-populations.  
We close by illustrating the method with an empirical example using household panel 
data from pastoralist communities in northern Kenya. The results demonstrate the method’s 
potential for identifying who is and is not resilient and when, as well as for generating aggregate 
measures of development resilience. We also briefly discuss prospective extensions of this 
approach to impact evaluation, multidimensional well-being measures, more sophisticated 
                                                 
1
 Although the term is the same, different fields employ different concepts of ‘resilience.’ See Folke (2006) for a 
nice review of the concept in the ecology and engineering literatures and Barrett and Constas (2014) for a discussion 
of why that concept must be adapted for international development or broader economic applications. 
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estimation of the underlying conditional moments, and the data needs to permit more widespread 
empirical implementation of such methods.    
II. Development Resilience Estimation 
Despite a growing, primarily non-economic, recent literature on development resilience 
(e.g., Cannon & Müller-Mahn 2010, Robinson & Berkes 2010, Davoudi 2012, BC, Béné et al. 
2014, Levine 2014), no peer-reviewed measures
2
 have been proposed and applied empirically in 
the development context. The BC approach suggests a path forward based on integration of 
several distinct empirical literatures in economics.  BC explicitly motivate their approach from 
the poverty dynamics and traps literatures that emphasize the possibility of nonlinear well-being 
dynamics and asset-based poverty traps (Carter & May 2001; Lybbert et al. 2004; Carter & 
Barrett 2006; Barrett & Carter 2013; McKay & Perge 2013). However, that literature focuses 
largely on ex post analysis of well-being. The vulnerability literature (e.g., Christiaensen & 
Boisvert 2000; Chaudhuri, Jalan, & Suryahadi 2002; Hoddinott & Quisumbing 2003), on the 
other hand, emphasizes probabilistic ex ante measures, although it overlooks the prospective 
importance of nonlinear path dynamics. But it is unnecessary to forsake dynamics in order to 
generate forward-looking estimates. BC’s definition implies that an economic measure of 
development resilience ought to be both probabilistic (building on the vulnerability literature) 
and allow for the possibility of nonlinear well-being dynamics (as per the poverty traps 
literature). By tapping established methods for estimating conditional moment functions, as 
developed in the empirical risk literature (Just & Pope 1979, Antle 1983), we offer an approach 
to estimating probabilistic ex ante well-being dynamics. Then by adapting the seminal work of 
                                                 
2
   Several empirical papers have emerged in the grey literature, for example, Alinovi, Mane, & Romano (2010), 
Smith et al. (2015), Vaitla et al. (2012), Alfani et al. (2015), and Vollenweider (2015). 
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Foster, Greer & Thorbecke (1984, hereafter FGT), we can turn the individual estimates into 
aggregate measures decomposable into subgroups that naturally lend themselves to targeting for 
policy and project interventions. We emphasize that none of the component methods we use are 
original; the novelty of the method arises from their integration into implementable, theory-based 
measures of development resilience.  
BC represent development resilience using a conditional moment function for well-being, 
specifically 𝑚𝑖
𝑘(𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝑠|𝑊𝑖𝑡, 𝑿𝑖,𝑡+𝑠, 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+𝑠), where 𝑚𝑖
𝑘 is the k
th
 moment of individual i’s well-
being, W, in period t+s (for s>0), a function of well-being in period t, a set of individual-, 
household- and community-level covariates, X, and random disturbances, ϵ. An individual’s 
well-being is therefore considered a random variable, with its own distribution in each period. 
One might use any of a host of well-being measures, depending on the context, from stock 
measures such as asset holdings or anthropometric indicators of health status to flow measures 
such as expenditures or income. The convention in the empirical poverty traps literature is to 
estimate only the first moment, the expected path dynamics of well-being, but to allow for 
potentially nonlinear path dynamics, as reflected either in a high-order polynomial in W_t 
(Lokshin & Ravallion 2004, Barrett et al. 2006, Antman & McKenzie 2007) or nonparametric or 
semiparametric estimation of a first-order Markov process (Lybbert et al., 2004; Adato, Carter, 
& May 2006; Naschold 2013). That literature to date has largely ignored heteroscedasticity and 
other non-constant higher-order central moments in the estimated path dynamics.  
The standard approach in the vulnerability literature, by contrast, is to estimate both the 
conditional mean and the conditional variance but to ignore prospective nonlinearity in the path 
dynamics by assuming, at best, a linear first-order autoregressive process. The development and 
humanitarian agencies’ current focus on resilience originates in the intersection of vulnerability 
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to shocks and the apparent existence of poverty traps among the remote (commonly drylands 
pastoralist) populations on which much of the resilience discourse focuses. So it seems sensible 
to take an approach to measurement that integrates the distinct strengths of each of these two 
literatures, as BC’s theory allows.  
We model the mean (indicated by the M subscript) stochastic well-being of individual or 
household i (household hereafter because in our empirical illustration we use a household-level 
indicator of well-being) in period t (𝑊𝑖𝑡) parametrically as a polynomial function (𝑔) of lagged 
well-being (𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1), and a vector of household characteristics, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, including shocks directly 
experienced by i or risks to which i is exposed: 
(1) 𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔𝑀(𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝛽𝑀) + 𝜹𝐌𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝑢𝑀𝑖𝑡. 
We assume a first-order Markov process for both conceptual and practical reasons. Conceptually, 
a lag is necessary to allow for persistence in the impact of previous period well-being on the 
future. At the same time, well-being (like wealth) is a state variable which summarizes all prior 
states, meaning only one lag is necessary. Empirically, incorporating a second lag would 
decrease the number of rounds of panel data available for analysis; the use of a single lag is 
economical while also addressing possible autocorrelation in the errors of the panel data. A cubic 
specification would be the most parsimonious parametric specification that allows for the S-
shaped dynamics typical of systems characterized by multiple equilibria poverty traps (Barrett et 
al. 2006), although higher order polynomials may be used. 
Using E to represent the expectation operator, a caret (^) to represent predicted values, 
and assuming that the random error term 𝑢𝑀𝑖𝑡 is mean zero (𝐸[𝑢𝑀𝑖𝑡] = 0), the conditional mean 
for household i at time t (𝜇1𝑖𝑡) can be written  
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(2) Conditional Mean: ?̂?1𝑖𝑡 ≡ ?̂?[𝑊𝑖𝑡|𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕] = 𝑔𝑀(𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, ?̂?𝑀) + ?̂?𝐌𝑿𝒊𝒕. 
Following Just & Pope (1979) and Antle (1983), and using a subscript V to indicate 
variance, the population second central moment can be expressed: 
(3) 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝑔𝑉(𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝛽𝑉) + 𝜹𝐕𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝑢𝑉𝑖𝑡.  
We can then use the mean zero squared residuals from equation (1), ?̂?𝑀𝑖𝑡, to estimate the second 
central moment equation. Under the standard assumption that 𝐸[𝑢𝑉𝑖𝑡] = 0, we can estimate the 
conditional variance for household i at time t (?̂?2𝑖𝑡) as: 
(4) Conditional Variance: ?̂?2𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝑔𝑉(𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, ?̂?𝑉) + ?̂?𝐕𝑿𝒊𝒕. 
The empirical strategy, discussed below, should take into consideration that the conditional 
variance must be non-negative. One can accommodate this either by using the log of ?̂?𝑖𝑡
2  as the 
dependent variable in (4) or by making particular distributional assumptions that impose non-
negativity.  
If one is prepared to make the strong assumption that 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 is distributed normally, 
lognormally, or gamma, these two predicted conditional moment estimates, {?̂?1𝑖𝑡, ?̂?2𝑖𝑡} suffice to 
describe household i’s conditional well-being distribution at time t. It would be relatively 
straightforward to relax the distributional assumption and compute higher-order central 
conditional moments, such as skewness (𝜇3𝑖𝑡) or kurtosis (𝜇4𝑖𝑡), to accommodate asymmetries or 
peakedness, respectively, in a more general distribution. Accommodating more moments is 
somewhat more demanding computationally, but tractable for a range of distributions. For 
example, a generalized (four-parameter) beta distribution is a highly-flexible, unimodal 
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distribution that could be estimated off of four estimated conditional central moments. In order to 
identify the household-specific distribution parameters, one could then use the method of 
moments, as described by Bury (1999). In the interests of brevity we impose a gamma and a 
lognormal distribution in the empirical illustration below and leave extension to higher-order 
moments to future work.  
 The assumed distribution functional form and the estimated moments jointly 
enable estimation of the household-and-period-specific conditional well-being probability 
density function and associated complementary cumulative density function (ccdf).
3
 Once we 
have estimated the household-and-period-specific ccdf, we can use it to estimate the probability 
of household i reaching some normative minimum standard of well-being in time t. We follow 
the BC framework, defining development resilience as the probability that household i will have 
well-being in period t above some normative threshold, W. For the time series defined by s ≥ 0, 
we can therefore define a household’s development resilience as the estimated complementary 
cumulative probability based on the sequence of estimated probabilities: (?̂?𝑖)𝑠=1
𝑇  where 
(5)  ?̂?𝑖𝑠 ≡ 𝑃(𝑊𝑖,𝑠 ≥ 𝑊|𝑊𝑖,𝑠−1, 𝑿𝑖,𝑠) = ?̅?𝑊𝑖,𝑠(𝑊; ?̂?1𝑖,𝑠(𝑊𝑖,𝑠, 𝑿𝒊,𝒔), ?̂?2𝑖,𝑠(𝑊𝑖,𝑠, 𝑿𝒊,𝒔)),  
and ?̅?(∙) is the assumed ccdf.   
                                                 
3
 An alternative approach would be to use moment generating functions (MGF) to identify the underlying 
conditional distribution functions, without assuming a particular distribution function. But while the MGF approach 
holds appeal in theory because it is less restrictive, in practice it can be difficult to identify a distribution function of 
unspecified form without a very large data set. In small data sets, the MGF approach often results in imprecise 
measures of the tails of the distribution, which are of particular concern in our case, as we explain below. To avoid 
these challenges, we assume a functional form for the underlying well-being distribution. 
8 
We can use this estimate to evaluate the impact of specific characteristics or programs 
today on the development resilience of households (or other units, such as individuals) at time t: 
𝜕?̂?𝑖𝑡/𝜕𝑋𝑖𝑡. We empirically estimate this derivative as follows, using a subscript R to indicate 
resilience: 
(6) ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔𝑅(𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝛽𝑅) + 𝜹𝐑𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝑢𝑅𝑖𝑡, 
where ?̂?𝑖𝑡 indicates the estimated probability of household i meeting or exceeding the 
normative well-being threshold W at time t.  
 Although same-period household development resilience can be calculated as 
described in (5), it is also possible to forecast household development resilience forward by 
computing it recursively. This computation replaces the lag with current period (realized) well-
being 𝑊𝑖𝑡, employs the estimated coefficients ?̂? from (2) and (4) above and requires making only 
a few assumptions on the progression over time of household characteristics and shocks (?̈?): 
(7) ?̂?𝑖,𝑡+1 ≡ 𝑃(𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1 ≥ 𝑊|𝑊𝑖𝑡, 𝑿𝑖,𝑡+1) = ?̅?𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1(𝑊; ?̂?1𝑖,𝑡+1, ?̂?2𝑖,𝑡+1) 
where ?̂?1𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑔𝑀(𝑊𝑖𝑡, ?̈?𝒊,𝒕+𝟏, ?̂?𝑀) + ?̂?𝐌?̈?𝒊,𝒕+𝟏 and ?̂?2𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑔𝑉(𝑊𝑖𝑡, ?̈?𝒊,𝒕+𝟏, ?̂?𝑉) + ?̂?𝐕?̈?𝒊,𝒕+𝟏. 
For periods beyond t + 1, the household’s lagged well-being should be drawn at random from 
the previous period’s well-being distribution. This approach could also be used to simulate 
resilience responses to shocks by including various simulated shocks in ?̈?. 
The continuous measure, ?̂?𝑖𝑡, can also be used to categorize a household as resilient or 
not resilient with reference to some normative minimal threshold probability, P, at/under which 
we consider a household’s probability of reaching or surpassing W (the minimum adequate well-
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being level) intolerably low.  If and only if ?̂?𝑖𝑡 ≥  𝑃 then we classify household i as development 
resilient in period t. Then the ?̂?𝑖𝑡 estimates can be turned into a dichotomous variable, 𝜃𝑖𝑡, that 
takes value one if the household is deemed resilient and zero if it is not. That is, 
(8) 𝜃𝑖𝑡 ≡  
1 𝑖𝑓 ?̂?𝑖𝑡 ≥  𝑃 
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
. 
The 𝜃𝑖𝑡 variable can be analyzed in the same way as binary poverty or other indicator variables.  
 A number of extensions to this approach follow reasonably directly. First, one 
could use interval criteria defined by two normative cut-offs in W space, as might be appropriate, 
for example, for an indicator such as body mass index for which values beneath one critical 
value (i.e., underweight) or above a different critical value (i.e., overweight) both signal an 
undesirable state of well-being. For such criteria, one simply replaces the ccdf in equation (5) 
with difference in the cumulative densities between the two thresholds.  
Second, we can extend this approach to multidimensional well-being by joint estimation 
of equations (1) and (3), so as to enjoy efficiency gains in the estimation of each well-being 
metric’s conditional moments. Then one would need to determine whether the normative 
criterion for a j-dimensional measure requires satisfaction of the minimum standard in each 
dimension j (i.e., ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑗 ≥  𝑃𝑗  ∀ 𝑗) – the intersection of the unidimensional criteria – or just in any 
dimension (i.e., ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑗 ≥  𝑃𝑗  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑗) – the union of the unidimensional criteria.   
There are multiple prospective practical uses of the sequence (𝜌𝑖)𝑠=0
𝑇  in support of 
operational efforts to build resilience. First, if an element of the X vector is plausibly exogenous 
(e.g., a weather shock, a randomized policy intervention), then one can identify associated 
changes in the estimated probabilities, as reflected in the corresponding element of the 𝜹𝐑 vector, 
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as causal and rigorously evaluate claims of “resilience building” using established inferential 
methods. We illustrate such inferential uses of this approach in the empirical example below.  
Second, operational agencies routinely need to target interventions, whether by recipient 
characteristic, seasonal or geographical characteristics, or some other covariate. For this purpose, 
the associations in the 𝜹𝐑 vector can prove useful even if they cannot be interpreted as causal 
because the relevant elements of the X vector are potentially endogenous. Indeed, the ability to 
generate s-period-ahead estimates, ?̂?𝑖𝑡+𝑠, enables one to establish which period t (i.e., current) 
covariates are most strongly and statistically significantly correlated with that forward-looking 
measure. Moreover, this approach offers the possibility to improve prediction if there are 
predictable intertemporal patterns such as arise from path dynamics in the underlying well-being 
variable. Relative to the prevailing approach of assuming current (i.e., period t) values will equal 
future values in the absence of intervention – equivalent to assuming a random walk process in 
the W variable – to predict s-period-ahead values, this new method may achieve significant 
forecasting gains. Moreover, by adjusting P an operational agency can choose which sort of 
targeting errors it favors, errors of exclusion or of inclusion, as we demonstrate below. The 
prevailing approach does not allow that sort of tailoring of targeting strategies.  
Third, using appropriate discount rates, the sequence (𝜌𝑖)𝑠=0
𝑇  might be added up over 
time, providing a discounted, intertemporal measure of resilience similar to Calvo & Dercon’s 
(2007) measure of chronic poverty. By aggregating our development resilience measure over 
time, one could assess the long-run impacts of shocks or policies. This type of intertemporal 
measure could also be used as a state variable in a dynamical system, allowing for development 
resilience analysis in coupled human-natural systems. 
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Finally, these measures can be used to identify development resilience indicators at more 
aggregated scales of analysis. We now turn to this task of development resilience aggregation, to 
follow Sen’s (1979) term, which represents a straightforward adaptation of today’s workhorse 
FGT class of decomposable poverty measures to the individual measures just introduced. 
III. Development Resilience Aggregation 
Sen describes the aggregation process as “some method of combining deprivations of 
different people into some over-all indicator” (Sen 1979, p.288). While the approach discussed in 
Section II allows us to identify the level of development resilience of a specific unit (such as an 
individual or household), we would also like to summarize the development resilience of the 
micro units into one overall sub-population or population-level resilience measure, the aggregate 
resilience index R. 
Even before Foster, Greer, & Thorbecke (1984) proposed a class of decomposable 
poverty measures, now known simply as the FGT poverty measures, certain desirable attributes 
for poverty measures had been discussed in the literature. Sen (1976) highlights some of the 
shortcomings of the headcount ratio, such as its violation of the monotonicity and transfer 
axioms.
4
 Sen proposed a poverty measure that meets additional desirable characteristics he sets 
out, including “relative equity,”5  and conveniently lies between 0 and 1. Sen also argues that a 
                                                 
4
 The Monotonicity Axiom states: “Given other things, a reduction in income of a person below the poverty line 
must increase the poverty measure” (Sen 1976, p.219). The Transfer Axiom states: “Given other things, a pure 
transfer of income from a person below the poverty line to anyone who is richer must increase the poverty measure” 
(Sen 1976, p.219). 
5
 Relative Equity requires “that if person i is accepted to be worse off than person j in a given income configuration 
y, then the weight vi on the income short-fall gi of the worse-off person i should be greater than the weight vj on the 
income short-fall gj” (Sen 1976, p. 221). 
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poverty measure would ideally combine “considerations of absolute and relative deprivation 
even after a set of minimum needs and a poverty line have been fixed” (Sen 1979, p.293). 
Another desirable feature of any aggregate measure is the ability to attribute shares of the 
overall development resilience indicator to various subgroups. The population-weighted sum of 
the subgroup measures would therefore equal the measure for the whole group. While the 
measure proposed by Sen is not decomposable in this way, FGT (1984) proposed an entire class 
of decomposable poverty measures and illustrated how the measures meet Sen’s (1976, 1979) 
various axioms. The FGT (1984) poverty measures serve as a logical jumping off point in the 
search for an additive development resilience measure that meets Sen’s axiomatic requirements.  
As a quick refresher, for a vector of household incomes, y, ordered from lowest to 
highest, poverty line z > 0, and income gap 𝑔𝑖 ≡ 𝑧 − 𝑦𝑖, there are q households in a population 
of size n at or below the poverty line. FGT (1984) proposed the measure 𝑃𝛼(𝑦; 𝑧) =
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑧
)
𝛼
𝑞
𝑖=1 , 
which meets the Sen criteria and is additively decomposable with population share weights for 
different subpopulations of n. When 𝛼 = 0 this is equivalent to the headcount ratio, when 𝛼 =
1 this is equivalent to the poverty gap index, and when 𝛼 = 2 it is the poverty severity index, 
also known as the squared poverty gap index (Haughton & Khandker 2009). By weighting each 
household’s poverty gap by its proportion of the gap, the squared index not only considers 
absolute deprivation (by focusing on those below the poverty line z), but also relative deprivation 
(placing higher weights on those further below the poverty line).  
Following FGT (1984), we propose a decomposable development resilience indicator that 
aggregates the individual- or household-specific development resilience probabilities, ?̂?𝑖𝑡, 
developed in Section II across the population into a single economy-wide measure that is also 
decomposable to describe distinct sub-populations. Just as with the FGT family of measures 
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from which the development resilience index is adapted, this measure meets the monotonicity, 
transfer, and relative equity axioms proposed by Sen in addition to being additively 
decomposable among groups. A demonstration of how this measure satisfies the various axioms 
set forth by Sen (1976, 1979) and FGT can be found in Appendix A. 
Assume a normative resilience probability threshold of P (1 ≥ 𝑃 ≥ 0), as discussed 
above, at/under which we consider a household’s probability of reaching or surpassing W (the 
normative threshold well-being level discussed in Section II) to be intolerably low. The 
resilience analyst must therefore select two normative thresholds, W and P, which may be 
context specific. Suppressing time period subscripts for now, we generate a vector   of 
household development resilience measures in time period t + s ordered from lowest to highest 
values, 𝝆 = (?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3, … , ?̂?𝑛; 𝑊) for a total number of n households. With this information we 
can count the number of non-resilient households, q, for which the household resilience 
probability falls at or below the resilience probability threshold 𝑞 = 𝑞(𝝆; 𝑃), as well as the 
resilience shortfall (measured in probabilities) for those households 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑃 − ?̂?𝑖. In the index, 
this gap is then weighted by α, a distribution sensitivity parameter that FGT refer to as the 
measure of poverty aversion.  
The sum of the weighted gaps is subtracted from one to ensure that larger numbers 
signify increased resilience. The decomposable resilience index is therefore defined for period t 
+ s as 
(9) 𝑅𝛼,𝑡+𝑠(𝝆𝒕+𝒔; 𝑊, 𝑃) ≡ 1 − [
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑔𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
𝑃
)
𝛼𝑞𝑡+𝑠
𝑖=1 ],  
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and the sequence of resilience indices, (𝑅𝛼,𝑡+𝑠)𝑠=0
𝑇
, would represent aggregate resilience over 
time to horizon period T. The measure necessarily lies on the closed interval [0,1], with R = 0 if 
each household in the population has a development resilience probability estimate ?̂?𝑖 < 𝑃 ∀ 𝑖 ∈
𝑛, and R = 1 if ?̂?𝑖 ≥ 𝑃 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑛, implying q = 0. This approach allows us to calculate the 
population share deemed resilient (i.e., development resilience headcount ratio) when 𝛼 = 0 
(𝐻𝑅 ≡
𝑛−𝑞
𝑛
), mean development resilience of non-resilient household (?̅?𝑞 =
∑ ?̂?𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1
𝑞
), as well as the 
resilience-gap ratio (𝐺 ≡ ∑
𝑔𝑖
𝑞𝑃
𝑞
𝑖=1 ). It is therefore well suited for situations in which resilience 
indices would be useful for targeting or for policy/project evaluation. Given that the poor are the 
least economically resilient by the BC definition, and for any measure based on a poverty-related 
welfare indicator, W, the measure is inherently pro-poor. 
IV. An Empirical Example 
To illustrate this method, we now employ the development resilience estimation and 
aggregation techniques discussed above using household data from northern Kenya. The Horn of 
Africa is a particularly relevant context for the implementation of a resilience measure, as the 
2011 drought in the region was one of the main drivers of governmental and non-governmental 
organization interest in resilience. In northern Kenya, pastoralist communities —considered to be 
some of the poorest and most vulnerable in the country—rely heavily on livestock (especially 
cattle, although also camels, goats, and sheep to a lesser extent) to generate most or all of their 
income. Few other livelihoods are viable given agroecological conditions and meager modern 
infrastructure (McPeak, Little, & Doss 2012). These households are incredibly vulnerable to 
weather shocks, such as drought, which can decimate herds. Prior research in the area has 
established, in multiple data sets, that multiple equilibrium poverty traps exist in livestock 
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holdings, and that drought risk is a key driver of households’ collapse into persistent poverty 
(Lybbert et al. 2004, Barrett et al. 2006, Santos and Barrett 2011).  
To help pastoral and agro-pastoral populations manage drought-related livestock 
mortality, an index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) product was piloted in northern Kenya 
beginning in January 2010 (Chantarat et al. 2013). Rainfall in Northern Kenya is bimodal, so the 
insurance product was designed to be marketed and sold twice annually, although each insurance 
contract protects the insured for an entire calendar year. The IBLI product uses normalized 
difference vegetation index (NDVI) estimates derived from satellite data to predict livestock 
mortality. When predicted livestock mortality due to drought, as reflected in low NDVI values, 
reaches catastrophic levels (contractually defined as 15% estimated area average loss), the 
insurance policy pays out. The benefit of an index-based insurance product is that premiums are 
much lower than for indemnity products, especially in remote locations. They also avoid moral 
hazard concerns that might prevent the development (or increase the price) of a traditional 
insurance product. During the five rounds of data, a catastrophic drought occurred once, between 
rounds two and three. 
The data used in this example were collected to evaluate the impact of the insurance 
program by a consortium led by the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), in 
collaboration with private insurance providers, using a multi-year impact evaluation strategy 
(ILRI 2013). The household surveys gathered information from 924 randomly selected 
households from sixteen sublocations
6
 in Marsabit County, including general demographic 
                                                 
6
 All administrative divisions in Marsabit were included. The sublocations vary in terms of pastoral system, ethnic 
group makeup, agro-ecology and market accessibility. The number of households from each sublocation was 
determined by proportional allocation within set minimum and maximum bounds. For more information see the 
survey codebook (ILRI 2013). 
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variables as well as data on livestock holdings and production, risk and insurance, livelihood 
activities, expenditure and consumption, assets, and savings and credit. Five rounds
7
 of the 
longitudinal annual survey have been administered each October-November, beginning in 2009 
(prior to the first insurance sales window).  
The IBLI product uses normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI) estimates derived 
from satellite data to predict livestock mortality. When predicted livestock mortality due to 
drought, as reflected in low NDVI values, reaches catastrophic levels (contractually defined as 
15% estimated area average loss), the insurance policy pays out. During the five rounds of data, 
a catastrophic drought occurred once, between rounds two and three. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics. We distinguish between fully settled households that 
never relocated do not practice transhumance and those partially or fully nomadic households 
that relocated, at least seasonally, as they migrated their herds over longer distances in search of 
forage and water. Nearly two-thirds of the sample is (at least partly) nomadic. Sedentarized 
households have significantly fewer livestock holdings, greater (albeit still limited) educational 
attainment, and are much more likely to practice Islam. The pooled sample attrition rate is 
approximately 2%. Of these, some households are absent for a given round and then reappear in 
subsequent rounds.
8
 Attrited households are somewhat more likely to be Catholic and have 
slightly fewer livestock holdings than the mean household. The dependency ratio is higher for 
                                                 
7
 Five rounds of the data are available and used in this analysis. Since we use lagged variables, the first round of the 
data is not used (with the exception of the lagged well-being (livestock) data). A sixth round of data has recently 
been collected but has not yet been included in this analysis. 
8
 Due to the lagged variable in our estimation, the household that is not contacted in one round is actually absent 
from the estimation for that round and the next, and the household is counted as attrited in both rounds. 
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attrited households, which may partially explain why no one was available to respond to the 
survey during a given round. 
Development Resilience Estimation 
Because most survey households hold a large share of their wealth in livestock and 
depend heavily on livestock to generate income, livestock holdings offer a logical (and 
commonplace) measure of well-being in pastoralist settings. The primary household well-being 
variable of interest, therefore, is household aggregate livestock holdings, expressed in tropical 
livestock units (1 TLU = 1 cow = 0.7 camel = 10 sheep or goats) in each survey round.  
TLU holdings are estimated via maximum likelihood, per equation (1), as a polynomial 
function of lagged well-being (i.e., TLU from the previous period), a dummy variable indicating 
a serious drought (i.e., area average predicted losses ≥ 15% per the IBLI index), the sex of the 
household head, the age and squared age of the household head to account for life cycle effects, 
the number of years of education for the household head, the household dependency ratio, and 
controls for religious affiliation and nomadic status:  
(10) 𝑊𝑖𝑡 = ∑ ?̂?𝑀𝛾𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1
𝛾4
𝛾=1 + 𝜹𝐌𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝑢𝑀𝑖𝑡. 
As mentioned above, a third order polynomial in lagged TLU holdings is the most 
parsimonious that can accommodate the S-shaped herd dynamics found in prior studies in the 
region (Barrett et al. 2006). For this empirical example, tests of the various polynomial 
specifications can be found in Table B1 in Appendix B. In this case, the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) values are decreasing in polynomial order, suggesting a higher order 
specification would be preferred. However, the coefficient estimates on the higher order lagged 
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well-being terms are effectively zero. A t-test on the equality of means between the predicted 
values of the higher-order specifications finds statistically insignificant differences for 
everything above and including the fourth order. Therefore, the fourth order specification is 
preferred in this case. 
Given that physical livestock holdings must be non-negative, the dependent variable is 
assumed to be distributed Poisson. The generalized linear model (GLM) log link regression is fit 
using maximum likelihood and Table 2 column (1) displays the marginal effects estimates for 
mean TLU well-being, as well as for low and high values of lagged TLU holdings. Consistent 
with prior studies of east African livestock wealth dynamics, herd dynamics are statistically 
significantly nonlinear, as evidenced by the difference between the marginal effect at a low value 
of past period TLU holdings and at a high value. Marginal effects at the mean of all covariates 
are presented in the bolded, middle column. Figure 1 displays estimated herd dynamics based on 
the marginal effects calculated in Table 2 column (1), valuing other covariates at sample means.  
Although there is evidence of S-shaped TLU dynamics, unlike prior empirical studies of herd 
dynamics using earlier datasets from the region, there is no evidence of multiple TLU equilibria, 
although this could simply reflect limited recovery time from the catastrophic 2011 drought in a 
short sample. Rather, this parametric estimation suggests a unique stable dynamic equilibrium at 
approximately 6 TLU. The coefficient estimate on drought is, as expected, strongly and 
statistically significantly negative, with an estimated average 2.4 TLU loss in a major drought 
associated with a one unit increase in lagged TLU, representing an 18% average loss relative to 
sample mean livestock holdings. For households with low past period livestock holdings, the 
marginal effect of drought—while still statistically significantly negative—is smaller in absolute 
terms, but actually represents a slightly larger proportion of their livestock holdings (20%). 
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Holding previous period herd size constant, female headed households have statistically 
significantly smaller herds than male headed households, as do households with more 
dependents. The coefficient estimates on the age of the household head and on his/her education 
are not statistically significantly different from zero. 
Following equation (3), we capture the residuals from the mean well-being equation just 
reported, square them, and use these values to estimate the conditional variance equation, also 
via maximum likelihood,
9
  
(11) ?̂?𝑖𝑡
2 = ∑ ?̂?𝑉𝛾𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1
𝛾4
𝛾=1 + 𝜹𝐕𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝑢𝑉𝑖𝑡. 
The estimates for the TLU variance equation can be found in column (2) of Table 2, 
again displayed at various values of lagged TLU holdings. There is statistically significant 
nonlinear autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity as reflected in the coefficient estimates of 
lagged herd size; the marginal effect of lagged TLU on conditional variance is 60% larger for 
households with higher previous period TLU holdings. Drought and the dependency ratio are 
also statistically significantly (and negatively) related to the conditional variance of herd size, 
while the other covariates are not. This indicates that there is less variance in times of drought, 
indicating that drought suppresses variation while it also lowers mean well-being. 
Using the estimates from columns (1) and (2) in Table 2, we can estimate each 
household’s TLU probability density function (pdf) for each period. Figure 2 shows how the 
estimated TLU pdfs—in this case based on the gamma distribution10—vary, both over time and 
                                                 
9
 As with the mean equation, the dependent variable (variance) must be non-negative. As such, once again we 
assume the dependent variable is distributed Poisson and fit the GLM log link regression using maximum likelihood. 
10
 Distribution parameters for the gamma distribution are: 𝑊𝑡|𝑊𝑡−1~Γ(
𝜇2𝑡
𝜇1𝑡
,
𝜇1𝑡
2
𝜇2𝑡
), based on Bury (1999). 
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across households: Household 1024 is a female-headed, fully settled household fairly typical of 
that sub-group in terms of livestock holdings, education, and age, while Household 5022 is a 
male-headed, nomadic household with TLU holdings near that sub-group’s mean. The former 
household is markedly poorer in terms of livestock than the latter, with lower expected TLU 
levels across all periods. Although the round following the drought shock (Round 3) sees a 
marked decrease in resilience for the female headed household, the household well-being 
improves markedly in the two post shock years, as reflected in leftward and rightward shifts of 
the pdfs, respectively. In fact, the household is able to achieve higher resilience in Rounds 4 and 
5 than in the initial period. Although household 5022 is relatively well-off in terms of TLU 
holdings, it is also dramatically affected by the drought shock; household well-being falls to its 
lowest levels during Round 3. The household is able to fully recover in Round 4 before being 
impacted by an idiosyncratic shock in the final round. 
After calculating the household-specific pdfs, the next step is to estimate each 
household’s probability of achieving the normative minimum well-being (W) in each period. We 
set the threshold level at 6 TLU (W = 6), which is the critical livestock threshold previously 
identified in the literature for this region of northern Kenya (Barrett et al. 2006). This threshold is 
represented in Figure 2 by the vertical line. The household-specific development resilience 
estimate for each period, ?̂?𝑖𝑡, is simply household i’s complementary cumulative probability 
beyond the threshold value, W, in period t, per equation (5). Each household-period-specific 
resilience score therefore lies in the interval [0,1].  
Following equation (6), we can regress these household-and-period-specific resilience 
scores on the same regressors used in the mean and variance equations, as follows: 
(12) ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = ∑ ?̂?𝑅𝛾𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1
𝛾4
𝛾=1 + 𝜹𝐑𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝑢𝑅𝑖𝑡. 
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We do this estimation because the resilience score is a nonlinear function of the (linear) 
estimates of the conditional mean and conditional variance. The fractional response estimates
11
 
for household resilience scores can be found in Table 2 column (3). We see strong evidence of 
non-linear relationships between lagged livestock holdings and development resilience. As seen 
in the coefficient estimates of the marginal effects at various lagged period livestock holding 
sizes, resilience increases quickly with each additional lagged TLU at first, but increases more 
slowly for larger lagged values. This can be clearly seen in Figure 3 by comparing the slopes of 
the curve at the various prior period livestock holding (lagged TLU) levels.
12
 Figure 3 also 
illustrates that, while the conditional mean regression estimates suggest a dynamic equilibrium 
herd size of about 6 TLU (Figure 1), household resilience actually increases monotonically in 
prior period herd size. This suggests that while households may incur a cost to TLU holdings 
larger than 6, they might overstock optimally as a form of self-insurance intended to increase 
resilience, following precautionary saving principles.  
As intuition would suggest, drought decreases household resilience. The marginal effect 
of drought is much greater for households with smaller (previous period) herds. Female headed 
households are less resilient, although the effect is much larger for households with lower values 
for lagged TLU. Households with more educated and older household heads, as well as 
                                                 
11
 The dependent variable (resilience) is between zero and one, necessitating a fractional response specification. As 
such, we assume the dependent variable is distributed binomially and fit the GLM logit link regression using 
maximum likelihood 
12
 The household-specific resilience scores are, naturally, sensitive to the well-being threshold selected. Figure B1 in 
Appendix B illustrates how predicted resilience changes with 𝑊. Resilience increases monotonically in lagged TLU 
holdings for all well-being thresholds 𝑊, although the dynamics become more “S-shaped” as the threshold 
increases, indicating that—at most threshold levels—resilience increases more quickly for those with large (above 
average, but not huge) previous period livestock holdings. 
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households with fewer dependents, have statistically significantly greater resilience, although the 
magnitudes of the estimated effects are quite small. These resilience dynamics are robust to 
various distributional assumptions.
13
  
As a robustness check, the mean, variance, and resilience equations were also estimated 
via OLS. These results can be found in Table B3 of Appendix B. In general, the two methods 
confirm the importance of path dynamics (in significance and magnitude) for both the variance 
and resilience equations, as well as the negative impact of drought on TLU well-being. The signs 
are not consistent, however, between the different specifications. Surprisingly, the estimated 
coefficient on education in the OLS resilience equation is negative, although the magnitude is 
negligible. 
Development Resilience Aggregation 
In order to generate aggregate development resilience measures for a population from the 
set of household-specific estimates, we must first select a minimum probability threshold, P, 
above which a household is deemed resilient and below which it is considered not resilient. This 
second normative threshold is necessary because development resilience is a probabilistic 
measure, unlike directly observable indicators such as expenditures, income or livestock 
holdings. We set P = 0.80, meaning that we only consider household i resilient if it has at least 
an 80% probability of reaching the well-being threshold (i.e., ?̂?𝑖𝑡  ≡ Pr(𝑊𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑊 =
6|𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕) ≥ 0.80). Setting the distribution sensitivity parameter, 𝛼 = 0, so as to generate a 
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 As a robustness check, resilience estimates were calculated for lognormally distributed household well-being. 
Those results can be found in Appendix B, Table B2. The qualitative results are, naturally, very similar such that the 
distributional assumption does not seem to matter to the central patterns observed. 
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headcount estimate of the population share who are not resilient, for the entire sample, pooled 
across periods, we estimate 
(13) 𝑅0(𝝆𝑻𝑳𝑼; 6, 0.8) ≡ 1 − [
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
0.8
)
0
𝑞
𝑖=1 ] = 0.394, 
meaning that about forty percent of households in the pooled sample are development resilient 
by this measure. 
One of the appealing features of FGT-style measures like R is their decomposability. The 
sample population can be broken down into various subgroups by characteristics such as sex or 
education of the household head, nomadic status, geographic area, etc. Another benefit of this 
new development resilience estimation approach is that the built-in path dynamics facilitate 
development resilience forecasting, projecting how resilience will evolve in future periods, given 
current and recently observed values. This allows us to forecast development resilience estimates 
for each household, and therefore the aggregate subgroup resilience measures, as well, under 
different scenarios. We can simulate how, for example, development resilience will develop in 
the absence (or presence) of another drought shock.  
Given the perceived vulnerability of female headed and settled households in this region, 
we calculate the headcount resilience index by sex and nomadic status per equation (9) and 
project the measures out two years into the future based on a few reasonable assumptions about 
the evolution of covariates, such as that the education of the household head remains unchanged 
while his or her age increases by one year each year, as described in equation (7). The dashed 
lines from periods 5 to 7 in Figure 4 show how development resilience is predicted to evolve 
over the two years following the fifth survey round if households in Marsabit do not suffer 
another catastrophic drought.  
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We calculate the sex-specific headcount measure for each round so as to observe the 
evolution of development resilience over the course of a drought cycle. Although headcount 
resilience is quite similar for male and female headed households in Round 2, female headed 
households do not appear to be as substantially impacted by the drought as male headed 
households at first. Although their initial headcount resilience drop is less substantial, female 
headed households appear unable to recover. The headcount resilience score continues to decline 
over the survey period and is projected to drop even further. Male headed households, on the 
other hand, see a sharp drop in their headcount resilience post-drought. Importantly, these 
households recover most of their lost resilience within three years of the drought and were 
forecast to maintain that level of resilience in subsequent years. 
Given longstanding observations in the region that nomadic households are better-off and 
seemingly more resilient to drought due to their mobility (Barrett et al. 2006, Little et al. 2008), 
we also explore how this development resilience measure varies by nomadic status. As depicted 
in Figure 4, nomadic households are indeed consistently more resilient than are settled 
households. The difference in resilience among households also appears far more pronounced in 
the mobility/nomadism dimension than based on gender of the household head. Consistent with 
the aforementioned observations, the headcount resilience score for nomadic households is 
seemingly unaffected by the drought, while settled households see a sharp initial drop and, as 
with female headed households, seem unable to recover in subsequent or project rounds. 
Targeting  
The resilience differences based on nomadic status suggest a targetable characteristic for 
interventions aimed at boosting the resilience of vulnerable households. This method and the 
estimates it generates can help to identify the key populations in need of assistance in order to 
25 
boost and/or buffer their resilience or for targeting specific types of interventions estimated to 
have especially pronounced expected effects on household resilience. Because good targeting 
necessarily involves forecasting where a household would be in the absence of an intervention, 
the (potentially nonlinear) conditional path dynamics built into this method of development 
resilience estimation offer a significant opportunity to improve targeting.  Conventional methods 
use the most recent observation of a household as the best estimate of the future state in the 
absence of an intervention. But that implicitly imposes a strong assumption of a random walk 
stochastic process. In the empirical example above, we can reject the null hypothesis of a random 
walk, suggesting that our method might enhance targeting accuracy. 
The strength of the development resilience approach is that it allows us to look at the 
probability of maintaining well-being over time, and leverage the inter-temporal variation 
captured by the panel dataset to predict future outcomes. In order to assess the targeting accuracy 
of this approach vis-à-vis conventional approaches, we could compare targeting accuracy rates 
(both correctly targeted and correctly not targeted), Type I errors (errors of inclusion, i.e., those 
targeted who nonetheless exceeded the threshold) and Type II errors (i.e., errors of exclusion, 
those not targeted who nonetheless fell below the threshold), for different probability thresholds 
(𝑃) for a standard targeting approach (based on the most recently observed value) and a 
resilience-based targeting approach, as described in Upton, Cissé, and Barrett (2016).  
Table 3 presents the estimates of targeting accuracy for an intervention in Round 5, based 
on the development resilience approach described above (using data from Rounds 1-4) and 
compares it to a standard targeting regime based only on realized TLU holdings in Round 4. 
While no probability threshold 𝑃 consistently outperforms the standard approach on all 
measures, a probability threshold can be selected that outperforms the standard model for each of 
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the various measures. That is, while the standard approach does not allow implementers to 
choose between inclusion and exclusion errors in targeting, the development resilience approach 
explicitly allows policymakers to choose between leakage and over-coverage depending on 
priorities and resource constraints. Importantly, resilience-based targeting outperforms the 
standard approach on the measure of interest given decision-makers’ priorities. 
V. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Given the disastrous impacts of increasingly frequent natural disasters, cyclical food 
assistance needs, and limited humanitarian budgets, international development and humanitarian 
agencies have recently begun to focus heavily on resilience. The empirical development 
resilience approach developed here provides an econometric strategy for understanding 
potentially nonlinear well-being dynamics in shock-prone contexts, bringing together relevant 
concepts from the poverty traps, risk, vulnerability, and poverty measurement literatures.  
As the empirical example demonstrates, it is important to understand mean well-being 
dynamics in order to design appropriate interventions. As Barrett & Carter (2013) explain, well-
targeted transfers to individuals just below a poverty trap threshold may help them escape 
poverty, but the same transfers would have negligible impacts in contexts such as the one 
discussed in this paper, with unique, low-level well-being equilibria. But understanding the mean 
well-being dynamics is not sufficient, as ignoring high-order moments obscures the impact of 
risk and self-insurance on well-being. In Northern Kenya, households (particularly nomadic 
households) acquire herds much larger than dynamic equilibrium levels, and at considerable cost. 
The development resilience approach offers insight into this seemingly costly and long-run futile 
behavior, by uncovering the correlation between large herd sizes and higher probabilities of 
future well-being. 
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While the benefits of a rigorous empirical analysis of development resilience are clear, 
the data are currently not available to allow this type of analysis at scale. We support calls for a 
multi-country system of sentinel sites collecting high-quality, high-frequency data over long 
periods of time, particularly in the most disaster-prone parts of the world (Barrett & Headey 
2014, Headey & Barrett 2015). Yet the absence of such data should not prevent methodological 
contributions, but rather guide developments in data collection and management systems. We 
hope that the methods introduced in this paper provide some direction and impetus for increased 
data collection while also providing a template for resilience estimation in contexts with 
adequate data availability, which are growing increasingly common. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Sample 
Mean 
Fully 
Settled 
Nomadic
14
 T-test Attrited T-test 
Tropical Livestock 
Units
15
 
13.60 7.99 17.03 *** 10.56 * 
Female headed (=1) 0.37 0.36 0.38  0.29 * 
Age of head (years) 49 50 48 *** 49  
Education (years) 1.05 1.83 0.58 *** 1.76 ** 
Dependency Ratio
16
 1.07 1.07 1.07  1.35 *** 
Catholic 0.31 0.34 0.29 *** 0.40 ** 
Anglican 0.08 0.08 0.09  0.11  
Other Christian 0.06 0.10 0.04 *** 0.04  
Muslim 0.24 0.37 0.16 *** 0.21  
Traditional Religion 0.30  0.12 0.42 *** 0.24  
No Religion 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  
N (5 rounds, pooled) 4619 
1754 
(38%) 
2865 
(62%) 
 114 
(2%) 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Includes households identified as “partially nomadic” or “nomadic.” 
15
 A tropical livestock unit (TLU) is an aggregate measure of livestock holdings. 1 TLU = 1 cow = 0.7 camel = 10 
sheep or goats. 
16
 The dependency ratio gives a sense of how many individuals are being cared for by the family. In this case, the 
dependency ratio equals the number of children under 15 plus the number of seniors over 64 divided by the number 
of adults (between the ages of 15 and 64) in the household. If there are no working aged adults in the households, 
the number of dependents is divided by 1. 
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Table 2: Marginal Effects at Representative Values
17
 – Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES TLU Variance(TLU) TLU Resilience [~Γ, W=6] 
 low mean high low mean high low mean high 
TLUt−1 0.572*** 0.735*** 0.824*** 2.939*** 4.125*** 4.976*** 0.0616*** 0.0381*** 0.0204*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0264) (0.0311) (0.609) (0.815) (0.903) (0.000494) (0.000236) (0.000311) 
Drought -1.583*** -2.380*** -2.957*** -12.97* -19.82** -25.21** -0.181*** -0.112*** -0.0600*** 
 (0.375) (0.559) (0.693) (6.795) (10.09) (12.76) (0.00284) (0.00225) (0.00168) 
Female Head -1.060*** -1.594*** -1.981*** 6.193 9.467 12.04 -0.122*** -0.0756*** -0.0406*** 
 (0.246) (0.369) (0.459) (5.110) (7.924) (10.14) (0.00455) (0.00301) (0.00178) 
Head Age (∗ 102) 0.586 0.881 1.10 14.2 21.7 27.6 0.0684*** 0.0423*** 0.0227*** 
 (0.901) (1.35) (1.68) (18.7) (28.7) (36.6) (0.0141) (0.00864) (0.00461) 
Education in Yrs  0.0378 0.0568 0.0706 1.705 2.607 3.315 0.00433*** 0.00268*** 0.00144*** 
 (0.0635) (0.0954) (0.119) (1.208) (1.869) (2.396) (0.00107) (0.000655) (0.000351) 
Dependency Ratio -0.504*** -0.758*** -0.941*** -7.621** -11.65** -14.82** -0.0564*** -0.0349*** -0.0187*** 
 (0.150) (0.225) (0.279) (3.710) (5.611) (7.119) (0.00212) (0.00142) (0.000868) 
Religion & Nomadic 
Dummies 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Model BIC 178991.48 8333433.3 -28669.092 
Robust (1) and bootstrapped
18
 (2)-(3) standard errors in parentheses. Pooled Sample, n = 3,581. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
  
                                                 
17
 For (1) and (2), a Poisson distribution is assumed. For (3), a binomial distribution is assumed. “Low” are the marginal effects at 𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑡−1 = 8, the average value 
for settled households. “Mean” are at the sample mean TLU value (𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑡−1 = 13.6) and “high” are at 𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑡−1 = 17, the average holdings for nomadic 
households. 
18
 B=400 repetitions chosen for the bootstrap based on Cameron & Trivedi (2010, p. 433). Bootstrapping estimates are made possible for complex survey data by 
calculating bootstrap weights. See Kolenikov (2010) for more information. 
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Table 3: Estimates of Targeting Accuracy  
P 
Correctly  
Not Targeted 
Correctly 
Targeted 
TI Error TII Error Sum of Errors 
0.45 0.539 0.342 0.059 0.059 0.119 
0.5 0.519 0.358 0.079 0.044 0.123 
0.55 0.505 0.363 0.093 0.038 0.132 
0.6 0.485 0.368 0.113 0.034 0.147 
0.8 0.384 0.386 0.214 0.015 0.229 
Standard 0.526 0.352 0.072 0.049 0.122 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Estimated Path Dynamics 
 
 
  
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
T
L
U
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Lagged TLU
95% CIs Mean TLU Dynamics
45 Degree Line
Predicted TLU Path Dynamics
38 
Figure 2: Conditional TLU Well-being pdfs 
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Figure 3: Estimated Resilience Dynamics 
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Figure 4: TLU Resilience Headcount 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Satisfaction of Key Axioms by Resilience Index  
The 𝑅𝛼,𝑡+𝑠(𝝆; 𝑊, 𝑃)index combines “considerations of absolute and relative [development 
resilience] deprivation” (Sen 1979, 293) even after the selection of a normative minimum 
development resilience threshold. We note that while the axioms are discussed with regards to 
individuals, they are applied in this paper almost exclusively to households. While in theory this 
approach could be used to aggregate individual resilience scores into a household-level 
aggregate, we assume for now a unitary household model and apply the axioms to the household 
as the most decentralized unit. 
Monotonicity Axiom: A reduction in development resilience of a person already below the 
resilience probability threshold, ceteris paribus, must (weakly) decrease the resilience index.  
Assume in a population of size 𝑛, that an individual 𝑗 (already below the resilience probability 
threshold) has a reduction in development resilience from period 𝐴 to period 𝐵 such that 
𝜌𝑗𝐴 > 𝜌𝑗𝐵. Since 𝑔𝑗 = 𝑃 − 𝜌𝑗 , clearly 𝑔𝑗𝐴 < 𝑔𝑗𝐵. Individual 𝑗 remains below 𝑃 and since neither 
the population size nor the resilience probability threshold 𝑃 is changed, therefore it is easy to 
see that [
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞𝐴
𝑖=1 ] > [
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞𝐵
𝑖=1 ] for all 𝛼 > 0 and therefore 𝑅𝐴 < 𝑅𝐵. As discussed 
above, for 𝛼 = 0 the resilience index is the headcount ratio and therefore 𝑅𝐴 = 𝑅𝐵.  
 
Transfer Axiom: A pure transfer of development resilience from a person below the resilience 
probability threshold to anyone who is more resilient must (weakly) decrease the resilience 
index, ceteris paribus. 
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The transfer axiom simply ensures that the index value changes in the development resilience of 
the least resilient more than changes in resilience indices of more resilient individuals (even if 
those individuals are still below the normative threshold 𝑃. 
 
Case 1: If the transfer is made to someone with resilience above 𝑃, this is effectively equivalent 
to the monotonicity axiom above.  
 
Case 2: Let two individuals 𝑗 and 𝑘 each have a level of development resilience below the 
resilience probability threshold, such that 𝜌𝑗𝐴 < 𝜌𝑘𝐴 ≤ 𝑃 in period 𝐴. A pure resilience transfer 
in the amount of 𝜋 reduces the development resilience of person 𝑗 to 𝜌𝑗𝐵 = 𝜌𝑗𝐴 − 𝜋 in period 𝐵 
and increases the resilience of person 𝑘 to 𝜌𝑘𝐵 = 𝜌𝑘𝐴 + 𝜋, which may or may not be above 𝑃.  
 
Case 2a: For this subcase let 𝜌𝑘𝐵 = 𝜌𝑘𝐴 + 𝜋 ≤ 𝑃, so individual 𝑗’s gap has increased (𝑔𝑗𝐴 <
𝑔𝑗𝐵) and 𝑘’s gap has shrunken (𝑔𝑘𝐴 > 𝑔𝑘𝐵). It is immediately clear that 𝑅𝐴 = 𝑅𝐵 when 𝛼 = 0 or 
𝛼 = 1 since neither the headcount nor the cumulative resilience gap is altered by the transfer. For 
𝛼 > 1, [
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞𝐴
𝑖=1 ] > [
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞𝐵
𝑖=1 ] since greater weight is placed on larger gaps and 
therefore it follows that 𝑅𝐴 < 𝑅𝐵. 
 
Case 2b: Now let 𝜌𝑘𝐵 = 𝜌𝑘𝐴 + 𝜋 > 𝑃. Notice that for 𝛼 = 0, the headcount ratio, 𝑅𝐴 > 𝑅𝐵 since 
fewer individuals fall below the resilience probability threshold. However, for ≥ 1 , 
[
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞𝐴
𝑖=1 ] > [
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞𝐵
𝑖=1 ] as individual 𝑗’s gap increases (𝑔𝑗𝐴 + 𝜋 = 𝑔𝑗𝐵) and 𝑘 surpasses 
the threshold and is considered resilient (𝑔𝑘𝐵 = 0), implying 𝑅𝐴 < 𝑅𝐵.  
43 
 
Relative Equity Axiom: If person 𝑗 is accepted to be less resilient than person 𝑘 in a given 
resilience configuration 𝝆, then the weight on the resilience gap 𝑔𝑗 of the less resilient person 𝑗 
should be greater than the weight on the resilience gap 𝑔𝑘. 
While the headcount ratio with 𝛼 = 0 ignores resilience gaps completely and gaps are given 
equal weights when 𝛼 = 1, for all 𝛼 > 1 the resilience index 𝑅(𝝆; 𝑊, 𝑃) ≡ 1 − [
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞
𝑖=1 ] 
weighs larger gaps more heavily than smaller gaps. 
 
Decomposability: The resilience index is decomposable with population share weights. 
Suppose we break the population into two (or more) subpopulations such that 𝑛 = 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 and 
𝑞 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2. It is clear that 𝑅𝛼(𝝆; 𝑊, 𝑃) ≡ 1 − [
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞
𝑖=1 ] = 1 −
1
𝑛
[∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞1
𝑖=1 +
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞2
𝑖=1 ] = (
𝑛1
𝑛
) −
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞1
𝑖=1 + (
𝑛2
𝑛
) −
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞2
𝑖=1 = (
𝑛1
𝑛
) (1 − [
1
𝑛1
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞1
𝑖=1 ]) +
(
𝑛2
𝑛
) (1 − [
1
𝑛2
∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑃
)
𝛼
𝑞2
𝑖=1 ]) = (
𝑛1
𝑛
) 𝑅𝛼1 + (
𝑛2
𝑛
) 𝑅𝛼2. 
 
The development resilience measure satisfies each of the four important axioms above. 
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Appendix B: Robustness 
Table B1: Poisson Estimates of TLU Well-Being – Polynomial Specifications 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
TLU TLU TLU TLU TLU TLU TLU TLU 
TLUt−1 1.55*** 3.43*** 5.73*** 9.69*** 12.2*** 20.0*** 22.2*** 27.5*** 
(∗ 102) (-0. 145) (0. 606) (0.556) (0.396) (0.978) (1.14) (1.21) (1.47) 
TLUt−1
2  
 
-0.0864** -0. 36*** -1.21*** -2.08*** -5.82*** -7.28*** -11.4*** 
(∗ 103) 
 
(0.0436) (0.0759) (0.0865) (0.343) (0.604) (0.717) (1.05) 
TLUt−1
3  
  
0.646*** 5.80*** 15.8*** 82.4*** 119*** 243*** 
(∗ 106) 
  
(0.167) (0.500) ( 4.06) (12.2) (16.6) (31.2) 
TLUt−1
4  
   
-0.86*** -5.19*** -56.6*** -98.7*** -280*** 
(∗ 108) 
   
(0.0810) (1.80) (10.7) ( 17.5) (44.7) 
TLUt−1
5  
    
1.00** 18.0*** 42.3*** 180*** 
(∗ 1010) 
    
(0.252) (3.98) (8.81) (33.7) 
TLUt−1
6  
     
-2.08*** -8.81*** -64.6*** 
(∗ 1012) 
     
(0.507) (2.06) (13.6) 
TLUt−1
7  
      
0.702*** 12.0*** 
(∗ 1014) 
      
(0.179) (2.74) 
TLUt−1
8  
       
-8.97*** 
(∗ 1017) 
       
(2.17) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
AIC 136.2 119.5 109.2 99.0 97.1 91.3 90.3 89.2 
T-test
19
 0.0211** 0.0000*** 0.0143** 0.1244 0.575 0.3557 0.3369 - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
                                                 
19
 P-value of the t-test on the equality of means between predicted values from the specific estimation and the 8
th
 
order polynomial specification. 
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Table B2: Marginal Effects at Representative Values – A Comparison of Two Well-Being 
Distributions 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TLU Resilience [~Γ, W=6]20 TLU Resilience [~lnN, W=6]21 
 low low low low mean high 
TLUt−1 0.0616*** 0.0381*** 0.0204*** 0.0613*** 0.0353*** 0.0194*** 
 (0.000494) (0.000236) (0.000311) (0.000461) (0.000830) (0.000475) 
Drought -0.181*** -0.112*** -0.0600*** -0.149*** -0.0925*** -0.0535*** 
 (0.00284) (0.00225) (0.00168) (0.00482) (0.00314) (0.00213) 
Female Head -0.122*** -0.0756*** -0.0406*** -0.0860*** -0.0535*** -0.0310*** 
 (0.00455) (0.00301) (0.00178) (0.00451) (0.00297) (0.00178) 
Head Age  0.0684*** 0.0423*** 0.0227*** 0.0142 0.00774 0.00413 
    (∗ 102) (0.0141) (0.00864) (0.00461) (0.0145) (0.00900) (0.00521) 
Education in  0.00433*** 0.00268*** 0.00144*** 0.000777 0.000483 0.000280 
  Yrs (0.00107) (0.000655) (0.000351) (0.000712) (0.000443) (0.000256) 
Dependency  -0.0564*** -0.0349*** -0.0187*** -0.0453*** -0.0282*** -0.0163*** 
  Ratio (0.00212) (0.00142) (0.000868) (0.00225) (0.00145) (0.000928) 
Religion & 
Nomadic 
Dummies 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Model BIC -28669.092 2727.261 
Bootstrapped
22
 (1) and robust (2) standard errors in parentheses. Pooled Sample, n = 3,581. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
  
                                                 
20
 These are the same estimates as presented in Table 2 column (3). 
21
 Distribution parameters for the lognormal distribution are: 𝑊𝑡|𝑊𝑡−1~ln𝑁 (ln(𝜇1𝑡) −
1
2
ln (1 +
𝜇2𝑡
𝜇1𝑡
2 ) , ln (1 +
𝜇2𝑡
𝜇1𝑡
2 )). 
Given convergence issues with the estimator, these estimates are not bootstrapped and exclude survey weights. The 
specification was also only able to include a third order polynomial. The fractional response model uses a logit 
model for the conditional mean.  
22
 B=400 repetitions chosen for the bootstrap based on Cameron & Trivedi (2010, p. 433). 
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Table B3: OLS Estimates of TLU Well-Being 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES IHS
23
(TLU) Variance 
(IHS(TLU)) 
Resilience 
[~Γ, W=6] 
    
TLUt−1 0.155*** -0.0160** 0.00626*** 
 (0.00577) (0.00775) (0.00101) 
TLUt−1
2 (∗ 1000) -2.40*** 0.395 -0.0994** 
 (0.172) (0.336) (0.0477) 
TLUt−1
3 (∗ 106) 12.8*** -1.75 0.563 
 (1.35) (4.34) (0.647) 
TLUt−1
4 (∗ 109) -20.1*** 2.17 -0.917 
 (2.54) (16.4) (2.55) 
Drought -0.164*** 0.0551 -0.00529*** 
 (0.0404) (0.0477) (0.000852) 
Female Head (=1) -0.234*** 0.107** -0.0133*** 
 (0.0460) (0.0452) (0.00149) 
Head Age 0.0161** -0.00185 0.000787*** 
 (0.00753) (0.00802) (0.000220) 
Head Age
2(∗ 105) -15.7** 3.33 -0.841*** 
 (6.97) (7.32) (0.199) 
Education in Yrs -0.00753 0.0145* -0.000463* 
 (0.00925) (0.00859) (0.000263) 
Dependency Ratio 1.42 -0.0956 0.0111 
(∗ 100) (2.29) (2.05) (0.0584) 
Religion & 
Settled 
Dummies 
Y Y Y 
Constant 0.827*** 0.668*** 0.0278*** 
 (0.205) (0.226) (0.00658) 
    
Observations 3,581 3,581 3,581 
R-squared 0.70 0.05 0.86 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, standard errors for (2) & (3) are  
bootstrapped w/400 reps. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
  
                                                 
23
 The inverse hyperbolic sine of TLU. 
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Figure B1. Estimated Resilience Dynamics for Selected 𝑾 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE IMPACTS OF INDEX INSURANCE ON RESILIENCE IN NORTHERN KENYA 
 
Jennifer Denno Cissé  and Munenobu Ikegami 
I. Introduction 
Northern Kenya is one of the poorest regions of the world. The primary livelihood in the 
region is nomadic pastoralism, although some households have become sedentarized in recent 
decades. While sedentarized households may still rely on animal husbandry for their livelihoods, 
they no longer migrate with their herds. These pastoral and agro-pastoral households are 
incredibly vulnerable to weather shocks, particularly drought. Yet, as is common in remote rural 
communities in developing countries, formal insurance and credit markets are highly imperfect 
in northern Kenya. As a result, households must employ a variety of ex ante risk mitigation and 
ex post risk coping strategies, including excess livestock accumulation and sales, asset 
smoothing, and informal borrowing. In the most extreme cases, these multiple financial market 
failures create poverty traps (Barrett & Carter 2013).  
Recurrent droughts and humanitarian appeals in the Horn of Africa have propelled calls 
for resilience building and other interventions to help pastoral communities manage drought risk 
and cope with shocks without falling into poverty traps or relying on increasingly scarce 
humanitarian assistance. One such intervention, an index-based livestock insurance (IBLI), was 
commercially piloted in Northern Kenya in 2009. The multi-year project was introduced to help 
vulnerable pastoral and agro-pastoral populations manage drought risk by allowing them to 
insure their livestock against drought. Given that pastoralism is the predominate livelihood 
strategy in the region, livestock was the natural asset to insure.  
49 
In this paper, we implement the empirical strategy for estimating development resilience 
proposed by Cissé & Barrett (2016) in order to evaluate the impact of IBLI on participant 
resilience in terms of herd size and child health. If a household has a high probability of 
achieving or maintaining satisfactory well-being with regards to those measures, it is considered 
resilient. As the first (as far as we are aware) paper evaluating the causal impacts of an insurance 
program on empirically-measured resilience, this paper contributes to two nascent literatures. 
First, we contribute to the resilience measurement literature, demonstrating that resilience 
estimation can and should have an important role in evaluating the well-being of vulnerable 
populations. Secondly, we contribute to the index insurance literature. The literature on index 
insurance is primed to expand rapidly as increasing access to affordable, high quality, high-
resolution satellite data is driving interest in—and the affordability of—index and 
microinsurance products around the world. This paper, therefore, will help guide the 
development of this literature by documenting the causal impacts of an index insurance product 
on well-being and resilience in a developing country.  
We begin by identifying household- and child-level conditional distributions of well-
being. We predict household and child development resilience by evaluating the probability, 
based on their individual distributions, that a household or child will achieve a satisfactory level 
of well-being based on specific, normative thresholds. We then evaluate the impact of insurance 
on resilience (probabilities) and explore how changing the normative well-being thresholds 
affect the impacts of the index insurance product. 
We find that, for a well-being threshold of just over two animals per capita, holding an 
IBLI contract in the previous season increases a household’s resilience in terms of livestock 
holdings, regardless of whether a drought occurred. The impact of insurance on resilience is 
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significantly greater, however, during droughts. For large herd sizes of over five animals per 
capita, we find that having insurance during a drought increases the probability that a household 
will achieve the threshold by a statistically significant fifteen percentage points. We also find 
that IBLI is positively associated with child health resilience during droughts, increasingly the 
probability that a child will be well-nourished by four percentage points. There appears to be no 
relationship between insurance holdings and probabilities of subsequently becoming severely 
acutely malnourished in non-drought years. 
The paper is organized as follows: section II provides a brief background on the extant 
pastoralist risk and insurance literatures in development economics. Section III describes the 
context and presents information on the IBLI project. Section IV overviews the Cissé & Barrett 
(2016) empirical approach for development resilience estimation. Section V empirically 
evaluates the impact of index insurance in terms of development resilience and presents results. 
Section VI concludes. 
II. Risk, Insurance, and Resilience 
Pastoral Livelihoods and Risk 
Although different pastoral strategies
24
 are practiced by the various pastoral ethnic groups 
(Fratkin 1986) in Africa’s arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs), African pastoralists are generally 
                                                 
24
 Pastoralism is the practice of raising livestock (i.e., animal husbandry). Pastoralists are often classified by the 
types of movement and distance covered as they care for their herds. Nomadic pastoralists general do not practice 
crop agriculture and are able to travel long distances to accommodate the needs of their herds. Transhumant 
pastoralists, generally referred to in this paper as semi-nomadic pastoralists, may have an established settlement and 
travel only to fixed locations according to seasonal needs. Semi-nomadic pastoralists often practice herd-splitting, 
leaving women and children at the primary settlement with lactating animals while the men migrate with the larger 
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considered to be among the poorest and most-vulnerable populations in the world (Rass 2006). 
Many pastoralist households in Northern Kenya earn most or all of their income from their 
livestock. Unfortunately, these households, who have few other livelihood options, are incredibly 
vulnerable to weather shocks, such as drought, which can decimate animal populations 
(Chantarat et al. 2013). As such, households rationally accumulate large herds, as income 
increases in herd size and large herds serve as self-insurance in the face of shock (McPeak 2005). 
This phenomenon is not unique to Sub-Saharan Africa; for example, there is evidence of path 
dynamics in reindeer herd size and protective herd accumulation practices in Norway (Næss & 
Bårdsen 2010). 
Herd stocks are commonly aggregated in terms of tropical livestock units, allowing 
researchers to compare aggregate livestock holdings across a variety of species. In this context, 
one tropical livestock unit (TLU) is equivalent to one cow, 0.7 camel, ten sheep, or ten goats.  
Although estimates differ, there is substantial evidence of asset thresholds and asset-based 
poverty traps among pastoral households in Northern Kenya and Ethiopia, with five to six 
animals or TLU per capita needed to sustain subsistence pastoral households in Northern Kenya 
(Pratt & Gwynne 1977; Barrett et al. 2006). The estimates in neighboring Ethiopia are a bit 
lower, ranging anywhere from one to five TLU per person (Coppock 1994), although more 
recent work in Southern Ethiopia finds evidence for the existence of at least two stable dynamic 
equilibria, with an unstable equilibrium between 10 and 15 animals (about two TLU per capita), 
above which households are able to engage in extensive pastoralism (Lybbert et al. 2004). 
                                                                                                                                                             
herd. Finally, agro-pastoralists are settled households that practice both animal husbandry and crop agriculture. See 
Blench (2001) for an excellent summary of the types of pastoralism being practiced around the world. 
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Given the potential impact of drought on herd size and the presence of poverty trap 
thresholds, some argue there is a need for safety net programs that protect livestock assets above 
the critical threshold level to prevent households from falling into a low equilibrium poverty trap 
(Barrett et al. 2006). In the absence of such programs, dramatic decreases in livestock herd size 
as a result of severe shocks prevents pastoralists from maintaining nomadic or semi-nomadic 
livelihoods, pushing households towards sedentarization (McPeak & Barrett 2001). 
Unfortunately, sedentary households who have lost the productive assets necessary for pastoral 
production are general considered the most vulnerable in the region, and face increased 
competition for unskilled or low-cost non-pastoral livelihoods (Little et al. 2008). Perhaps of 
even greater concern, child anthropometric measures from Northern Kenya demonstrate that 
children in nomadic pastoral communities are much healthier than those in sedentarized 
communities (Fratkin, Roth, & Nathan 2004). Other research shows that children from sedentary 
households are much more likely to suffer from malnutrition during dry years, as nomadic 
children are able to consume more milk than their sedentary counterparts are, even during 
drought (Nathan, Fratkin, & Roth 1996).  
Resilience  
Soon after much of the empirical work discussed above was completed, the Horn of 
Africa suffered the worst drought in sixty years, causing famine in the most politically and 
geographically isolated regions (Maxwell & Fitzpatrick 2012). The 2011 drought was followed 
soon after by drought and famine in the Sahel in 2012. Citing projections showing continued 
need for humanitarian intervention in these vulnerable regions in the future, exacerbated by 
shocks of increasing frequency and severity, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) launched guidance in 2012 aimed at “Building Resilience to Recurrent 
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Crisis” (USAID 2013). USAID and other humanitarian actors quickly called for the need to 
bridge the humanitarian-development divide by implementing projects that would reduce 
drought risk and increase the resilience of families living in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa 
(Hillier & Dempsey 2012). Since then, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on 
resilience building initiatives in the two regions. Given this focus on resilience, it makes sense to 
evaluate potential safety net programs, including index insurance interventions, through a 
resilience lens, as we will describe below. 
Risk Management, Coping, and Insurance 
Despite the cyclical nature of droughts and crisis in the ASALs, households in Northern 
Kenya have similar risk mitigation and coping strategies available to them as in other part of the 
continent. Those with access to credit and/or insurance may employ intertemporal risk sharing in 
order to smooth consumption and investments (Besley 1995) while avoiding asset-based poverty 
traps (Carter & Barrett 2006). While actuarially-fair, formal insurance is often the preferred risk-
management mechanism in the absence of market failures, most poor, rural households do not 
have access to formal insurance (Skees & Barnett 2006; Barnett, Barrett, and Skees 2008). 
Insurance- and credit-constrained households in developing countries have developed a variety 
of second-best insurance strategies, including informal borrowing, selling off assets, and risk-
averse production decisions (Morduch 1994). Some of these risk mitigation strategies—such as 
on-farm diversification, on- and off-farm production, migration—can be considered ex ante risk 
management while others—borrowing, saving, selling off assets, etc.—are primarily concerned 
with ex post risk coping (Alderman & Paxson 1992). Insurance, therefore, can be expected to 
impact behavior both 1) in response to shock and 2) via ex ante production and investment 
decisions (Mobarak & Rosenzweig 2012; Janzen & Carter 2013; Karlan et al. 2014). 
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Although there is evidence from other countries in Sub-Saharan African that asset sales 
in response drought (a covariate shock) do appear to temper the impacts of shock for some 
households and in some situations (Hoddinott 2006), asset sales generally provide more 
protection against idiosyncratic shocks, as increased supply in times of covariate shock will 
likely decrease the asset price (Morduch 1994), In fact, droughts in the area of study in Northern 
Kenya have been found to decrease the price of female camels, cattle, goats, and sheep by 5, 52, 
17, and 34% , respectively (Barrett et al. 2003). Informal, community-based mechanisms are also 
more suited to insuring against idiosyncratic shocks than covariate shocks (Dercon 2002). For 
example, by separating non-food from food consumption, Skoufias & Quisumbing (2005) show 
that idiosyncratic income shocks are correlated with non-food consumption in Ethiopia, but that 
food consumption is partially shielded from these shocks, which they presume to be the result of 
informal food consumption insurance mechanisms.  
On the other hand, even relatively mild covariate shocks may have permanent impacts, 
particularly for poorer households (Hoddinott 2006). Index insurance is one mechanism that has 
been proposed to deal with covariate weather-related risk in poor, primarily agricultural 
communities (Barnett & Mahul 2007; Chantarat et al. 2007). Index insurance works by insuring 
households or individuals against bad weather, as opposed to insuring them against particular 
outcomes. Weather can be monitored remotely by satellite, reducing the cost substantially 
compared to traditional insurance (Mude et al. 2009). These index-based risk transfer products, 
as they are also known, may allow households to avoid poverty traps by correcting a critical 
market failure (Barnett, Barrett, and Skees 2008).  
Given this potential to provide market-based solutions to weather-related vulnerability in 
developing countries, index insurance products have received considerable attention in the past 
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fifteen years. Well-designed, experimental approaches have found promising results. Karlan et 
al. (2014) evaluated the impact of rainfall insurance piloted in northern Ghana in 2009 and found 
uninsured risk to be the primary barrier to farmer investment. Similarly, Mobarak & Rosenzweig 
(2012) find that rice farmers in India offered index insurance in 2010-2011 invest in higher 
yielding portfolios that are less resistant to drought. 
One of the earliest examples of weather-based index insurance was the rainfall insurance 
project piloted in Andhra Pradesh, India in 2003 by ICICI Lombard with technical assistance 
from the World Bank (Giné et al. 2010). This and other early example of index insurance were 
characterized by low take-up, in part due to limited understanding of the products, long lag 
periods between the weather shock and receipt of indemnity payments, and high levels of basis 
risk (Giné et al. 2010). As far as we are aware, the first example of predicted mortality-based 
livestock insurance was the index-based livestock insurance product in Mongolia, which the 
World Bank piloted in 2006. The lessons learned over the course of the implementation in 
Mongolia, including the need for high quality data as well as education around the product for 
potential consumers (DeAngelis 2013), informed the development of the Kenya and Ethiopia 
IBLI projects. 
Increasing access to affordable, high quality, high-resolution satellite data is partly 
responsible for booming interest in and availability of index-based insurance products in recent 
years. For example, in the past ten years the Index Insurance Innovation Initiative (I4), a project 
of the USAID-supported Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Assets and Market Access, has 
piloted or researched index insurance products in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, the Dominican 
Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Mali, Nepal, Peru, and Tanzania. This is in 
addition to their support for research related to the Ethiopia and Kenya IBLI projects. 
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Although index insurance has many supporters, some have pointed out the potential 
weaknesses of index-based insurance products. Households already caught in poverty may not be 
able to benefit from un-subsidized insurance (Kovacevic & Pflug 2011). In addition to the cost to 
insure, the main limitation of index insurance is basis risk, i.e., that some shock-affected 
households may not receive an indemnity or that non-affected households may receive a payout 
(Barnett, Barrett, and Skees 2008; Jensen, Barrett, & Mude 2016). However, informal insurance 
mechanisms can help share the burden of basis risk where they exist (Mobarak & Rosenzweig 
2012). Nonetheless, among pastoral communities in Southern Ethiopia, Lybbert et al. (2004) find 
that household-specific idiosyncratic shocks and characteristics account for more variability in 
well-being dynamics than do covariate shocks, which calls into questions the appropriateness of 
weather-based index insurance in some settings. 
III. Context and Project Background 
Despite the limitations of index insurance mentioned above, an index-based livestock 
insurance (IBLI) product was commercially piloted in Northern Kenya beginning in January 
2010 in order to help pastoral and agro-pastoral populations manage drought-related livestock 
mortality. The ASALs of Northern Kenya experience frequent drought, and the arid conditions 
make crop-based livelihoods infeasible for the majority of the population. The climate is better 
suited to extensive pastoralism and Northern Kenyan communities rely heavily on livestock for 
their livelihoods. (McPeak, Little, & Doss 2012) Still, households are heavily exposed to 
climactic shock and Kenya’s pastoralists communities are considered to be the most vulnerable 
in the country. Given these vulnerabilities and the cyclical nature of shocks in the region, IBLI 
aims to protect against catastrophic livestock mortality by allowing households to insure their 
most important assets against shock (Mude et al. 2009).  
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This paper evaluates the impact of IBLI on the development resilience of households in 
the project implementation zone. We provide the technical definition of resilience in the next 
section but, in general, we define resilience as the probability that a household will achieve a 
satisfactory level of well-being in a particular period (following Barrett & Constas (2014)). We 
are therefore interested in evaluating how holding an IBLI contract increases (or not) 
households’ probabilities of achieving well-being above a particular threshold (e.g., poverty 
line).  
Some previous work has studied the impact of IBLI on well-being. Janzen & Carter 
(2013) examine how insured households anticipate reducing coping behaviors during a drought. 
They explore how these expected behavioral responses may differ around a critical livestock 
asset threshold. Other impact assessments find positive impacts of IBLI on material well-being—
particularly in terms of reduced risk exposure through reductions in herd size and investments in 
herd health (Jensen, Barrett, & Mude 2015; Jensen, Ikegami, & Mude 2015)—and on subjective 
well-being (Tafere et al. 2015).  
The IBLI project was implemented in Northern Kenya, in the semi-arid county of 
Marsabit (see Figure 1). According to the 2005-2006 Kenya Integrated Household Budget 
Survey, Marsabit is the second-poorest district in Kenya, with a poverty rate
25
 of 91.7% (Kenya 
National Bureau of Statistics, National Data Archive). Marsabit is a large county that borders 
Ethiopia to the north and Lake Turkana to the west. The county contains six administrative 
divisions, all of which were targeted by the program: Central, Gadamoji, Laisamis, Loiyangalani, 
Maikona, and North Horr.  
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 Based on the rural Kenya poverty line of 1,562 Kenyan shillings per month. 
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Beginning in 2009, five annual rounds
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 of the survey were administered in Marsabit, 
covering the period before the introduction of IBLI and four subsequent periods, including an 
indemnity payout period. In general, insurance contracts are offered for sale prior to each rainy 
season (two sales periods per year) and each contract lasts for a full year. Insurance is available 
to all residents and information about the insurance product was shared during village assemblies 
and by insurance promoters. Households choose how many TLU to insure and premium 
payments vary by administrative division, as the risk of catastrophic drought varies by location. 
IBLI payouts are based on a statistical model that identifies the relationship between the 
normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI) and livestock mortality. NDVI is a satellite-
derived measure of vegetative greenness, which is correlated with rainfall and pasture conditions. 
When the NDVI falls below a certain pre-determined threshold, catastrophic livestock mortality 
is predicted and insurance holders receive an indemnity payout of 15,000 KSH for each insured 
TLU (Jensen, Barret & Mude 2016), which is generally distributed in cash following the next 
data collection round. The IBLI project piloted a 15 percent strike contract, meaning that when 
the statistical model predicted that livestock mortality would surpass 15%, the insurance product 
would pay out (Chantarat et al. 2013). Given that only predicted covariate risk can be insured 
through IBLI, idiosyncratic risk remains formally uninsured. See Chantarat et al. (2013) for a full 
description of the IBLI index design. 
Figure 2 illustrates the timing between the seasons, survey (data) collection rounds, 
insurance contract coverage, and weather shocks. Each Rainfall in Northern Kenya is bimodal 
and each survey round covers two climactic seasons, the short-rainy-short-dry (SRSD) season 
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 A sixth round has recently become available, but it differs from previous rounds in a few important ways and 
therefore is not included in this analysis. 
59 
and the long-rainy-long-dry season (LRLD). Although the survey was administered after each 
LRLD season, the enumerators asked respondents to recall livestock sales, deaths, births, etc. 
that occurred during the SRSD season, allowing us to construct ten seasons of livestock holdings 
over the five year period. IBLI insurance sales occur in the two months prior to the contract 
periods shown in the figure. Note that while IBLI sales occurred prior to both the LRLD and 
SRSD seasons, each contract lasts for a full year, insuring the purchaser through both upcoming 
seasons (and therefore theoretically allowing for someone to be covered by two different 
insurance contracts simultaneously). A total of five contract periods are evaluated here. 
The baseline survey (Round 1) was conducted in October and November 2009, prior to 
the first round of IBLI sales for the first contract period (Contract 1). Additional survey rounds 
were conducted in October and November of subsequent years. As indicated by the red line on 
Figure 2, a catastrophic drought occurred in 2011 when the predicted livestock mortality (PLM) 
index surpassed the 15% threshold and triggered indemnity payments for all holders of Contract 
2 (in all six divisions) and some holders of Contract 3 (only in select divisions).  
Insurance uptake was encouraged through the use of premium discount coupons, which 
were randomly provided to 60% of the surveyed households. Among those households that 
received a coupon in a given round, the coupon amount varied randomly, with approximately 
equal numbers of households receiving coupons for 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, and 60% off the 
IBLI insurance premium amounts for the first 15 TLU insured. Households were re-randomized 
in each sales period (meaning that prior coupon receipt had no impact of the probability of 
receiving a coupon in any given period), ensuring within-household random variation in 
insurance premiums over time. Coupons were distributed during each sales period, in the two 
60 
months prior to the contract sales windows listed in Figure 2. The randomization of the coupon 
distribution was largely achieved. For more information, see Jensen, Barrett, and Mude (2015).  
IV. Empirical Approach to Development Resilience Estimation 
As mentioned above, this paper evaluates the impact of IBLI on development resilience. 
Estimating household resilience is a multi-step process. In the first step, we employ the approach 
described by Cissé & Barrett (2016) to estimate household-level conditional probability density 
functions (pdfs) of well-being, otherwise known as the development resilience approach, in order 
to estimate the impact of index insurance on well-being. The benefit of this approach is that it 
looks beyond simple mean effects to understand the impact of a program on households’ 
probabilities of achieving some minimum standard of well-being. These are conditional 
probabilities, based on the household’s well-being in the previous period, allowing us to account 
for path dynamics of well-being. 
In order to allow for nonlinear path dynamics, including S-shaped dynamics, as suggested 
by Barrett & Constas (2014), Cissé & Barrett (2016) model well-being (𝑊𝑖𝑡) parametrically as a 
polynomial function of lagged well-being (𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1), and a series of household characteristics, 
including shocks and insurance coverage, 𝑿𝒊𝒕: 
(1) 𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔𝑀(𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝛽𝑀) + 𝑢𝑀𝑖𝑡. 
The first central moment (conditional mean, or 𝜇1𝑖𝑡) is:  
(2) ?̂?1𝑖𝑡 ≡ 𝐸[𝑊𝑖𝑡|𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕] = 𝑔𝑀(𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, ?̂?𝑀).  
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where E represents the expectation operator and the random error term 𝑢𝑀𝑖𝑡 is mean zero. In the 
second step, we take the residuals from equation (1) and square them. The conditional variance 
(𝜇2𝑖𝑡) is thus: 
(3) ?̂?2𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸[𝑢𝑀𝑖𝑡
2 ] = ?̂?𝑖𝑡
2 ,  
where 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝑔𝑉(𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝛽𝑉) + 𝑢𝑉𝑖𝑡 and 𝐸[𝑢𝑉𝑖𝑡] = 0.  
Following the Barrett & Constas (2014) conceptual framework, in the third step we 
define development resilience (𝜌) as the probability that household i will have well-being in a 
future period (t) above some normative threshold, W. Assuming that the conditional well-being 
pdf for each household comes from a two parameter distribution (e.g., normal, lognormal, 
gamma, or Weibull), the conditional mean (𝜇1𝑖𝑡) and conditional variance (𝜇2𝑖𝑡) are sufficient to 
completely describe the conditional distribution and therefore the conditional probability of 
achieving well-being greater than W. This permits us to estimate their resilience: 
(4) 𝜌𝑖𝑡 ≡ Pr(𝑊𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑊|𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑋𝑖𝑡) = F̅Wit(𝑊; ?̂?1𝑖𝑡(𝑊𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡), ?̂?2𝑖𝑡(𝑊𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡)),   
where F̅it is the complementary cumulative distribution function. As explained by Cissé & 
Barrett (2016), the impact of any plausibly exogenous component of X on resilience may be 
estimated: 𝜕?̂?𝑖𝑡/𝜕𝑋𝑖𝑡. 
(5) ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔𝑅(𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝛽𝑅) + 𝑢𝑅𝑖𝑡 
Aside from demonstrating how to measure development resilience at the household level, 
Cissé & Barrett (2016) develop a decomposable development resilience measure similar to the 
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class of poverty measures developed by Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984). This feature allows 
us to attribute shares of the overall development resilience measure to various subgroups, as we 
demonstrate below. 
V. Impact of Insurance on Development Resilience 
Data 
The data used in this analysis were collected in order to evaluate the impact of the 
insurance by the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), Cornell University, 
University of California-Davis, and Syracuse University in collaboration with private sector 
insurance providers using an elaborate multi-year impact evaluation strategy (Ikegami & 
Sheahan 2016). The household surveys were designed to capture a wealth of household 
livelihood and welfare variables for survey households and include general demographic 
questions as well as questions regarding livestock holdings and production, risk and insurance, 
livelihood activities, expenditure and consumption, assets, and savings and credit. Researchers 
determined the number of households that would need to be surveyed in order to identify the 
impacts of the project, and randomly selected households from the divisions mentioned above 
(with the exception of North Horr) to ensure representativeness. This resulted in a final sample of 
924 households for all sixteen sublocations in Marsabit County that were followed over the 
length of the project.
27
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 Details on the sample household selection methodology are available in the IBLI survey codebook (ILRI 2013) 
and Ikegami & Sheahan (2016). There are population differences by sublocation, including ethnic group makeup, 
pastoral system and agro-ecology, and market accessibility. Proportional allocation relative to sublocation 
population size was used to determine the number of households from each sublocation to survey within set 
minimum and maximum bounds. 
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Table 1 provides household-level summary statistics. The first column presents the 
sample mean (all ten seasons pooled) for household-level covariates. All 924 households are 
included, but some are lost to attrition (discussed below), so there are 8,670 observations across 
the ten seasons. On average, households have 14.3 TLU. However, six percent of households 
have zero animals, so the average TLU holdings conditional on having any animals is 15.3. A 
histogram of TLU holdings can be found in Figure 3. The PLM index varies by division and 
season, with mean predicted livestock mortality at about 12%. The contract variable is an 
indicator variable taking the value of one if a household purchases any IBLI insurance during a 
given season. On average, one in eight households holds an insurance contract in a given season. 
Household can insure any number of animals, but the average number of TLU insured is about 
0.6, however conditional on purchasing insurance the average number of TLU insured is nearly 
five TLU. The treatment indicator takes a value of one if a household receives a coupon to 
purchase insurance in a given season. On average across the ten seasons, the treatment rate is just 
under 50% (this includes two baseline seasons when no coupons were distributed). 
The remaining summary statistics provide information on household characteristics. Over 
a third of households are headed by women. The dependency ratio
28
 is just about two, meaning 
the average household has twice as many dependents as able-bodied adults of working age. 
Household heads have very little formal education (about one year). Over a third of households 
are fully settled, although some of these may be formerly nomadic or partially-nomadic. Given 
the reliance on animal products in the region and the poor conditions for agricultural production, 
milk production is important for home consumption, sale, and consumption at satellite camps by 
                                                 
28
 The dependency ratio gives a sense of how many individuals are being cared for by the family. In this case, the 
dependency ratio equals the number of children under 18, plus seniors over 55 and disabled or chronically ill 
household members, divided by the number of able-bodied adults (between the ages of 18 and 55) in the household. 
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those moving with the animals. On average, households produce about two-thirds of a liter of 
milk a day at the primary homestead or base camp, while production at satellite camps is about 
twice as much. Average weekly food consumption expenditure is nearly 5,000 Kenyan shillings 
(nearly $60/week), although the median is about a third of that. Information on where the 
households live and insure is also provided.  
Since our identification strategy, discussed below, relies of the random distribution of the 
insurance coupons, we check to ensure balance between households that received coupons and 
those that did not. Panel A presents Season 1 summary statistics, broken down by future 
treatment. Untreated households are those who would not receive a coupon for IBLI purchases in 
Season 4, while treated households are those who would receive a coupon in Season 4.  There is 
no statistically significant difference in means between treated and untreated households.  
Table 1, Panel B provides summary statistics for households that appear in all rounds of 
the survey and those who attrit. We see a statistically significant difference between the means of 
the two groups in terms of dependency ratios, education, nomadism, and milk production at 
satellite camps. Note that while only 89% of the sample appears in all rounds, most of the 
“attrited” households do not drop out completely, but rather are missing for one or more rounds 
before reappearing in the sample. All analyses below control for the possibility of non-random 
attrition; see Appendix A for more information on our method. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics at the child level. Data was collected during each 
round for all children in surveyed households under the age of five, for a total of 1,083 eligible 
children. Since new children are born and some children age out of the sample (or their 
households attrit), the same children are not present in all rounds. The first column presents 
sample averages for the eligible children as often as they are present (for a total of 2,358 
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observations). We are interested in child health, measured anthropometrically using the child’s 
mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC). While other common child anthropometric measures 
such as weight-for-height and height-for-age are relevant, these measures are more prone to 
measurement error. In community-based management of malnutrition, children (aged 6 – 59 
months) are generally at risk for acute malnutrition when their MUAC falls below 13.5 cm. The 
sample mean MUAC is 14.4 cm, which is considered well-nourished. Figure 4 presents a 
histogram of MUAC, which is relatively normally distributed, if a bit peaked towards the mean. 
Just under half of the children are girls. Most of the sample means are close to the household-
level means presented in Table 1, although the dependency ratio is slightly higher in the child 
sample (not surprisingly). Milk production at both the homestead and satellite camp is higher in 
the child sample. 
Panel A compares pooled summary statistics for children in untreated and treated 
households in any given round. This is not a balance test since randomization was not at the child 
level and because some of the covariates may be impacted by the treatment. In fact, we do see 
that MUAC is higher for children in treated households. The means for consumption and milk 
production at the base camp are also statistically significantly higher among children in treated 
households, although milk production at the satellite camp and TLU holdings overall are lower. 
There are also some differences in terms of where the household lives and insures. Panel B 
presents the means for children that are present in each round for which they are eligible (as long 
as their family did not attrit) and for “missing” children, or children that are not surveyed, despite 
being eligible and their family not attriting. Thankfully, according to survey results none of the 
children are missing due to death nor have they been sent away to live with their biological 
parents. We see that children from female headed households are more likely to be missing, as 
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are children from settled households. The mean weekly food expenditure is much higher in 
households from which children are subsequently missing. There is also a geographical 
component to missingness. Panel B demonstrates that missing children are not missing at 
random. We therefore correct survey weights to control for this missingness, as discussed in 
Appendix A. 
IBLI and Mean Well-being 
Households in the IBLI program area decide whether or not to purchase the product, as 
well as how many animals to insure. As mentioned above, should the predicted livestock 
mortality index surpass contractual 0.15 strike point, the insurance holder receives a payout. In 
order to evaluate the impact of insurance on mean well-being, we estimate a nonlinear 
polynomial parametric regression model of stochastic well-being, W, for household 𝑖 (𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑁) in season 𝑠 (𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑆): 
(6) 𝑊𝑖𝑠 = 𝑔𝑀(𝛽𝑀𝑊𝑖,𝑠−1, 𝛿𝑀1𝑃𝐿𝑀𝑠−1, 𝛿𝑀2𝐼𝑠−1, 𝛿𝑀3(𝐷𝑠−1 ∗ 𝐼𝑠−1), 𝜹𝑴𝟒𝑯𝒊𝒔) + 𝑢𝑀𝑖𝑠. 
Suppressing household subscripts for now, the regression model describes current well-
being as a possibly nonlinear function of lagged well-being (𝑊𝑠−1) and a series of explanatory 
variables, including previous season predicted livestock mortality (𝑃𝐿𝑀𝑡−1), an indicator for 
holding an IBLI contract in the previous season (𝐼𝑠−1)
29
, and an interaction term indicating 
holding an IBLI contract in the previous season when the PLM surpassed the 0.15 strike point 
(𝐷𝑠−1 ∗ 𝐼𝑠−1). For simplicity we shall henceforth refer to seasons in which the PLM surpasses the 
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 For robustness, regressions were also computer controlling instead for the number of TLU insured in the past 
season, interacted with the drought. These estimates are available from the author by request. 
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indemnity threshold as droughts, indicated here by the indicator variable D. Since the impact of 
PLM on mean well-being is potentially nonlinear, 𝑃𝐿𝑀𝑠−1
2  is also included in all specifications. 
Current season household level characteristics (𝑯𝒊𝒔) such as education and nomadic status (as 
described in the summary statistics) are also included. As discussed below, polynomial terms for 
lagged well-being are included in most specifications to capture nonlinearities, with a minimum 
third-order polynomial required to capture S-shaped well-being dynamics.  
The 𝛽s and 𝛿s are coefficients and 𝑢𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the household- and season-specific residual for 
this mean (M) estimation. The coefficients of primary interest are therefore those on the indicator 
for holding and IBLI contract (𝛿𝑀2) and for holding a contract during a drought (𝛿𝑀3). The 
dependent well-being variables of interest (𝑊𝑖𝑡) are household livestock holdings in TLU and 
child anthropometry. Using both a productive asset/wealth measure and a health measure allows 
us to understand how insurance impacts the two key aspects of household wealth holdings in this 
context: their livestock and their children. Household aggregate livestock holdings are measured 
in TLUs (recall 1 TLU = 1 cow, 0.7 camel, 10 sheep, or 10 goats) held by each household in 
each round of the survey. In Northern Kenya, TLUs (which we will also refer to as herd size) 
allow households to store wealth, as there is limited access to formal banking. Animal are also 
productive assets, providing milk for household consumption and offspring, which can be sold 
for cash or saved. TLU holdings in any given period is strongly associated with past period TLU 
holdings (correlation coefficient = 0.8700), as demonstrated by the kernel regression of lagged 
TLU holdings on current period holdings (Figure 5). The second dependent variable of interest is 
child anthropometry (measured in MUAC). We check to see if there is evidence of dynamics in 
MUAC. Figure 6 provides the kernel regression of lagged MUAC on MUAC, showing a positive 
association between the two (correlation coefficient = 0.4135). 
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Given that TLU are necessarily non-negative, we assume the dependent variable is 
distributed Poisson and estimate a generalized linear model (GLM)
30
 log link regression using 
maximum likelihood. Table 3 presents the marginal effects at mean values of all covariates. In 
all specifications, we cluster standard errors at the household level and include attrition-corrected 
survey weights and season fixed effects. While there are important theoretical reasons why 
lagged dependent variables should be included in dynamic well-being models, it is necessary to 
test empirically whether there is evidence of path dynamics in our well-being indicators, as well 
as to evaluate the extent to which serial correlation may cause us to underestimate standard 
errors on our coefficient estimates. Column (1) provides coefficient estimates and standard errors 
estimated without including a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side, while column (2) 
includes polynomial terms up to the third-order and column (3) up to the fourth-order. The 
marginal effects of the lagged terms are statistically significant in both cases where they are 
included, and the fit in improves substantially (as evidenced by the increased pseudo R
2
). The 
final row shows the correlation coefficient between the residuals and lagged residuals. We see 
incredibly strong serial correlation in column (1), but we control for serial correlation fully when 
the first- through fourth-order lagged terms are included in the specification. 
It is not possible to include household fixed effects in a nonlinear model due to the 
incidental parameters problem. To avoid this issue, Table 3 columns (4) through (6) include the 
Mundlak (1978) cluster-level means of all covariates. We will henceforth refer to these simply as 
household fixed effects (FE) for the nonlinear models. Otherwise, columns (4)-(6) are identical 
to (1)-(3). Marginal effects for the lagged dependent variables continue to be positive and 
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 We prefer the GLM estimator over a simple log linear regression since we do not need to transform zero-valued 
dependent variables, of which there are many. Nor do we need to adjust predicted values to transform them from 
ln(TLU) to TLU. 
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statistically significant in the FE models. Serial correlation is a problem, as evidenced by the 
very large correlation coefficient on the FE specification in column (4). We can almost 
completely correct for the serial correlation by including the polynomial lagged terms up to the 
fourth-order as in column (6), although the correlation coefficient is still higher than in column 
(3).  
We retain the third specification (with up to a fourth-order lagged dependent variable, no 
household FE) as our preferred specification. In that specification (column (3)) we see that the 
coefficient on insurance in a non-drought season is negative, but not statistically significant. 
Holding an IBLI contract during a drought, however, is positively and statistically significantly 
associated with increased future herd size. A Wald test confirms that the two coefficients are 
statistically significantly different from each other (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 = 0.0797). Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and fixed-effects (using the within regression estimator) estimates are provided in 
Appendix B, Table B1 for robustness. Signs and magnitudes are similar between the nonlinear 
and linear estimators, although serial correlation in the linear model in minimized without the 
fourth-order polynomial term. Many of the coefficients in the preferred nonlinear specification 
are statistically significant while they are not in the corresponding (Table B1, column (3)) OLS 
estimate. 
In order to make a causal statement about the impact of IBLI on average herd size, we 
take advantage of the experimental design of the data to instrument for endogenous insurance 
uptake. As discussed above, the project randomly distributed coupons to decrease the cost of 
insurance to a subset of the sample. The coupons introduce the random variation needed to 
instrument for the endogenous decision to purchase insurance. Table 4 presents the first stage 
and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation results, including the first-, second-, and third-
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order lagged dependent variables found to minimize serial correlation (Appendix Table B2). 
There are three instrumental variables (IVs): past season coupon values when there was no 
drought, past season coupon values when there was a drought, and current season coupons 
received, which are used to instrument for current period insured TLU, which is used as a control 
variable. We do not instrument for lagged well-being given the correlation between TLU and its 
lagged values. We see that the signs in the 2SLS model are consistent with those in the nonlinear 
model we prefer and although the magnitudes are larger in the 2SLS specification, they are not 
statistically significantly different from zero. However, a Wald test confirms that the coefficients 
on IBLI during drought and not during drought are statistically significantly different from each 
other (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 = 0.0506).  
Turning to child health, we similarly run serial correlation tests on the MUAC mean well-
being regressions using Poisson MLE (Table 5) and OLS (in Appendix B, Table B2). 
Enumerators collected child health information annually, during each survey round. Therefore, 
MUAC data is only available for even seasons. We still regress MUAC on previous season PLM 
and insurance holdings, as in equation (6), but must proxy previous season MUAC (𝑊𝑖,𝑠−1) with 
previous round MUAC (i.e., 𝑊𝑖,𝑠−2), which is only available for seasons 4, 6, 8, and 10.  Once 
again, we assume the dependent variable is distributed Poisson and estimate a GLM regression 
with a log link using maximum likelihood. Table 5 presents the marginal effects at mean values 
for all covariates, using survey weights corrected as described in Appendix A and standard errors 
clustered at the child level. Despite the longer lag period between rounds, we continue to see 
evidence of path dynamics in child health. The serial correlation in the specification without lags 
(column (1)) is lower than we see with TLU, but still sufficiently high to be concerned about the 
impact on our standard errors. Including the lagged terms, however, substantially reduces the 
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serial correlation
31
. There is no different in serial correlation between the third-order (column 
(2)) and up to fourth-order (column (3)) specifications, although the pseudo R
2
 is slightly higher 
in the former specification. The marginal effect coefficients on our variables of interest in the 
fixed effects models (columns (4) through (6)) do not change, although we lose magnitude and 
statistical significance on some of the time-invariant child characteristics, as we would expect. 
We select the specification in column (2) as the preferred nonlinear MUAC specification and 
note that the coefficients on the two variables of interest—the association between previous 
season insurance holdings and child MUAC during non-drought and drought seasons—are both 
negative, but small in magnitude and not statistically significantly different than zero. Nor are 
they statistically significantly different from each other. Appendix B, Table B2 presents the OLS 
and FE results. The coefficients of interest are similar in sign, magnitude, and significance. Serial 
correlation is a particular problem in the FE specifications. 
We would like to explore the causal impact of insurance on child health, and attempt to 
do so using 2SLS using the same IVs discussed above. Table 6 presents the first stage 
regressions and 2SLS estimates of the impact of insurance on child MUAC with and without 
drought. While there is positive coefficient on the impact of insurance during non-drought 
seasons on MUAC, the coefficient on insurance during drought is negative. Neither coefficient is 
statistically significant, although the F statistics indicate that at least two of the IVs are incredibly 
weak.  
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 In fact, it appears to over correct to the point that serial correlation becomes negative. The magnitude is smaller 
however, and negative serial correlation is less of a concern as it may cause us to overstate rather than underestimate 
standard errors. 
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The Variance of Well-being 
As described in Section III, there are three steps involved in predicting households’ well-
being pdfs. We begin by predicting their mean well-being, using equation (6). In order to ensure 
that predictions are non-negative, we predict mean well-being values from our preferred 
nonlinear specifications discussed above (i.e., the TLU specification in Table 3 column (3) and 
the MUAC specification in Table 5 column (2)). Given the nonlinear nature of these estimates, 
we present the marginal effects at important representative values of the PLM index in the first 
panels of Tables 7 and 8, which we discuss below. 
As described above, the second step is to predict household well-being variance. We 
square the residuals estimated in equation (6) and regress them on the polynomial lagged well-
being terms, last season PLM, last season insurance holdings disaggregated by non-drought and 
drought seasons, and the same vector of household or child characteristics. Using the subscript V 
to indicate this is the variance equation, we estimate: 
(7) ?̂?𝑀𝑖𝑠
2 = 𝑔𝑉(𝛽𝑉𝑊𝑖,𝑠−1, 𝛿𝑉1𝑃𝐿𝑀𝑠−1, 𝛿𝑉2𝐼𝑠−1, 𝛿𝑉3(𝐷𝑠−1 ∗ 𝐼𝑠−1), 𝜹𝑽𝟒𝑯𝒊𝒔) + 𝑢𝑉𝑖𝑠. 
Variance is necessarily non-negative, so we estimate equation (7) for both the squared 
TLU residuals and squared MUAC residuals using Poisson MLE. The right panels of Tables 7 
and 8 provide the marginal effects for variables of interest at representative values of the PLM 
index. Specifically, we provide marginal effects at 𝑃𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 0.039 and 𝑃𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
0.265, which are the sample mean PLM for non-drought and drought years, respectively. Table 7 
panel (1), therefore, shows the marginal effects of various covariates during average non-drought 
(column (A)) and drought (column (B)) years. All other covariates are taken at their means. 
Recall that this is the same specification as Table 3 column (3), with marginal effects presented 
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at specific values of the PLM index rather than at its mean. Coefficients are therefore consistent 
with the previously discussed analysis, although it is interesting to note that the marginal effect 
on mean herd size of increasing predicted livestock mortality is much greater at lower values of 
the index, demonstrating the importance of allowing PLM to impact herd size nonlinearly. 
Panel (2) reports the marginal effects, again at two PLM index values, associated with 
increases in the variance or herd size. Since we previously estimated the dependent variable, 
report bootstrapped standard errors, clustered at the household or child level, for all variance 
equations. We see that holding insurance during a non-drought season is correlated with 
increased variance in herd size, while holding an IBLI contract during a drought is associated 
with a large decrease in the variance of herd size. Despite these interesting correlations, the 
coefficients are not statistically significant. We predict the variance of herd size for each 
household in each season and use this, along with the predicted mean TLU to parameterize the 
household’s TLU well-being distribution, as discussed below. 
Turning to child anthropometry in Table 8, panel (1) presents the marginal effects at the 
two (non-drought and drought) PLM index levels from the preferred MUAC specification (i.e. 
Table 5, column (2)). The association between IBLI and mean child MUAC is negative, small, 
and not statistically significant, regardless of drought conditions. Increased past season PLM is 
associated with higher MUAC, which is surprising, although the marginal effect does fall for 
high PLM. Panel (2) presents the variance estimates per equation (7). We see that IBLI in 
associated with decreases in the future variance of MUAC, both in drought and non-drought 
seasons, although the marginal effects are not statistically significant. The pseudo R2 on the 
variance estimates is very low, meaning there is a lot of variation in the variance of child 
anthropometry that we do not explain. 
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Development Resilience Estimation 
We use the household-season conditional predicted means from equation (6) and 
variances from equation (7) to parameterize household well-being distributions, which we 
assume to be distributed gamma
32
. As described in Section 3, we must select a well-being 
threshold, W, for each of our well-being indicators. Given a household’s well-being distribution 
in a particular season, the household’s resilience (in that season) as the probability that the 
household surpasses the threshold W, as in equation (4) above. So household i’s TLU resilience 
in season s (𝜌𝑖𝑠) is the area under its TLU well-being distribution beyond the threshold W. 
Figure 6 provides a concrete example, using a specific household from our dataset. For 
simplicity, we display only four rounds (rather than eight seasons). The household’s TLU 
holdings in each round are marked with the stars. The four distributions show the household 
TLU well-being distribution for the given round. Naturally, the realized TLU holdings lie on 
each of the curves. The red vertical line marks the TLU threshold 𝑊𝑇𝐿𝑈 = 14. So for a threshold 
of 14 TLU, Household 5008’s TLU resilience in Round 2 is the integral of their distribution 
beyond W (this can also be calculated using the complementary cumulative distribution function, 
as in equation (4)). We can see from the legend that 46% of the area under the black Round 2 
curve lies to the right of W, meaning ?̂?5008,2
𝑇𝐿𝑈 = 0.46. We can see that the household is affected 
by the drought, as their Round 3 distribution shifts to the left, causing a decrease in their TLU 
resilience. The household begins to recover in Round 4 and has achieved nearly complete 
resilience in Round 5. 
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 For a two-parameter distribution, the gamma distribution is much more general than the normal, and is entirely 
non-negative. 
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As the figure clearly demonstrates, the resilience scores depend on the selection of W. In 
order to identify the impact of IBLI on TLU and MUAC resilience for any given threshold, the 
household- and child-specific development resilience scores are regressed on the same set of 
regressors used in the well-beings equations, as in equation (8), below. 
(8) ?̂?𝑖𝑠 = 𝑔𝑅(𝛽𝑅𝑊𝑖,𝑠−1, 𝛿𝑅1𝑃𝐿𝑀𝑠−1, 𝛿𝑅2𝐼𝑠−1, 𝛿𝑅3(𝐷𝑠−1 ∗ 𝐼𝑠−1), 𝜹𝑹𝟒𝑯𝒊𝒔) + 𝑢𝑅𝑖𝑠. 
Since the resilience scores are necessarily between zero and one, we would prefer to use a 
fractional response specification. Unfortunately, the estimation of binomially distributed 
dependent variables using maximum likelihood is currently infeasible in the presence of 
endogenous explanatory variables. For the TLU specification, we instead estimate the impact of 
IBLI on TLU resilience via 2SLS, instrumenting for endogenous past season IBLI holdings 
interacted with drought with past season coupon receipts interacted with drought, as discussed 
above.
33
 Table 9 presents that 2SLS estimates for the impacts of IBLI on TLU resilience at 
various values of  𝑊𝑇𝐿𝑈. Figure 7 presents these coefficients visually. We see in Table 9 that the 
coefficients on IBLI holdings in non-drought seasons are smaller in magnitude than those during 
drought. In terms of interpretation, the -0.0497 coefficient on drought/IBLI interaction in Table 9 
column (1) means that holding IBLI in the past season, a drought season, increased a 
household’s probability of having at least two TLU by nearly 5 percentage points.  
The coefficients on both variables appear to drop initially before rising and remaining 
above zero. Interestingly, the coefficient on holding insurance during a drought season is not 
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 We do not instrument in the mean and variance equations since our goal in the first two stages is to maximize 
goodness of fit (predict household distributions of well-being well), not inference. We instrument in the final stage 
as causal inference is desired. 
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statistically significant unless our threshold value 𝑊𝑇𝐿𝑈 ≥ 20, above which the coefficient 
estimates are large and positive. This is consistent with recent work showing that IBLI is 
ineffective at preventing poverty backslides for households whose livestock holdings are below 
the critical herd growth threshold of approximately 15 TLU (Chantarat et al. 2017). As we can 
see clearly in Figure 7, the coefficients on both variables are maximized when the threshold is set 
around 30 or 31 TLU. This means that we see the largest causal impact of IBLI on TLU 
resilience when we consider households’ probabilities of maintaining or accumulating at least 30 
TLU. The 30 TLU threshold is economically meaningful, as it is the lower bound on the 
bifurcation point identified non-parametrically in a similar context by Barrett et al. (2006). For 
robustness, we provide the full regressions results for 𝑊𝑇𝐿𝑈 = 14  estimated via 2SLS and MLE 
Tobit
34
, each with and without household FE in Appendix B, Table B4. The results are incredibly 
robust; the 2SLS and Tobit estimates are nearly identical. 
Given the weak IV problem in the MUAC estimates, we assume MUAC resilience is 
distributed binomially and fit the GLM logit link regression using maximum likelihood without 
using any instruments. Table 10 presents the coefficients and standard errors for our two 
explanatory variables of interest for different values of 𝑊𝑀𝑈𝐴𝐶 . The coefficients are plotted 
visually in Figure 8. Note that the various threshold values are important indicators of child 
health; in community-based management of severe acute malnutrition (SAM), children under 
five are generally admitted for treatment of SAM when their MUAC falls below 11.5 cm (Binns 
et al. 2014). With MUAC below 12.5 cm children are considered at risk for acute malnutrition, 
while above 13.5 cm child are considered well nourished. 
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 ivtobit in Stata, censoring at 0 and 1. 
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We see that the coefficient on IBLI without drought is initially positive and significant 
for very low threshold levels (𝑊𝑀𝑈𝐴𝐶 = 11.5, column(1)), although the magnitude is very small. 
There appears to be no relationship between past seasons IBLI holdings and probabilities of 
subsequently becoming severely acutely malnourished in non-drought years. As the threshold 
increases, the coefficient on IBLI in non-drought seasons drop precipitously. However, the 
coefficients on IBLI during drought are positive and statistically significant, taking their 
maximum coefficient value around a threshold of 𝑊𝑀𝑈𝐴𝐶 = 13.5. This indicates that in both 
drought and non-drought seasons, IBLI is associated with positive (but small) increases in the 
probability of a child not being severally acutely malnourished the following season. Holding an 
IBLI contract during a drought season is associated with a nearly 4 percentage point increase in 
the probability of a child being well-nourished the following season, but holding an IBLI 
contract during a non-drought season is associated with a 2.5 percentage point decrease in the 
child’s probability of being well-nourished the following season. For robustness, Table B5 in 
Appendix B provides the full binomial MLE specification, presented in panel (1) at 
representative values of the PLM index. Panel (2) presents the intent-to-treat impact of randomly 
receiving a coupon in a given season on the following season’s child MUAC. While not 
statistically significant, the signs are consistent with those in the binomial specification. 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper evaluates the impacts of the IBLI insurance product on the development 
resilience of children and households in pastoral areas of Northern Kenya. Like much of the 
ASALs in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn, Marsabit County is prone to droughts. Although the 
climate is more suited to pastoralism than agricultural cultivation, pastoral and agro-pastoral 
households are nonetheless extremely vulnerable to drought. The index-based livestock 
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insurance program was designed to “manage the [weather] risks faced by vulnerable pastoral and 
agro-pastoral populations and provide them with a productive safety net” (Mude et al. 2009). 
The cycle of droughts and humanitarian response in this region, and in the ASALs in 
general, has motivated donor and governmental interest in building resilience with the goal of 
improving vulnerable populations’ abilities to manage risk and cope with shocks and in the 
hopes of reducing demands for humanitarian assistance. Given the goals of the IBLI project and 
the focus on resilience in the region, it is appropriate to evaluate the impacts of IBLI in terms of 
resilience. In order to do so, we predict household distributions of well-being in terms of two 
highly important indicators, livestock holdings and child health. Using both linear and nonlinear 
methods, we assess the impact of insurance on the probability that a household or child will have 
a high level of well-being, that is of their resilience. 
We find that holding an IBLI contract in the previous season increases a household’s 
TLU resilience—whether a drought occurred or not—when we consider the probability of 
having more than 15 TLU (close to mean TLU holdings), although the household’s resilience is 
increased more if the previous season was a drought season. The positive impacts of past season 
insurance on TLU resilience are statistically significant for thresholds of 20 TLU and above. 
This indicates that while index-based livestock insurance does increase the resilience, in terms of 
TLU holdings, of pastoralists in Northern Kenya, it does not effectively increase the resilience of 
the poorest households with the smallest initial herds. IBLI does, however, dramatically increase 
the resilience of slightly better-off households and appears to allow them to invest more in their 
herds while avoiding protective over-stocking.  
With regards to child health, we see a positive association between past season IBLI 
holdings and resilience during droughts. However, during non-drought season there is a negative 
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association between insurance and future MUAC resilience for higher thresholds of child well-
being. There appears to be no relationship between past season’s IBLI holdings and probabilities 
of subsequently becoming severely acutely malnourished in non-drought years.  
There are a few limitations to this analysis. Unfortunately, the small sample of children 
and weak instruments prevented us for looking at the causal impact of IBLI on child MUAC 
resilience, although the intent-to-treat analysis was consistent with the associational analysis. 
Future studies of this kind may increase the number of households surveyed with a particular 
focus on households with small children if they are interested in understanding the impact of 
policies or projects on child health and resilience. It may be worth following children even after 
their fifth or sixth birthdays in order to avoid highly unbalanced panels of children. Secondly, 
this paper emphasizes inference, taking advantage of the experimental nature of the IBLI data. 
We focus on variables that are typically associated with well-being in the rural Kenyan context, 
but future work may substantially improve on the predictive performance of our analysis using 
ensemble learning methods. 
Despite these shortcomings, this paper contributes to the body of evidence demonstrating 
the positive impact of IBLI on well-being. The relatively low cost of IBLI compared to safety net 
programs of similar impact (Jensen, Barrett, & Mude 2015) recommends it as the primary means 
of managing covariate drought risk in pastoral communities. While the findings are encouraging, 
IBLI should be piloted and assessed in other ASALs, such as in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger
35
, 
in order to establish the external validity of these findings. 
                                                 
35
 Mills et al. (2016) provide a nice classification of countries by TLUs supply and insurance infrastructure that 
could be used to inform future locations for IBLI pilots. 
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Future work on index insurance and resilience would benefit from randomizing access to 
a suite of products, including insurance, credit, and savings, particularly in combination with 
social protection programs that protect the poorest households from shocks. In combination, 
these activities may be able to protect households from climatic risk while incentivizing 
increased savings, prudent risk-taking, and investment in production activities that would allow 
households to increase standards of living while increasing their own resilience to the shocks 
they face. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Household Summary Statistics  
 Pooled  Panel A: Season 1 only Panel B: Season 1 only 
 
Sample 
Mean 
Untreated 
Season 4 
Treated 
Season 4 
T* 
Unattrited Attrited 
T* 
TLU
36
 14.3 15.9 17.1  17.1 13.9  
Conditional TLU 15.3 17.1 18.4  18.2 15.9  
PLM Index 0.119       
Contract (0/1) 0.125       
# Insured TLU 0.595       
Conditional # Insured 
TLU 
4.77       
Treatment (0/1) 0.456       
Female headed 0.376 0.369 0.388  0.377 0.327  
Dependency Ratio
37
 2.03 1.97 2.05  2.03 1.74 * 
Education (yrs) 1.03 1.20 0.947  0.970 2.59 *** 
Settled (0/1)
38
 0.375 0.258 0.221  0.229 0.317 ** 
Milk Prd 
39
- Base 0.644 0.764 0.775  0.775 0.816  
Milk Prd - Sat 1.21 1.54 1.41  1.45 1.93 ** 
Consumption
40
 4620 1400 1420  1430 1280  
Division
41
        
Central and Gadamoji 0.240 0.239 0.244  0.244 0.202  
Laisamis 0.147 0.139 0.132  0.137 0.125  
Loiyangalani 0.325 0.336 0.340  0.330 0.346  
Maikona 0.282 0.286 0.284  0.289 0.327  
North Horr 0.007       
        
N (households) 
8,670 
(924) 
360 (40.5%) 529 (59.5%)  
820 
(88.7%) 
104 
(11.3%) 
 
*T-test on difference of means: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
                                                 
36
 A tropical livestock unit (TLU) is an aggregate measure of livestock holdings. 1 TLU = 1 cow = 0.7 camel = 10 
sheep or goats. 
37
 The dependency ratio gives a sense of how many individuals are being cared for by the family. In this case, the 
dependency ratio equals the number of children under 18, plus seniors over 55 and disabled or chronically ill 
household members, divided by the number of able-bodied adults (between the ages of 18 and 55) in the household. 
If there are no working aged adults in the households, the number of dependents is divided by 1. 
38
 Indicates that a household is fully settled. “Partially nomadic” (i.e. agro-pastoral) and nomadic households not 
settled. 
39
 Daily average milk production in liters. This is disaggregated for the base camp (homestead) and satellite camp. 
40
 Winsorized (top 1%) weekly food consumption expenditure in Kenyan shillings, including value of produced 
foods consumed at home. The mean value is approximately $60/week. Median expenditure is much lower – closer to 
$20/week. 
41
 For households that insured, the division is listed as the division in which the household chose to insure, not the 
division of residence. For all other households, the division of residence is used. 
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Table 2: Child Summary Statistics  
 Pooled Panel A: Pooled (5 rounds) Panel B: Pooled  
 
Sample 
Mean 
Untreated in 
round 
Treated in 
round 
T* Not 
missing 
Missing
42
 T* 
MUAC
43
 (cm) 14.4 14.3 14.5 ** 14.4 14.3  
PLM Index 0.136       
Contract (0/1) 0.124       
# Insured TLU 0.636       
Conditional # 
Insured TLU 
5.12 
      
Treatment (0/1) 0.412       
Female headed 0.328 0.335 0.305  0.318 0.458 ** 
Girl (0/1) 0.481 0.468 0.500  0.483 0.417  
Dependency 
Ratio 
2.33 
2.36 2.28  2.33 2.22  
Head Educ (yrs) 1.12 1.16 1.05  1.12 1.04  
Settled (0/1) 0.362 0.355 0.373  0.356 0.556 *** 
Milk Prd - Base 1.15 1.08 1.25 * 1.16 0.847  
Milk Prd - Sat 2.41 2.54 2.23 ** 2.42 2.24  
Consumption 4960 3080 7660 *** 4800 10000 *** 
HH TLU holdings 15.2 16.3 13.5 *** 15.1 16.6  
Division
44
        
Central and 
Gadamoji 
0.210 
0.203 0.220  0.208 0.278  
Laisamis 0.160 0.154 0.170  0.163 0.0694 ** 
Loiyangalani 0.352 0.379 0.314 *** 0.347 0.500 *** 
Maikona 0.272 0.263 0.284  0.276 0.153 ** 
North Horr 0.006 0.001 0.011 *** 0.006 0  
        
N (children<5) 
2,358 
(1,083 ) 
1,387 
(58.8%) 
971 
(41.2%) 
 2,286 
(96.9%) 
72 
(3.1%) 
 
*T-test on difference of means: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
                                                 
42
 A child may not reappear for many reasons, including (random) aging out and (non-random) household attrition. 
Missingness here means unexplained missingness not caused by aging out or household attrition (which is already 
corrected for in the probability weights). 
43
 Mid upper arm circumference in cm. 
44
 For households that insured, the division is listed as the division in which the household chose to insure, not the 
division of residence. For all other households, the division of residence is used. 
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Table 3: Poisson MLE
45
 of mean TLU – specification and serial correlation checks (marginal effects at mean values) 
 (1) MLE (2) MLE (3) MLE (4) MLE (5) MLE (6) MLE 
VARIABLES TLU TLU TLU TLU TLU TLU 
TLU𝑠−1    
46
  0.449*** 0.663***  0.363*** 0.557*** 
  (0.0287) (0.0251)  (0.0250) (0.0251) 
PLMindexs−1 -13.07*** -10.03*** -8.410*** 1.347 -3.377* -2.721 
 (2.734) (1.702) (1.726) (3.318) (1.808) (1.954) 
(No drought # insurance) s-1 -0.192 0.285 -0.0830 -0.361 -0.0713 -0.0801 
 (0.630) (0.350) (0.338) (0.423) (0.291) (0.309) 
(Drought # insurance) s-1 0.734 1.096** 0.899** 0.186 0.451 0.626 
 (0.855) (0.427) (0.409) (0.616) (0.389) (0.417) 
Female Headed HH (indicator) 0.0170 -0.448 -0.517** -0.544 -0.185 0.0160 
 (0.758) (0.273) (0.222) (0.729) (0.670) (0.672) 
Dependency Ratio -0.411* -0.0859 -0.159** -0.182 -0.238 -0.209 
 (0.227) (0.0798) (0.0722) (0.208) (0.146) (0.164) 
Education of head in yrs -0.135 -0.0774 -0.0141 0.199 0.269** 0.297** 
 (0.181) (0.0568) (0.0623) (0.205) (0.129) (0.116) 
Settled HH (indicator) -6.543*** -1.904*** -1.717*** 0.229 0.566 0.153 
 (0.772) (0.323) (0.321) (0.665) (0.415) (0.365) 
Milk Production at Base 0.362 0.235*** 0.222*** 0.0633 -0.0252 0.00369 
 (0.234) (0.0797) (0.0777) (0.111) (0.0713) (0.0767) 
Milk Production at Satellite Camp 1.291*** 0.524*** 0.453*** 0.228* 0.282*** 0.280*** 
 (0.233) (0.115) (0.112) (0.117) (0.0827) (0.0852) 
Ln(consumption) 0.549** 0.170 0.103 0.0266 0.0958 0.127 
 (0.237) (0.123) (0.100) (0.147) (0.112) (0.109) 
# Insured TLU s 0.00386 0.00597 0.00588** -0.00504 0.000715 0.00311 
 (0.00905) (0.00372) (0.00242) (0.00772) (0.00396) (0.00284) 
HH FE
47
 N N N Y Y Y 
                                                 
45
 TLU is assumed to be distributed Poisson and fit using the canonical log link. This is essentially a log-linear model estimated using maximum likelihood. 
46
 First, second, and third order polynomial terms included in (2) and (5) and up to fourth order terms included in (3) and (6). 
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Pseudo R
2 
 
48
 0.0441 0.664 0.679 0.234 0. 699 0.701 
Correlation Coefficient 0.7666 0.2405 -0.0089 0.8027 0.2752 0.0420 
Clustered (HH) standard errors in parentheses. Season fixed effects included in all specifications. N=6,807.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
47
 In the nonlinear setting, rather than including HH fixed effects, household-level mean values of all covariates are included (Mundlak 1978). 
48
 All MLE pseudo R
2
 values are the correlation between the response and the fitted or predicted response, calculated using Stata’s glmcorr by Nicholas J. Cox. 
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Table 4: 2SLS estimates of mean TLU 
 (1) 1
st
 Stage (2) 1
st
 Stage  (3) 1
st
 Stage (4) 2SLS 
VARIABLES 𝐼𝑠−1 (𝐷𝑠−1 ∗ 𝐼𝑠−1) # Insured TLU TLU 
     
IV1: (No drought # coupon) s-1 0.00323*** -0.000811*** 0.00820  
 (0.000497) (0.000119) (0.0165)  
IV2: (Drought # coupon) s-1 -0.000864*** 0.00423*** 0.0106  
 (0.000263) (0.000716) (0.0128)  
IV3: Coupon s 6.17e-06 5.86e-05 -0.0111  
 (0.000218) (0.000162) (0.0152)  
TLU𝑠−1 0.000863 0.000508 0.0281 0.904*** 
 (0.000725) (0.000390) (0.0237) (0.0373) 
TLU𝑠−1
2  -1.50e-05** -6.65e-06* -0.000381 -0.00201*** 
 (7.38e-06) (3.87e-06) (0.000258) (0.000618) 
TLU𝑠−1
3  3.38e-08** 1.57e-08* 8.90e-07 3.92e-06*** 
 (1.56e-08) (8.16e-09) (5.81e-07) (1.46e-06) 
PLMindex𝑠−1 -0.358*** 0.641*** 2.253 -21.62*** 
 (0.0944) (0.0811) (7.695) (5.706) 
PLMindex𝑠−1
2  0.599*** -1.150*** -1.756 42.09*** 
 (0.191) (0.174) (15.42) (11.38) 
(No drought # insurance) s-1    -1.812 
    (2.532) 
(Drought # insurance) s-1    3.003 
    (2.822) 
Female Headed HH (indicator) -0.0121 -0.0198*** 0.778 -0.385 
 (0.0135) (0.00732) (0.716) (0.470) 
Dependency Ratio -0.00414 -0.00103 -0.220 -0.184* 
 (0.00443) (0.00207) (0.134) (0.112) 
Education of head in yrs -0.000572 -0.00149 -0.0161 -0.0184 
 (0.00230) (0.00110) (0.0153) (0.0389) 
Settled HH (indicator) 0.0378*** -0.000544 -0.331 0.145 
 (0.0124) (0.00807) (0.317) (0.420) 
Milk Production at Base -0.000127 0.00194 -0.145 0.0782 
 (0.00415) (0.00210) (0.166) (0.151) 
Milk Production at Satellite Camp 0.00483 -0.00167 -0.0578 1.035*** 
 (0.00403) (0.00187) (0.136) (0.165) 
Ln(consumption) -0.000853 -0.00689** -0.177 0.194 
 (0.00676) (0.00334) (0.212) (0.132) 
# Insured TLU s    -0.0323 
    (0.511) 
Constant 0.0349 -0.0110 1.103 0.686 
 (0.0495) (0.0274) (2.072) (1.916) 
     
R
2
 0.13 0.19 0.01 0.75 
F-stat / Wald 𝜒2 25.59 41.12 0.73 12018.85 
(0.0000) 
Clustered (HH) standard errors in parentheses. Season fixed effects included in all 
specifications. N=6,807. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 5: Poisson MLE
49
 of mean MUAC – specification and serial correlation checks (marginal effects at mean values) 
 (1) MLE (2) MLE (3) MLE (4) MLE (5) MLE (6) MLE 
VARIABLES MUAC MUAC MUAC MUAC MUAC MUAC 
MUAC𝑠−2  0.393*** 0.394***  0.383*** 0.384*** 
  (0.0573) (0.0576)  (0.0556) (0.0526) 
PLMindexs-1 3.062*** 3.487*** 3.519*** 2.420*** 3.369*** 3.401*** 
 (0.711) (0.891) (0.894) (0.697) (0.883) (0.887) 
(No drought # insurance) s-1 -0.0202 -0.174 -0.179 -0.0532 -0.165 -0.170 
 (0.132) (0.156) (0.154) (0.130) (0.155) (0.153) 
(Drought # insurance) s-1 0.189 -0.138 -0.148 0.172 -0.113 -0.123 
 (0.194) (0.209) (0.208) (0.188) (0.211) (0.210) 
Female Headed HH (indicator) -0.255** -0.356*** -0.349*** 0.286 0.301 0.308 
 (0.113) (0.0991) (0.0994) (0.338) (0.359) (0.359) 
Girl (indicator) -0.0492 -0.0867 -0.0945 -0.0631 -0.0971 -0.105 
 (0.0906) (0.0832) (0.0833) (0.0893) (0.0848) (0.0849) 
Dependency Ratio -0.0723*** -0.0246 -0.0251 0.00204 -0.0138 -0.0161 
 (0.0277) (0.0286) (0.0281) (0.0467) (0.0487) (0.0484) 
Education of head in yrs 0.0685*** 0.0421*** 0.0433*** 0.0274 0.0164 0.0168 
 (0.0171) (0.0132) (0.0134) (0.0520) (0.0501) (0.0503) 
Settled HH (indicator) 0.217** 0.0925 0.0881 0.120 0.0468 0.0431 
 (0.0923) (0.0912) (0.0915) (0.0967) (0.104) (0.104) 
Milk Production at Base -0.00857 -0.00862 -0.00834 -0.0144 -0.0130 -0.0127 
 (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0152) (0.0199) (0.0206) (0.0205) 
Milk Production at Satellite Camp -0.0124 -0.00376 -0.00255 0.00465 -0.00279 -0.00176 
 (0.0125) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0142) (0.0172) (0.0172) 
Ln(consumption) 0.114** 0.0232 0.0259 0.00616 -0.0417 -0.0396 
 (0.0485) (0.0622) (0.0617) (0.0560) (0.0802) (0.0796) 
TLU -0.000405 0.00111 0.000884 -2.32e-05 -0.000766 -0.000978 
 (0.00193) (0.00165) (0.00164) (0.00553) (0.00632) (0.00650) 
# Insured TLU s 0.00239 0.0147*** 0.0146*** 0.00246*** 0.0137*** 0.0135*** 
                                                 
49
 MUAC is assumed to be distributed Poisson and fit using the canonical log link. This is essentially a log-linear model estimated using maximum likelihood. 
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 (0.00152) (0.00505) (0.00500) (0.000938) (0.00502) (0.00498) 
Child FE
50
 N N N Y Y Y 
Observations 1,882 1,257 1,257 1,882 1,257 1,257 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0851 0.246 0.244 0.132 0.255 0.253 
Correlation Coefficient 0.3667 -0.1237 -0.1237 0.3463 -0.1205 -0.1199 
Clustered (child) standard errors in parentheses. Round FE included in all specifications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
                                                 
50
 In the nonlinear setting, rather than including child fixed effects, child-level mean values of all covariates are included (Mundlak 1978). 
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Table 6: 2SLS estimates of mean MUAC 
 (1) 1
st
 Stage (2) 1
st
 Stage  (3) 1
st
 Stage (4) 2SLS 
VARIABLES 𝐼𝑠−1 (𝐷𝑠−1 ∗ 𝐼𝑠−1) # Insured TLU MUAC 
     
IV: (No drought # coupon) s-1 0.00248*** -0.00107*** -0.00884  
 (0.000687) (0.000252) (0.00705)  
IV: (Drought # coupon) s-1 -0.000623 0.00641*** 0.00365  
 (0.000710) (0.00174) (0.00505)  
IV: Coupon s -2.23e-05 0.000351 0.00456  
 (0.000426) (0.000322) (0.00588)  
MUAC𝑠−2 1.136 -0.218 0.824 -8.806 
 (1.040) (0.430) (3.864) (11.52) 
MUAC𝑠−2
2  -0.0803 0.0175 -0.0182 0.588 
 (0.0776) (0.0310) (0.290) (0.763) 
MUAC𝑠−2
3  0.00187 -0.000442 -0.000448 -0.0124 
 (0.00192) (0.000733) (0.00720) (0.0168) 
PLMindexs−1  -1.006*** 1.541*** -4.048 13.16 
 (0.383) (0.390) (5.677) (20.09) 
PLMindexs−1
2  1.431** -2.118*** 4.496 -15.66 
 (0.609) (0.545) (8.464) (27.13) 
(No drought # insurance) s-1    3.324 
    (7.917) 
(Drought # insurance) s-1    -0.328 
    (1.334) 
Female Headed HH (indicator) -0.0235 -0.00428 -0.235* -0.00234 
 (0.0258) (0.0144) (0.138) (0.638) 
Girl 0.0191 0.0211 0.187 -0.346 
 (0.0210) (0.0144) (0.215) (0.631) 
Dependency Ratio 0.00227 0.000392 -0.00722 -0.0231 
 (0.00652) (0.00367) (0.0508) (0.0661) 
Education of head in yrs -0.00300 -0.00281 -0.0163 0.0691 
 (0.00323) (0.00268) (0.0184) (0.0562) 
Settled HH (indicator) 0.0406* -0.0202 -0.0382 -0.0114 
 (0.0210) (0.0157) (0.120) (0.261) 
Milk Production at Base -0.00182 0.00705** 0.0481 -0.0494 
 (0.00460) (0.00333) (0.0363) (0.0849) 
Milk Production at Satellite 
Camp 
0.00798 -0.00421* -0.00783 -0.0237 
 (0.00514) (0.00230) (0.0491) (0.0478) 
Ln(consumption) 0.0155 -0.00202 0.0395 -0.0670 
 (0.0132) (0.00615) (0.0479) (0.182) 
TLU -0.000469 0.000186 0.00364 -0.00163 
 (0.000503) (0.000228) (0.00626) (0.00846) 
# Insured TLU s    1.075 
    (1.548) 
Constant -5.268 0.592 -5.804 55.44 
 (4.589) (1.952) (17.59) (56.41) 
     
R
2
 0.11 0.38 0.01  
F-stat / Wald 𝜒2 4.87 23.37 3.94 104.44  
(0.0000) 
Clustered (child) standard errors in parentheses. Round fixed effects included in all specifications. N=1,257. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 7: Poisson MLE of TLU and its variance– marginal effects at representative values of 
the PLM index 
 (1) MLE (2) MLE 
VARIABLES TLU V(TLU) 
 (A) (B) (A) (B) 
PLM =  .039 0.265 .039 0.265 
     
TLUs−1  0.642*** 0.543*** 4.875 2.889 
 (0.0142) (0.0188) (65.14) (38.32) 
PLMindexs−1  -20.56*** 0.815 -624.7 5.834 
 (4.336) (1.739) (7,728) (123.4) 
(No drought # insurance) s-1 -0.118 -0.0998 8.192 4.855 
 (0.479) (0.406) (105.9) (62.31) 
(Drought # insurance) s-1 1.275** 1.080** -62.64 -37.13 
 (0.588) (0.492) (762.8) (448.6) 
Female Headed HH -0.733** -0.621** 58.83 34.86 
 (0.318) (0.268) (715.1) (420.5) 
Dependency Ratio -0.225** -0.191** -4.520 -2.679 
 (0.104) (0.0875) (58.67) (34.49) 
Education of head in yrs -0.0201 -0.0170 3.511 2.081 
 (0.0885) (0.0749) (41.99) (24.69) 
Settled HH (indicator) -2.436*** -2.063*** -9.826 -5.823 
 (0.470) (0.400) (125.3) (73.58) 
Milk Production at Base 0.316*** 0.267*** 2.828 1.676 
 (0.110) (0.0938) (35.67) (20.99) 
Milk Pr, Satellite Camp 0.643*** 0.545*** 20.91 12.39 
 (0.163) (0.137) (257.4) (151.4) 
Ln(consumption) 0.146 0.123 -5.670 -3.360 
 (0.142) (0.120) (67.77) (39.86) 
Insured TLU s 0.00834** 0.00706** -0.0182 -0.0108 
 (0.00346) (0.00291) (3.157) (1.871) 
     
Pseudo R
2
 0.679 0.614 
Clustered (HH) standard errors in parentheses. Variance standard errors are bootstrapped 
(reps=400). Season fixed effects included in all specifications. N=6,807. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 8: Poisson MLE of MUAC and its variance– marginal effects at representative values 
of the PLM index 
 (1) MLE (2) MLE 
VARIABLES MUAC V(MUAC) 
 (A) (B) (A) (B) 
PLM =  .039 0.265 .039 0.265 
     
MUAC𝑠−2 0.351*** 0.370*** 0.108 0.134 
 (0.0401) (0.0434) (0.0732) (0.114) 
PLMIndexs−1 4.588*** 2.058*** 1.533 0.794 
 (1.261) (0.710) (2.536) (1.707) 
(No drought # insurance) s-1 -0.169 -0.178 -0.308 -0.383 
 (0.152) (0.161) (0.290) (0.361) 
(Drought # insurance) s-1 -0.134 -0.141 -0.533 -0.664 
 (0.203) (0.215) (0.355) (0.586) 
Female Headed HH -0.346*** -0.365*** 0.0870 0.108 
 (0.0961) (0.102) (0.190) (0.230) 
Girl -0.0845 -0.0890 0.239 0.297 
 (0.0811) (0.0853) (0.170) (0.240) 
Dependency Ratio -0.0240 -0.0253 0.0287 0.0357 
 (0.0278) (0.0294) (0.0581) (0.0695) 
Education of head in yrs 0.0410*** 0.0432*** -0.0184 -0.0229 
 (0.0129) (0.0135) (0.0248) (0.0328) 
Settled HH (indicator) 0.0902 0.0950 0.246 0.307 
 (0.0888) (0.0936) (0.180) (0.227) 
Milk Production at Base -0.00840 -0.00885 -0.0610 -0.0760 
 (0.0150) (0.0158) (0.0376) (0.0541) 
Milk Pr, Satellite Camp -0.00366 -0.00386 0.000414 0.000515 
 (0.0131) (0.0138) (0.0228) (0.0284) 
Ln(consumption) 0.0226 0.0238 0.0348 0.0434 
 (0.0605) (0.0639) (0.120) (0.159) 
TLU 0.00108 0.00114 -0.00290 -0.00361 
 (0.00160) (0.00169) (0.00321) (0.00451) 
# Insured TLU s 0.0144*** 0.0151*** -0.00604 -0.00752 
 (0.00491) (0.00520) (0.0257) (0.0319) 
     
Pseudo R
2
 0.246 0.022 
Clustered (child) standard errors in parentheses. Variance standard errors are bootstrapped 
(reps=400). Round fixed effects included in all specifications. N=1,257. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 9: 2SLS Coefficient Estimates on TLU resilience at various values of 𝑊𝑇𝐿𝑈 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
𝑾𝑻𝑳𝑼: 2 8 14 20 26 32 38 
(No drought # insurance) s-1 -0.019 -0.0442 -0.00675 0.0311 0.0554 0.0627 0.0502 
 (-0.0322) (-0.0391) (-0.0446) (-0.0474) (-0.0476) (-0.0428) (-0.0362) 
(Drought # insurance) s-1 0.0497 -0.0447 0.00522 0.0861* 0.141*** 0.154*** 0.133*** 
 (-0.0345) (-0.0405) (-0.0424) (-0.0467) (-0.0499) (-0.0475) (-0.0405) 
Clustered (HH), bootstrapped (reps=400) standard errors in parentheses. N=6,807. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Table 10: Binomial MLE Coefficient Estimates on MUAC resilience at various values of 
𝑊𝑀𝑈𝐴𝐶  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑾𝑴𝑼𝑨𝑪: 11.5 12.5 13.5 14.5 
(No drought # insurance) s-1 0.000356* -0.000755 -0.0254*** -0.0808*** 
 (0.000205) (0.00114) (0.00348) (0.00593) 
(Drought # insurance) s-1 0.00430*** 0.0238*** 0.0386*** -0.0215*** 
 (0.000551) (0.00241) (0.00707) (0.00776) 
Clustered (child), bootstrapped (reps=400) standard errors in parentheses. N=1,257. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Map of Kenya and Marsabit County 
 
Adapted from Wikipedia 
Figure 2: Timeline of IBLI Sales and Data Collection Rounds 
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Figure 3: Histogram of TLU
51
 Figure 4: Histogram of MUAC 
  
Figure 5: Kernel Regression of Lagged TLU and TLU 
 
                                                 
51
 In order to facilitate interpretation, outliers above 150 TLU have been censored from all figures. 
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Figure 5: Kernel Regression of Lagged MUAC and MUAC 
  
1
0
1
2
1
4
1
6
1
8
M
id
-u
p
p
e
r 
a
rm
 c
ir
c
u
m
fe
re
n
c
e
 i
n
 c
m
10 12 14 16 18 20
Lagged MUAC
95% CI Mid-upper arm circumference in cm lpoly smooth
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = .65, pwidth = .97
Local polynomial smooth
95 
Figure 6: Household 5008’s distributions of TLU well-being over time 
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Figure 7: 2SLS Coefficients Estimates of IBLI on TLU resilience 
 
 
Figure 8: Binomial MLE Coefficients Estimates of IBLI on MUAC resilience 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Attrition 
There is evidence of non-random attrition by households, as shown in the summary 
statistics. To avoid bias due to attrition, we adjust the survey probability weights to oversample 
households similar to those who attrited based on observables. We calculate these attrition-
correcting inverse probability weights following Baulch & Quisumbing (2011) and multiply 
them by the survey probability weights. The probits used in this calculation are below (Columns 
(1) and (2)). Note that following Wooldridge (2002), only households that are surveyed at 
baseline (in Round 1) are included in the analysis (throughout the paper) despite the inclusion of 
replacement households when originally surveyed households could not be resurveyed. 
Columns (3) and (4) present the probit results on non-missingness for children. As 
mentioned in above, children may (randomly) enter and leave the child survey sample as they are 
born or age out. Some children are lost to follow-up because their families attrit. Eligible (age 
appropriate) children that are missing from the child sample and whose households have not 
attrited are considered missing. The household survey confirms that no children are missing due 
to death or moving back home to live with their biological parents. Nonetheless, child 
missingness is not random, as can be seen in the probit below. The predicted missingness from 
columns (3) and (4) are used to correct survey weights for missingness in the MUAC regressions 
above. 
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Table A1: Probit estimates on non-attrition and non-missingness 
 (1) Probit (2) Probit (3) Probit (4) Probit 
VARIABLES HH remains HH remains Child not missing Child not missing 
     
Female Headed HH (indicator) -0.167 -0.0873   
 (0.136) (0.115)   
Girl (indicator)   0.0965 0.134 
   (0.110) (0.106) 
Dependency Ratio 0.0594 0.0373 0.0278 0.0297 
 (0.0397) (0.0348) (0.0446) (0.0400) 
Education of head in yrs -0.0560* -0.0541*** 0.0437 0.0231 
 (0.0337) (0.0166) (0.0591) (0.0188) 
Head literate (indicator) -0.128  -0.328  
 (0.310)  (0.520)  
HH head age (yrs) -0.00625  -0.00153  
 (0.00382)  (0.00407)  
Child age (months)   0.00789** 0.00799** 
   (0.00340) (0.00330) 
Settled HH (indicator) -0.0859 -0.0730 -0.403*** -0.378*** 
 (0.0834) (0.0781) (0.130) (0.116) 
Sublocation attrition rate -4.973***  -0.649  
 (1.113)  (0.938)  
Sublocation child missing rate   -4.664*  
   (2.592)  
Milk Production at Base -0.00217 0.0216 0.00208 0.0272 
 (0.0336) (0.0335) (0.0336) (0.0297) 
Milk Production at Satellite Camp 0.00168 0.00530 0.00797 -0.00444 
 (0.0225) (0.0228) (0.0217) (0.0189) 
Ln(consumption) 0.0309 0.0762 -0.114* -0.0824 
 (0.0473) (0.0550) (0.0599) (0.0582) 
HH TLU Holdings    -0.00254 
    (0.00189) 
Season FE Y Y N N 
Division FE Y N Y N 
Religion FE Y N Y N 
Constant 2.283*** 0.709* 3.341*** 2.239*** 
 (0.490) (0.405) (0.586) (0.492) 
     
Observations 8,664 8,664 2,348 2,355 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1575 0.0901 0.0781 0.0344 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, clustered at HH ((1) & (2)) and child-level ((3) and (4).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Appendix B: Robustness Checks 
 
Table B1: Linear estimates of mean TLU – specification and serial correlation checks 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) FE
52
 (5) FE (6) FE 
VARIABLES TLU TLU TLU TLU TLU TLU 
       
TLU𝑠−1  0.903*** 1.001***  0.448*** 0.693*** 
  (0.0324) (0.0651)  (0.0823) (0.106) 
TLU𝑠−1
2
  -0.00199*** -0.00480**  0.000572 -0.00549* 
  (0.000553) (0.00196)  (0.00114) (0.00308) 
TLU𝑠−1
3
  3.87e-06*** 2.39e-05*  3.71e-07 4.07e-05* 
  (1.31e-06) (1.31e-05)  (2.46e-06) (2.16e-05) 
TLU𝑠−1
4
   -3.60e-08   -7.00e-08* 
   (2.25e-08)   (3.81e-08) 
PLMindex𝑠−1  -52.83*** -18.46*** -16.98*** -4.635 -9.826* -9.537* 
 (12.65) (4.810) (4.848) (9.487) (5.719) (5.677) 
PLMindex𝑠−1
2  131.0*** 37.07*** 33.75*** 19.35 20.37 20.00 
 (30.81) (10.30) (10.51) (21.07) (12.70) (12.68) 
(No drought # insurance) s-1 -0.753 -0.0939 -0.135 -0.358 -0.207 -0.249 
 (0.753) (0.379) (0.378) (0.699) (0.519) (0.520) 
(Drought # insurance) s-1 0.794 0.626 0.551 1.227 0.842* 0.786 
 (1.054) (0.479) (0.476) (0.751) (0.510) (0.507) 
Female Headed HH (indicator) -0.549 -0.444** -0.389** 0.618 0.690 0.797 
 (0.857) (0.182) (0.196) (1.003) (0.858) (0.842) 
Dependency Ratio -0.548** -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.340 -0.264 -0.250 
 (0.248) (0.0646) (0.0660) (0.282) (0.201) (0.203) 
Education of head in yrs -0.0900 -0.0201 -0.0116 -0.0637 0.0784 0.0743 
 (0.147) (0.0379) (0.0383) (0.251) (0.153) (0.149) 
Settled HH (indicator) -5.440*** 0.106 0.267 0.744 0.705 0.709 
 (0.784) (0.307) (0.362) (1.008) (0.551) (0.538) 
                                                 
52
 Probability weights in the fixed effects equations are average household-level probability weights. 
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Milk Production at Base 0.650 0.0863 0.0519 0.0797 0.0326 0.0347 
 (0.453) (0.126) (0.126) (0.200) (0.150) (0.150) 
Milk Production at Satellite Camp 4.118*** 1.023*** 0.979*** 1.234*** 0.959*** 0.931*** 
 (0.443) (0.157) (0.151) (0.280) (0.184) (0.185) 
Ln(consumption) 0.574** 0.182* 0.172* 0.144 0.136 0.146 
 (0.275) (0.0983) (0.0975) (0.193) (0.140) (0.140) 
# Insured TLU s 0.00484 0.00202 0.00126 -0.00929 -0.00179 -0.000299 
 (0.0162) (0.00558) (0.00542) (0.0190) (0.0104) (0.00929) 
HH FE N N N Y Y Y 
Constant 14.65*** 3.478*** 2.919*** 13.67*** 7.482*** 5.977*** 
 (2.527) (0.939) (1.031) (2.006) (1.329) (1.603) 
       
Adjusted R
2
 0.232 0.754 0.755 0.0541 0.407 0.412 
Number of HH    889 889 889 
Correlation Coefficient 0.7434 0.0152 0.0207 0.8347 0.3872 0.3640 
Clustered (HH) standard errors in parentheses. Season fixed effects included in all specifications. N=6,807. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table B2: Linear Estimates of mean MUAC – specification and serial correlation checks 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) FE
53
 (5) FE (6) FE 
VARIABLES MUAC MUAC MUAC MUAC MUAC MUAC 
       
MUAC𝑠−2  -3.729 -38.08  6.332 -55.01 
  (3.809) (30.43)  (5.565) (35.69) 
MUAC𝑠−2
2   0.273 3.994  -0.446 6.231* 
  (0.280) (3.317)  (0.393) (3.759) 
MUAC𝑠−2
3   -0.00600 -0.183  0.00970 -0.310* 
  (0.00682) (0.159)  (0.00921) (0.174) 
MUAC𝑠−2
4    0.00314   0.00568* 
   (0.00283)   (0.00301) 
PLMindexs−1  5.024*** 5.290*** 5.314*** 5.459*** 6.130*** 6.123*** 
 (1.277) (1.540) (1.540) (1.357) (1.562) (1.519) 
PLMindexs−1
2  -7.190*** -6.158** -6.154** -10.29*** -13.88*** -13.76*** 
 (2.545) (2.767) (2.762) (2.857) (3.604) (3.531) 
(No drought # insurance) s-1 -0.0207 -0.178 -0.182 -0.173 -0.142 -0.126 
 (0.130) (0.155) (0.153) (0.144) (0.142) (0.144) 
(Drought # insurance) s-1 0.192 -0.140 -0.150 -0.218 -0.0429 -0.0757 
 (0.201) (0.216) (0.215) (0.207) (0.266) (0.262) 
Female Headed HH (indicator) -0.252** -0.351*** -0.344*** -0.112 0.625 0.625 
 (0.111) (0.0977) (0.0978) (0.404) (0.583) (0.573) 
Girl (indicator) -0.0484 -0.0874 -0.0942    
 (0.0906) (0.0834) (0.0833)    
Dependency Ratio -0.0712*** -0.0239 -0.0242 0.0438 -0.0171 -0.0216 
 (0.0271) (0.0282) (0.0278) (0.0467) (0.0546) (0.0547) 
Education of head in yrs 0.0707*** 0.0442*** 0.0452*** 0.0232 0.0491 0.0451 
 (0.0180) (0.0139) (0.0141) (0.0469) (0.0545) (0.0530) 
Settled HH (indicator) 0.215** 0.0922 0.0878 0.102 -0.0451 -0.0459 
 (0.0925) (0.0916) (0.0918) (0.0922) (0.106) (0.106) 
Milk Production at Base -0.00864 -0.00865 -0.00835 0.0146 -0.0594** -0.0568** 
 (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0151) (0.0240) (0.0248) (0.0250) 
Milk Production at Satellite Camp -0.0120 -0.00360 -0.00244 -0.00447 -0.00657 -0.00476 
 (0.0123) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0170) (0.0165) (0.0167) 
Ln(consumption) 0.115** 0.0250 0.0273 -0.0305 0.0361 0.0373 
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 Probability weights in the fixed effects equations are average child-level probability weights. 
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 (0.0497) (0.0634) (0.0629) (0.0674) (0.0565) (0.0557) 
HH TLU holdings -0.000407 0.00108 0.000864 0.000792 -0.00446 -0.00478 
 (0.00192) (0.00163) (0.00162) (0.00356) (0.00535) (0.00523) 
# Insured TLU s 0.00239 0.0153*** 0.0150*** 0.00457*** -0.0116 -0.0113 
 (0.00155) (0.00537) (0.00529) (0.000845) (0.0278) (0.0289) 
Child FE N N N Y Y Y 
Constant 12.83*** 28.48* 146.1 13.44*** -14.52 194.4 
 (0.438) (17.14) (103.6) (0.597) (26.00) (125.9) 
       
Observations 1,882 1,257 1,257 1,882 1,257 1,257 
Adjusted R
2
 0.112 0.246 0.247 0.132 0.250 0.257 
Number of children    941 730 730 
Correlation Coefficient
54
 0.3672 -0.1244 -0.1245 0.4122 0.7049 0.7109 
Clustered (child) standard errors in parentheses. Round fixed effects included in all specifications. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
                                                 
54
 The correlation coefficient is the pairwise correlation coefficient between the regression residual and the lagged value of the regression residual. Higher 
correlations indicate serial correlation. 
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Table B3: Binomial
55
 MLE of TLU resilience – marginal effects at representative values of 
the PLM index 
 (1) MLE (2) MLE 
VARIABLES ?̂?𝑖𝑠
𝑇𝐿𝑈, 𝑊 = 14 ?̂?𝑖𝑠
𝑇𝐿𝑈 , 𝑊 = 14 
 (A) (B) (A) (B) 
PLM =  .039 0.26 .039 0.26 
     
TLUs−1  0.0183*** 0.0158*** 0.0183*** 0.0158*** 
 (0.00129) (0.000934) (0.00129) (0.000948) 
PLMindexs−1  -0.397*** 0.0416*** -0.385*** 0.0434*** 
 (0.0476) (0.00705) (0.0472) (0.00707) 
(No drought # insurance) s-1 -0.00321 -0.00288   
 (0.00217) (0.00194)   
(Drought # insurance) s-1 0.00791* 0.00710*   
 (0.00441) (0.00395)   
(No drought # treatment) s-1   0.00111 0.001000 
   (0.00190) (0.00171) 
(Drought # treatment) s-1   -0.00227 -0.00205 
   (0.00328) (0.00296) 
Female Headed HH -0.00746*** -0.00670*** -0.00768*** -0.00692*** 
 (0.00190) (0.00171) (0.00194) (0.00175) 
Dependency Ratio -0.00391*** -0.00351*** -0.00392*** -0.00354*** 
 (0.000655) (0.000564) (0.000655) (0.000567) 
Education of head in yrs 0.000477 0.000428 0.000494 0.000445 
 (0.000402) (0.000357) (0.000399) (0.000356) 
Settled HH (indicator) -0.0379*** -0.0341*** -0.0379*** -0.0342*** 
 (0.00288) (0.00203) (0.00287) (0.00205) 
Milk Production at Base 0.00534*** 0.00480*** 0.00535*** 0.00482*** 
 (0.000644) (0.000533) (0.000647) (0.000537) 
Milk Pr, Satellite Camp 0.0119*** 0.0107*** 0.0118*** 0.0107*** 
 (0.00133) (0.000974) (0.00133) (0.000984) 
Ln(consumption) 0.00159* 0.00143* 0.00145* 0.00131* 
 (0.000850) (0.000762) (0.000843) (0.000758) 
Insurance TLU 0.000207 0.000186 0.000207 0.000187 
 (0.000127) (0.000114) (0.000159) (0.000143) 
     
Pseudo R
2
 0.983 0.983 
Clustered (HH) standard errors in parentheses. Variance standard errors are bootstrapped 
(reps=400). Season fixed effects included in all specifications. N=6,807.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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 ?̂?𝑖𝑠
𝑇𝐿𝑈 is assumed to be distributed binomially and fit using the canonical logit link. This is essentially a fraction 
response logistic regression. 
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Table B4: 2SLS and IV Tobit Estimates of TLU resilience  
 (1) 2SLS (2) 2SLS FE (3) ivtobit [0,1] (4) ivtobit [0,1] 
VARIABLES ?̂?𝑖𝑠
𝑇𝐿𝑈, 𝑊 = 14 ?̂?𝑖𝑠
𝑇𝐿𝑈, 𝑊 = 14 ?̂?𝑖𝑠
𝑇𝐿𝑈, 𝑊 = 14 ?̂?𝑖𝑠
𝑇𝐿𝑈, 𝑊 = 14 
     
TLU𝑠−1 0.0371*** 0.0429*** 0.0371*** 0.0403*** 
 (0.00349) (0.000914) (0.00455) (0.000915) 
TLU𝑠−1
2
 -0.000390** -0.000521*** -0.000391* -0.000444*** 
 (0.000157) (1.76e-05) (0.000206) (2.05e-05) 
TLU𝑠−1
3
 1.51e-06 2.34e-06*** 1.52e-06 1.82e-06*** 
 (1.98e-06) (1.09e-07) (2.61e-06) (1.38e-07) 
TLU𝑠−1
4
 -1.93e-09 -3.32e-09*** -1.94e-09 -2.42e-09*** 
 (7.10e-09) (1.86e-10) (9.29e-09) (2.44e-10) 
PLMindext−1  -0.515*** -0.597*** -0.502*** -0.468*** 
 (0.0680) (0.0687) (0.0677) (0.114) 
PLMindext−1
2   1.121*** 1.314*** 1.094*** 1.075*** 
 (0.159) (0.164) (0.158) (0.219) 
(No drought # insurance) s-1 -0.00675 -0.0253 -0.00592 -0.0570 
 (0.0446) (0.0292) (0.0446) (0.0394) 
(Drought # insurance) s-1 0.00522 0.00309 0.00779 -0.0439 
 (0.0424) (0.0267) (0.0429) (0.0488) 
Female Headed HH (indicator) 0.0163** 0.00413 0.0159** 0.00156 
 (0.00683) (0.0143) (0.00683) (0.0147) 
Dependency Ratio -0.00183 -0.00274 -0.00184 -0.00496** 
 (0.00204) (0.00187) (0.00201) (0.00227) 
Education of head in yrs 0.00101 0.000871 0.00101 2.41e-07 
 (0.00113) (0.00287) (0.00110) (0.00219) 
Settled HH (indicator) 0.00372 -0.0325*** 0.00393 -0.0276*** 
 (0.00636) (0.00400) (0.00731) (0.00526) 
Milk Production at Base -0.000240 0.00777*** -0.000156 0.00682** 
 (0.00317) (0.00173) (0.00323) (0.00274) 
Milk Production at Satellite Camp 0.0117*** 0.0158*** 0.0118*** 0.0152*** 
 (0.00193) (0.00194) (0.00205) (0.00196) 
Ln(consumption) 0.000680 0.000236 0.000829 -0.000186 
 (0.00253) (0.00158) (0.00251) (0.00180) 
HH FE N Y N Y
56
 
Constant -0.0181 -0.0387** -0.0208 -0.0505 
 (0.0243) (0.0160) (0.0270) (0.0907) 
     
Overall R
2
 0.90 0.896   
Number of HH  889   
Wald 𝜒2  471036.22  
(0.0000) 
14152.05 
(0.0000) 
16822.65 
(0.0000) 
Clustered (HH) standard errors in parentheses. (1) & (3) are bootstrapped (reps=400). (2) 
does not contain survey weights. Season fixed effects included in all specifications. N=6,807. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
  
                                                 
56
 Fixed effects in column (4) are implemented using household-level means for all covariates. 
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Table B5: Binomial
57
 MLE of MUAC resilience – marginal effects at representative values 
of the PLM index 
 (1) MLE (2) MLE 
VARIABLES 𝜌𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝑈𝐴𝐶 , 𝑊𝑀𝑈𝐴𝐶 = 13.5 𝜌𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝑈𝐴𝐶 , 𝑊𝑀𝑈𝐴𝐶 = 13.5 
 (A) (B) (A) (B) 
PLM =  .039 0.265 .039 0.265 
     
MUAC𝑠−2 0.0892*** 0.0565*** 0.0903*** 0.0551*** 
 (0.00180) (0.00118) (0.00187) (0.00136) 
PLMindexs-1 1.195*** 0.324*** 1.321*** 0.335*** 
 (0.0426) (0.0111) (0.0567) (0.0113) 
(No drought # insurance) s-1 -0.0318*** -0.0201***   
 (0.00439) (0.00276)   
(Drought # insurance) s-1 0.0485*** 0.0307***   
 (0.00879) (0.00570)   
(No drought # treatment) s-1   -0.00187 -0.00114 
   (0.00335) (0.00205) 
(Drought # treatment) s-1   0.00906 0.00552 
   (0.00759) (0.00467) 
Female Headed HH -0.111*** -0.0703*** -0.111*** -0.0678*** 
 (0.00307) (0.00195) (0.00331) (0.00216) 
Girl -0.0479*** -0.0303*** -0.0485*** -0.0296*** 
 (0.00269) (0.00177) (0.00296) (0.00189) 
Dependency Ratio -0.00744*** -0.00471*** -0.00762*** -0.00465*** 
 (0.000872) (0.000554) (0.000920) (0.000574) 
Education of head in yrs 0.0163*** 0.0103*** 0.0164*** 0.0100*** 
 (0.000815) (0.000545) (0.000858) (0.000552) 
Settled HH (indicator) 0.00197 0.00125 -0.000502 -0.000306 
 (0.00275) (0.00174) (0.00293) (0.00179) 
Milk Production at Base 0.00239** 0.00151** 0.00268** 0.00163** 
 (0.00116) (0.000736) (0.00119) (0.000732) 
Milk Pr, Satellite Camp -0.00127** -0.000801** -0.00178*** -0.00109*** 
 (0.000512) (0.000324) (0.000531) (0.000324) 
Ln(consumption) 0.00376*** 0.00238*** 0.00353** 0.00215** 
 (0.00141) (0.000890) (0.00154) (0.000939) 
TLU 0.000629*** 0.000398*** 0.000658*** 0.000401*** 
 (6.80e-05) (4.30e-05) (7.13e-05) (4.42e-05) 
# Insured TLU s 0.00640*** 0.00405*** 0.00550*** 0.00335*** 
 (0.000848) (0.000542) (0.00108) (0.000669) 
     
Pseudo R
2
 0.967 0.932 
Clustered (child), bootstrapped (reps=400) standard errors in parentheses. Round fixed 
effects included in all specifications. N=1,257. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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 ?̂?𝑖𝑠
𝑀𝑈𝐴𝐶  is assumed to be distributed binomially and fit using the canonical logit link. This is essentially a fraction 
response logistic regression. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LIVELIHOOD DIVERSIFICATION AND WELL-BEING IN UGANDA:  
A DEVELOPMENT RESILIENCE APPROACH 
 
Jennifer Denno Cissé 
I. Introduction 
It is commonly accepted that households in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), particularly rural 
households, employ diversified livelihood strategies. But why do these households choose to 
diversify? In an early publication, Binswagner (1983) lays out a clear story of the road from 
subsistence agriculture to specialization, pointing out that rural areas gain from specialization, 
which leads to significant (albeit not always well-distributed) increases in average income.  
Yet households continue to diversify. While the heterogeneous nature of livelihood 
portfolio decision processes was pointed out some 15 years ago (Ellis 1998), much of the recent 
empirical work has focused on diversification as an ex-ante risk mitigation strategy. Carter 
(1997), for example, views diversification as conditional self-insurance, protecting households 
against microclimatic risk and weather shocks in the face of incomplete (insurance and credit) 
markets. This would indicate that diversification may have resilience-enhancing benefits, allow 
households to better manage risk and cope with shock. Yet while diversification may certainly be 
a logical risk-mitigation strategy in some contexts, decreasing absolute risk aversion would 
imply that the poorest households would diversify more than their wealthier neighbors. This 
theory is not supported by much of the empirical literature on diversification, which finds more 
diversification at higher income levels (Barrett, Reardon, and Webb 2001). 
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Others view diversification as a result of rational agents gradually entering into new and 
better livelihood options. Balihuta and Sen (2001) argue more effort needs to be directed toward 
policy measures that contribute “positively to livelihood diversification that allows households to 
move out of poverty” (8). As Barrett, Reardon, and Webb (2001) remind us, however, income 
diversification might result naturally for a variety of reasons, including diminishing returns to 
factors of production, market failures and incomplete markets, and risk management and coping 
practices. If diversification is the result of market failures, policy would have the greatest impact 
on poverty by addressing the root market imperfections. 
The thin recent literature on diversification and resilience finds that livelihood 
diversification promotes resilience, particularly in the face of complex social-ecological systems 
(Goulden et al. 2013) and climate change (Seo 2012). This argument has also been championed 
by development NGOs (TANGO 2012). Yet the relationship between livelihood diversification 
— including diversification across sectors, functions, and space (Barrett, Reardon, and Webb 
2001) — and the resilience of households in the face of shock remains unclear. Given the 
increasing focus by the international community on resilience building, and the promise of 
diversification to contribute to the resilience of vulnerable communities in SSA, empirical 
evidence on diversification and well-being is needed. In particular, evidence is needed not only 
of average associations, but also the relationship between diversification and the variability of 
well-being. 
In order to understand the relationship between crop and income diversification in rural 
Uganda and development resilience, I apply the Cissé and Barrett (2016) resilience approach to a 
large, nationally-representative panel dataset. I find that income diversification is negatively 
associated with increased resilience at all expenditure threshold levels. Crop diversification is 
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significantly and positively associated with increased resilience when considering expenditures 
above the absolute poverty line. However, I find that diversifying into cash crop production is 
associated with lower levels of resilience. 
II. Risk Management and Livelihood Diversification 
While there are many opinions (see Martin and Lorenzen, 2016, for a recent review) 
about the reasons for and role of livelihood diversification in the literature, these can broadly be 
classified as the “progressive success” role and the “distress diversification” role.  
Progressive success is the process of gradually entering into new and better livelihood 
options (Martin & Lorenzen 2016) that allow households to escape poverty (Balihuta & Sen 
2001). These are generally caused by “pull factors,” as increased wealth allows households to 
overcome barriers to entry into (presumably higher-return) non-farm livelihoods and also spurs 
demands for non-farm goods and services (Barrett & Reardon 2000). There is a substantial 
literature showing that barriers to entry into non-farm livelihoods are important in SSA (Barrett 
& Reardon 2000), which would explain why diversification is often positively correlated with 
wealth (Reardon et al. 2000, Bigsten & Tengstam 2011, Martin & Lorenzen 2016), and suggest 
that asset-based poverty traps may be preventing households from moving into higher-return 
activities (Barrett & Reardon 2000). Household-level diversification is not necessarily 
contradictory to the theory of specialization, as individual family members may specialize within 
the household (Ellis 2000). 
Nonetheless, there is mixed evidence on the role that non-farm activities play in rural 
incomes (Martin & Lorenzen 2016). This may be due, in certain contexts, to the presence of 
distress diversification, which includes both ex ante risk management through self-insurance due 
to incomplete financial markets (Carter 1997, Barrett & Reardon 2000)—including portfolios 
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that have lower risk but lower average returns—and ex post coping due to reduced capacity to 
manage shocks, both of which could be considered “push factor” (Barrett & Reardon 2000). 
Although diversification may serve as a form of self-insurance, crop diversification may not 
contribute positively to risk management given the highly correlated nature of the risk profiles 
(Barrett & Reardon 2000). In fact, diversification based on natural resource use is viewed by 
some as increasing vulnerability to shocks, including climate change (Thomas & Twyman 2005). 
Seasonal diversification
58
, for example growing different crops at different times of the 
year or working off-farm during the dry season, may fall into either category. Some researchers 
also consider seasonal diversification as a type of distress diversification (Martin & Lorenzen 
2016), as households attempt to smooth consumption over the course of the year. On the other 
hand, seasonal diversification (including crop diversification) may be a rational response to 
varying returns to labor and other inputs over the course of the year (Ellis 2000).  
III. Data and Context 
In order to understand the relationship between both crop and income diversification and 
resilient well-being in Uganda, I use three rounds of the Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS), 
a household-level panel dataset collected in 2009–10, 2010–11, and 2011–12. The UNPS is 
representative at the national, urban/rural, and four regional levels (discussed below) and 
includes data on approximately 3,200 households. It is implemented jointly by the Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics and the World Bank Living Standard Measurement Study—Integrated 
Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) program.  In addition to the typical LSMS style household 
survey questions, the UNPS and other LSMS-ISA surveys collect high quality data on 
                                                 
58
 The process of diversifying the households livelihood portfolio over time such that different activities are 
performed during different seasons. 
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agriculture, including crop production and livestock earnings. The analysis additionally benefits 
from data aggregates on household income sources generated by the Rural Income Generating 
Activities (RIGA) project. 
These data me to explore on-farm crop diversification as well as income diversification 
from on- and off-farm sources (including remittances), and how each of these relates to well-
being while controlling for elevation, geo-referenced weather variables, a variety of household 
characteristics, assets, livestock, landholdings, and self-reported shocks. The dependent variable 
of interest is well-being, measured in terms of monthly household expenditure per adult 
equivalent (PAE). Given my interest in on-farm crop diversification, I limit the dataset to rural 
households included in the RIGA dataset, of which there are nearly 1,800. 
Uganda contains four regions (see Figure 1): Central, Eastern, Western, and Northern. 
Central borders Tanzania and contains the capital, Kampala, and much of the Lake Victoria 
shoreline. The Eastern region borders Lake Victoria and Kenya, while the Western region 
borders Tanzania, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as well as Lake 
Edward and Lake Albert. Generally speaking, these regions experience bimodal rainfall, 
allowing two crops annually (FAO 1999). The Northern region, on the other hand, transitions to 
a unimodal rainfall pattern and borders DRC to the West, South Sudan to the North, and Kenya 
to the East. The conditions in the North are less favorable for crop agriculture and more 
favorable for extensive livestock production (FAO 1999). 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the rural RIGA dataset, broken out by round. 
The average household contains around six people, two or three of which are of working age 
(over 14 but under 60 years of age). Nearly three-quarters of households are headed by men, 
although the rate seems to decrease slightly over time. The average household head has 
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completed about 5 years of formal education. In Round 1, nearly 70% of households report 
having experienced a shock in the last year, although this falls to below half in Rounds 2 and 3. 
As mentioned above, the dependent variable of interest is monthly expenditure PAE in 
2005-2006
59
 Ugandan shillings (USh).  Monthly expenditure, monthly expenditure PAE, acres 
under cultivation, acres under cash crop cultivation, wages, assets, and livestock holdings 
(measured in tropical livestock units, or TLU
60
) have extremely long tails and are therefore 
winsorized
61
 (right side only) at the 1% level. Both total income and own income (income from 
self-employment activities) have some negative values and long tails on both ends of the 
distribution, so I winsorize these at the 1% level on both ends. The histogram of the winsorized 
density for monthly PAE expenditure can be found in Figure 2. As I show in Table 1, the average 
monthly expenditure in Round 1 (2009-2010) is 51,000 USh, which is about $28
62
 per month, or 
$0.90 per (adult equivalent) person per day. This is well below the international poverty line of 
$1.25/day in 2005 dollars.  
The primary explanatory variables of interest are crop diversification and income 
diversification. A major consideration when exploring the relationship between well-being and 
diversification is how to measure diversification. Different methods and definitions are used in 
                                                 
59
 The LSMS data are converted to 2005-2006 USh in order to compare real values to the initial survey round. I have 
maintained the use of 2005-2006 real values for simplicity. 
60
 In this context, one tropical livestock unit is equivalent to two cattle, donkeys, or horses; five pigs; ten sheep or 
goats; or one hundred poultry, fowl, or rabbits.  The conversations are based on Chilonda & Otte (2006) coefficients 
for SSA and may not be comparable to other TLU calculations for East Africa. 
61
 Summary statistics for the original and winsorized variables, as well as histograms of the unwinsorized densities 
for PAE monthly expenditure can be found in Appendix 1. 
62
 Using historical August 2005 exchange rates (1829.27 USh/$, average of the August 2005 buy and sell rates) 
according to the bank of Uganda: 
https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/collateral/interbank_forms/2005/Aug/major_25Aug05.html. 
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the literature (see Barrett & Reardon 2000, Martin & Lorenz 2016 for a more thorough 
discussion of various measures employed in the literature). Some use combinations of different 
types of activities—such as farm income, non-agricultural work, and self-employment income—
to explore diversification (Bigsten & Tengstam 2011), while others count the total number of 
activities undertaken at the household level (Martin & Lorenz 2016). Neither of these methods, 
however, weights according to intensification in a various activity. For this reason, I use 
transformed Herfindahl indices, normalized between zero and one, which sum up squared 
proportions of intensity in various activities, with zero meaning that a household is completely 
specialized in one crop (or one type of income) and one representing a highly diversified crop (or 
income) portfolio. I have provided more details on how the diversification indices are calculated 
in Appendix 2. While the transformed Herfindahl index has many strengths in this setting, it has 
certain drawbacks as well. The index cannot distinguish between crops or activities that have 
highly correlated returns, meaning that diversification into a secondary crop with a similar 
climate risk exposure would not be captured differently than diversification into a crop with a 
very different risk profile. Unfortunately, the LSMS-ISA data is not sufficient to identify the 
variance-covariance matrix that would be required in order for such agronomic detail to be 
incorporated. Given that any strategy to address this shortcoming of the transformed Herfindahl 
index would likely inject significant measurement error, I opt to move forward with the 
Herfindahl despite this concern. 
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that households are moderately diversified in 
terms of their crop portfolio on average, and diversification increases very slightly after Round 1. 
Interestingly, income diversification decreases from its high in Round 1. On average, households 
have more diversified crop portfolios than income portfolios. This is particularly evident when 
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examining the distributions of the two indices, as seen in Figure 3. Interestingly, a scatter plot 
(Figure 4) of the two shows little relationship between having a diversified crop portfolio and 
income diversification; the correlation coefficient is only 0.0795. As one can see in Table 1, 
households have between two and three acres under cultivation on average, very little of which 
(only an eighth of an acre) is under cash crop cultivation—meaning land used for coffee, cotton, 
tea, tobacco, vanilla,  or cocoa. Wage and own income data is in annual USh and was aggregated 
by RIGA. We see higher average wage than own income, although the range for own income is 
larger. In terms of assets, I explore both livestock and non-productive assets, as data on 
productive assets is not available in the same manner across all rounds. As mentioned above, 
livestock holdings are measured in TLU, and the average households has 1.46 TLU in Round 1, 
falling slightly across rounds. Interestingly, households hold a large amount of self-reported, 
non-productive (non-agricultural) assets—which I will refer to simply as assets—on average. I 
sum these up at self-reported values, averaging nearly $6,000 in assets per household.  
In the analysis, I also control for a variety of climactic and geological variables. These 
include rainfall in mm, rainfall difference with long-run average, the satellite-based greenness 
indicator Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI), the EVI difference with long-run average, and the 
elevation in meters of the community in which the household lives. Both of the difference 
variables are calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference between the current year’s 
value and the long-run average, divided by the district standard deviation. This is to get a sense 
of how different the growing conditions were in the given year from the average growing 
conditions. 
In Table 2, I dig into the regional distribution of the sample and breakdown a few key 
variables. The households are pretty well-distributed across the four regions. In order to get a 
 122 
sense of levels of absolute poverty, as well as consistency with other sources, I calculate the 
share of households in each region spending fewer than 26,000 USh PAE per month (about $14). 
I will consider this to be the absolute rural poverty line. We can see that 11%, 20%, 30%, and 
23% of rural households in Central, Eastern, Northern, and Western regions, respectively, are 
below this absolute poverty line. This is somewhat close to the 14%, 25%, 49%, and 23%, 
respectively, of rural households in 2009-2010 below the headcount poverty line (for caloric 
requirements plus a few non-food needs) in these regions according to the Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics (UBOS 2010, chapter 6). I also breakdown the crop and income diversification indices 
by region. Crop diversification is relatively constant across the regions, and increasing over time 
in Central and Western. Income diversification is highest in the Northern region, likely due to the 
importance of livestock income in the region.  
IV. Empirical Model 
This paper employs the Cissé & Barrett (2016) conditional moments-based resilience 
approach to understand the dynamic relationship between rural Ugandan livelihood 
diversification and well-being in the face of shocks. The resilience approach allows researchers 
to estimate household-level well-being probability density functions (pdfs) and associated 
predicted levels of well-being. By estimating not only the mean but also the variance of well-
being, the resilience approach is well-suited to exploring the relationship between well-being and 
diversification. 
The empirical approach below is as described in Cissé and Ikegami (2016). I begin by 
estimating the mean well-being equation, 
(1) 𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔𝑀(𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝛽𝑀) + 𝑢𝑀𝑖𝑡. 
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𝑊𝑖𝑡 is the household i’s well-being (in terms of monthly expenditures) in round t. Well-being is a 
non-linear function of past-period well-being (𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1); household factors of production/ 
characteristics, assets, portfolio decisions, and weather (𝑿𝒊𝒕); parameters (𝛽𝑀); and a residual 
(𝑢𝑀𝑖𝑡). Given that the relationship between expenditure and diversification may be non-linear, I 
begin regressing expenditure on polynomials of crop (Table 3) and income (Table 4) 
diversification. Both tables clearly indicate that the relationship is highly non-linear, with the 
adjusted R-squared values indicating that the 5th order polynomials fit the data best. I explore the 
non-linearities in Figure 5, which plots the predicted expenditure at various diversification levels. 
For crop diversification, we see expenditure peak at low levels of diversification (although not at 
complete specialization) before dipping at moderate levels of diversification. Expenditure 
increases again for households with high levels of crop portfolio diversification, although the 
confidence intervals are very large. The trend is similar, although more muted, for income 
diversification. All remaining explanatory variables in 𝑿𝒊𝒕 are included as levels only, with the 
exception of head age and household size. I include squared terms for each of these to allow for 
possible non-linearities.  
Given that a household’s monthly expenditure is non-negative, I assume that the 
dependent variable is distributed Poisson and estimate a generalized linear model (GLM)
63
 log 
link regression using maximum likelihood. I discuss the results in the following section. The first 
central moment (conditional mean, or 𝜇1𝑖𝑡) is:  
(2) ?̂?1𝑖𝑡 ≡ 𝐸[𝑊𝑖𝑡|𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕] = 𝑔𝑀(𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, ?̂?𝑀).  
                                                 
63
 See Cissé and Ikegami (2016) for a discussion of why GLM is preferred over ordinary least squares. 
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where E represents the expectation operator and the random error term 𝑢𝑀𝑖𝑡 is mean zero. I can 
then take the predicted residuals from equation (1) and square them to calculate conditional 
variance (𝜇2𝑖𝑡), where ?̂?2𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸[𝑢𝑀𝑖𝑡
2 ] = ?̂?𝑖𝑡
2  and: 
(3) 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝑔𝑉(𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝛽𝑉) + 𝑢𝑉𝑖𝑡,  
and 𝐸[𝑢𝑉𝑖𝑡] = 0. Regressing the conditional variance on the same explanatory variables allows 
me to explore not only how diversification and household characteristics are associated with 
mean well-being, but also how they are associated with variations in well-being.  
Still following Cissé and Barrett (2016), as described in Cissé and Ikegami (2016), I 
define development resilience (𝜌𝑖𝑡) as the probability that household i will have expenditure in 
round (t) above some expenditure poverty line threshold, W. I assume the conditional 
expenditure pdf for each household comes from a two parameter gamma distribution such that: 
(4) 𝜌𝑖𝑡 ≡ Pr(𝑊𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑊|𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕) = F̅Wit(𝑊; ?̂?1𝑖𝑡(𝑊𝑖𝑡, 𝑿𝒊𝒕), ?̂?2𝑖𝑡(𝑊𝑖𝑡, 𝑿𝒊𝒕)),  
where F̅it is the complementary cumulative distribution function. The association between any 
component of X and resilience may be therefore be estimated by regressing the ?̂?𝑖𝑡 I calculated 
on 𝑿𝒊𝒕: 
(5) ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔𝑅(𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝛽𝑅) + 𝑢𝑅𝑖𝑡. 
The histogram of 𝜌𝑖𝑡 for W = 26,000 USh/mo can be seen in Figure 6. Recalling that I’ve 
described 26,000 USh as the absolute poverty line (roughly equivalent to PAE expenditure of 
$14/month), it is perhaps not surprising that a large number of households have resilience scores 
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equal to 1, meaning that their entire expenditure pdf lies to the right of the absolute poverty 
threshold.  It is clear that the association between expenditure resilience and diversification (or 
other household characteristics) likely depends on the selection of the poverty line ▁W. I 
therefore choose to recalculate (4) and reevaluate (5) for a variety of different well-being 
thresholds W. This will allow me to see if crop diversification is associated with increased 
probabilities of surpassing, for example, low poverty line thresholds while perhaps income 
diversification is associated with increased resilience for higher poverty line thresholds. 
V. Results 
Figure 7 shows the predicted path dynamics of expenditure for two models. The complex 
model includes higher order polynomial terms (including a third order term of lagged 
expenditure and the preferred high order diversification indices. The parsimonious model retains 
a square lagged expenditure term and level terms for the diversification indices (equivalent to 
Table 5 Column 3, below). As can be seen from the path dynamics in Figure 7, the two models 
are virtually indistinguishable, and therefore the parsimonious model is preferred for subsequent 
specifications. Further, the figure demonstrates that while the path dynamics are non-linear, there 
is only one stable equilibrium, at just below 50,000 USh (approximately $25 PAE per month). 
While this is nearly twice the rural Ugandan absolute poverty line, it is still well below the 
international $1.25/day poverty line in 2005 dollars. It is worth noting that this equilibrium is 
very close to the sample mean PAE monthly expenditure level. 
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Table 5 presents the marginal effects (at mean values of all covariates
64
) from a Poisson 
MLE regression on mean (Columns 1-3) and variance (Columns 4-6)
65
 of expenditure using the 
parsimonious model discussed above. I include survey weights, a series of households control 
variables (household size, labor, an indicator for having a male head, the years of education of 
the head, and his/her age), regional dummies, and household level Mundlak
66
 fixed effects in all 
specifications. We can see from the statistically significant coefficients on the lagged well-being 
term that there are significant path dynamics in expenditure resilience. In Column 1 of Table 5, I 
regress expenditure on diversification and household assets and other controls without 
controlling for cash crop cultivation or levels of non-farm income. Neither the coefficient 
estimates on crop diversification nor on income diversification is statistically significant. The 
coefficient estimates for total income (from all sources) and assets are significantly, positively 
associated with well-being. Those for EVI and elevation are also statistically significantly 
associated with expenditure, although the coefficient estimates for rainfall and deviations from 
typical EVI and rainfall are not significant.  
In Columns 2, I introduce area of land under cash crop cultivation in order to assess 
whether diversification into cash crop cultivation is confounding the relationship with crop 
diversification. Neither the estimated coefficient on cash crop cultivation nor on area cultivated 
is significant. In Column 3, I additionally include levels of two types of non-agricultural income: 
                                                 
64
 For robustness, I present an alternative specification, holding lagged expenditure at the absolute poverty line, in 
Appendix 3 Table A3. The results are largely consistent. 
65
 Predicted conditional variance is calculated for Columns 4, 5, and 6 using the regressions in Columns 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. 
66
 Given the inclusion of a lagged variable, standard fixed effects are not appropriate. I opt instead to include 
Mundlak fixed effects through the inclusion of household level means of crop and income diversification indices, 
area under cultivation, TLU, assets, shocks, HH labor, the various income measures, and cash crop area. 
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wage income and own (self-employment) income. The estimates for these additional inclusions 
are not statistically significant and do not change the overall story presented by the data. In 
general, it appears that crop and income diversification are not associated with mean levels of 
household expenditure. Income and assets continue to be highly associated with expenditure, 
perhaps as should be expected. 
Following equation (3), I regress the conditional variance of household monthly 
expenditure on the same right hand side. Results of the Poisson MLE regressions are displayed in 
Columns 4-6. Neither crop nor income diversification is associated with increased conditional 
variance of expenditure, although increased area under cultivation is positively associated with 
increased variance, highlighting the riskiness of agricultural livelihoods. As I show in Column 5, 
this relationship is even larger (and stronger) when controlling for cash crop cultivation, although 
the coefficient estimate for cash crop cultivation is not statistically significant. Neither the 
coefficient estimate for total income nor for either of the non-farm income variables is 
statistically significantly associated with increased conditional variance of expenditure. 
Somewhat surprisingly, assets are positively associated with an increase in variance, perhaps a 
result of the increased investment opportunities available to these households. 
Using the predicted conditional mean and variance (from Columns 3 and 6), I construct 
well-being distributions for each household for Rounds 2 and 3 (Round 1 is used at the lagged 
values for Round 2) as described in equation (4), above. The resilience score for the household is 
the probability that the household will be above the threshold poverty line W in that period given 
their well-being distribution. In order to evaluate the importance of the poverty line threshold W, 
and recalling that mean expenditure PAE is around 50,000 USh per month, I calculated eleven 
resilience scores per household per period, using evenly dispersed values for W between 13,000 
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and 143,000 USh, the latter of which is about $2.60/day, or twice the international poverty line 
of $1.25/day (2005 dollars). Following equation (5), I then regress these resilience scores on the 
right hand side variables mentioned previously using a binomial
67
 GLM with a logit link via 
MLE.  
The regressions for select values of W are provided in Table 6.  As suspected, the 
selection of W is important in understanding the relationship between diversification and 
resilience. Controlling for area under cultivation (including cash crop cultivation), we see that 
crop diversification is not significantly associated with increased resilience when the absolute 
poverty line is selected as the well-being threshold (Column 1), although crop diversification is 
significantly associated with increased resilience for higher well-being thresholds (Columns 2 
and 3). The magnitude also varies with the choice of well-being threshold selected. The table 
presents marginal effects (at means) which have been multiplied by 100 so that they can be 
interpreted as percentage points. The 2.83 estimated coefficient on crop diversification in 
Column 2 should be interpreted as at average levels of all covariates, going from completely 
specialized to a completely diversified crop portfolio is associated with an increase in resilience 
by nearly three percentage points (i.e., is associated with a three percentage point increase in the 
probability of the household having expenditure above 78,000 USh PAE).  
Coefficient estimates for area under cultivation and cash crop area are both statistically 
significant in all three specifications (for various well-being thresholds). Interestingly, we see 
that area under cultivation is negatively associated with resilience when a very low (absolute 
poverty line) threshold is considered. For higher thresholds, however, area under cultivation is 
positively associated with resilience. Meaning that ceteris paribus (and for mean values of all 
                                                 
67
 A binomial distribution is assumed for the dependent variable since it lies on a range from 0 to 1. 
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covariates), increasing the area under cultivation is associated with a decreased probability of 
achieving the absolute poverty line, however once a higher threshold is selected, increasing area 
under cultivation is positively associated with increased resilience. Increasing cash crop 
cultivation is negatively associated with resilience regardless of well-being threshold, although 
the magnitude decreases towards zero as higher well-being thresholds are considered. Increasing 
cash crop cultivation is therefore associated with lower levels of resilience, driven by the lower 
levels of mean well-being for cash crop producers. 
When controlling for levels of income, including levels of wage and self-employment 
income, income diversification is consistently negatively (and significantly) associated with 
resilience, although the magnitude decreases for higher well-being thresholds. Column 1 
indicates that moving from a specialized to a diversified income portfolio decreases expenditure 
resilience, or the probability that a household will have at least absolute poverty line expenditure, 
by 3.5 percentage points. So while more income is associated with increased resilience across all 
specifications (as one would expect), more diversified income is not. Interestingly, the signs on 
the estimated coefficients for wage and own (self-employment) income are negative in all 
specifications, so holding total income constant, increasing the share of that income that comes 
from wage and self-employment sources is associated with decreased resilience. This is likely a 
combined effect from the mean decreasing but variance increasing relationships we see with 
these non-farm incomes sources in Table 5.  
These coefficients can be more clearly understood visually, however, so I plot the 
coefficient estimates for the different poverty thresholds in Figure 8, along with the 95% 
confidence interval. Here it is easy to see that both crop and income diversification are actually 
associated with lower resilience for very low well-being thresholds (below the 26,000 USh rural 
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absolute poverty line). Crop diversification becomes increasingly associated with increased 
resilience for higher well-being thresholds, however, passing zero at a well-being threshold 
equivalent to the absolute poverty line. Plotting the coefficient estimates for different well-being 
thresholds allows us to see at what level diversification is most strongly associated with 
resilience. From Figure 8, we see that moving from a specialized to a diversified crop portfolio is 
associated with the largest increases in resilience when considering the probability of a 
household having expenditure of 52,000 USh or more per person per month (about 
$0.95/person/day, and close to the sample mean expenditure level). As higher well-being 
thresholds are considered (as it moves towards and surpasses the international poverty line) the 
magnitude of the association between crop diversification and resilience decreases. 
For income diversification, we see a consistent negative and statistically significant 
relationship between income diversification and resilience, as I also showed in Table 6. From 
Figure 6, we see that the negative relationship is maximized around well-being thresholds of 
39,000 USh of expenditure person/month. This is below the mean expenditure level in the panel, 
so setting the well-being threshold this low focuses the analysis on changes in well-being 
distributions of the least resilient households, meaning that having a diversified income portfolio 
is most negatively associated with resilience for the least resilient households. 
VI. Conclusion 
By building on the development resilience theory set forth by Barrett and Constas (2014) 
and the empirical research on diversification discussed above, this paper provides the first 
empirical analysis using the Cissé and Barrett (2016) development resilience approach of how 
diversification is correlated with household development resilience in Uganda. This question is 
not academic; as national governments, international organizations, and donors increasingly 
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focus on building resilience to shocks and stressors in agriculturally-dependent developing 
countries, many are focusing on on-farm and income diversification as possible strategies for 
increasing resilience. For a resilience-building strategy to be successful, however, it should 
ideally increase mean well-being, while decreasing risk (or the variance of well-being) in the 
face of shocks and stressors. The Cissé and Barrett (2016) approach is particularly well-suited to 
undertaking this sort of analysis, as approaches based on analyses of mean associations only 
neglect potentially important relationships between diversification (or other risk management 
strategies) and the conditional variance of well-being.  
The analysis herein shows that crop and income diversification are not linearly associated 
with conditional mean well-being in terms of monthly household expenditure in rural Uganda. 
Nor is there a straightforward association between increased diversification and resilience. While 
crop diversification is weakly associated with increased expenditure, income diversification is 
not. Holding levels of diversification constant, increased shares of cash crop production is 
negatively (although not statistically significantly) associated with increased well-being. 
Similarly, holding levels of income diversification constant, increased shares of self-employment 
and wage income are weakly, negatively associated with increased well-being. 
In terms of resilience, or the probability that a household surpasses a given normative 
well-being threshold (W) in a given period, we see that income diversification is negatively 
associated with increased resilience regardless of well-being threshold, possibly indicating that it 
is being used as a last resort strategy by these households. Crop diversification is not associated 
with increased resilience for these poorest households, possibly due to fixed costs or limited 
access to land or agricultural inputs. Once the resilience threshold is increased above the rural 
absolute poverty threshold of 26,000 USh PAE per month, however, crop diversification is 
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significantly and positively associated with resilience in terms of expenditure. This positive 
relationship between crop diversification and increased resilience peaks at a well-being threshold 
of 52,000 USh. Somewhat surprisingly, area under cultivation is negative and significant for very 
low thresholds, possibly driven by poor access to inputs for the least resilient households or that 
area increases for those households are on lower quality land. The drivers of this relationship 
could be explored with further research. Once a well-being threshold above the rural absolute 
poverty line is considered, increased area under cultivation is positively associated with 
resilience. However, cash crop cultivation is negatively associated with resilience across the 
board, seemingly due to its negative relationship to mean expenditures. 
Taken together, these results indicate that diversification on-farm should have a place in 
the resilience-building toolkit, although pushing farmers into cash crops may be 
counterproductive. It does not appear that income diversification on its own is sufficient to 
increase resilience, although increasing incomes in general is associated with increased resilience 
in terms of expenditure through its effects on mean expenditure. More generally, this paper 
demonstrates the important role this type of resilience analysis should play in identifying 
evidence-based strategies to increase resilience in developing countries. 
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Tables 
Table I: Summary Stats 
 2009–10 – N 
68
 = 1,974 2010–11 – N = 1,828 2011-12 – N = 1,893 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
HH size 6.3 3.1 1 23 5.9 2.8 1 21 6.0 2.8 1 22 
HH labor 2.8 1.7 0 14 2.5 1.5 0 13 2.6 1.5 0 14 
Male Head (indicator) 0.73 0.45 0 1 0.71 0.45 0 1 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Head school years  4.8 3.8 0 18 5.2 3.9 0 18 4.9 3.9 0 18 
Head age 46.7 15.1 14 100 47.3 15.3 14 96 47.8 15.2 0 94 
Shock (indicator) 0.693 0.461 0 1 0.491 0.500 0 1 0.410 0.492 0 1 
Monthly expenditure (1,000 of USh) 213 168 8 892 171 146 9 892 171 135 9 892 
Mo expenditure PAE (1,000) 51 36 5 218 45 37 3 218 44 34 5 218 
Crop diversification 0.582 0.207 0 1 0.617 0.185 0 1 0.611 0.198 0 0.897 
Income diversification 0.403 0.217 0 0.786 0.389 0.221 0 0.794 0.376 0.220 0 0.788 
Acres under cultivation 2.71 2.73 0 14.1 2.55 2.32 0 14.1 2.24 1.91 0.1 14.1 
Cash crop acres 0.15 0.44 0 2.8 0.17 0.45 0 2.8 0.17 0.42 0 2.8 
Total income (1,000 USh) 1,674 1,948 -413 12,100 1,806 2,196 -413 12,100 1,920 2,034 -413 12,100 
Wage income (1,000 USh) 531 1163 0 6734 538 1226 0 6734 364 868 0 6734 
Own income (1,000 USh) 395 1263 -1680 9240 456 1404 -1680 9240 552 1543 -1680 9240 
TLU 1.46 2.68 0 17 1.31 2.50 0 17 1.19 2.38 0 17 
Non-ag assets (1,000 USh) 10700 23100 0 163000 10900 22200 0 163000 12200 23900 0 163000 
Rainfall (mm)
69
 391 64 165 594 509 94 298 757 464 147 222 834 
Rainfall difference
70
 0.138 0.085 0 0.373 0.186 0.090 0.006 0.445 0.205 0.177 0 0.910 
                                                 
68
 In Round 1, income diversification is available for 1,833 households and head age is missing for 2. In Round 2, income diversification is available for 1,771 
households and total income for 1,793. Assets are missing for 16 households in R3, and total income for 32. 
69
 This is the rainfall in the wettest quarter within Jan-Dec of the year in question, or Jan-Jun in places with bimodal rainfall. 
70
 The absolute value of the difference between the current rainfall (mm of year’s wettest quarter) and the average, divided by the average. 
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Enhanced Vegetation Index
71
 0.496 0.054 0.301 0.591 0.522 0.057 0.336 0.630 0.517 0.052 0.309 0.623 
EVI difference
72
 0.052 0.027 0.006 0.208 0.019 0.015 433 0.111 0.030 0.025 0 0.181 
Elevation (m) 1236 254 621 2297 1235 253 621 2396 1233 257 621 2396 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Region 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 
 
Mean Abs. Poor
73
 Crop Div. Income Div. Mean Abs. Poor Crop Div. Income Div. Mean Abs. Poor Crop Div. Income Div. 
Central 0.206 0.110 0.582 0.383 0.223 0.152 0.642  0.376 0.202 0.105 0.668 0.390 
Eastern 0.271 0.199 0.607 0.419 0.279 0.424 0.636 0.389 0.273 0.405 0.627 0.367 
Northern 0.283 0.303 0.564  0.426 0.278 0.452 0.564  0.422 0.291 0.452 0.529 0.407 
Western 0.240 0.230 0.575  0.376 0.220 0.338  0.634 0.361 0.234 0.239  0.642 0.334 
                                                 
71
 Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI) value at peak of greenness within main (or first) growing season of the current year 
72
 The absolute value of the difference between the current year’s EVI and the average, over the average 
73
 Percentage of sample households in the region that have PAE monthly expenditure below 26,000 USh 
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Table 3: OLS Regressions of PAE Expenditure and Crop Diversification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure 
       
Crop diversification -3,175 -32,847*** 20,242 73,963* 175,283** 159,462 
 (2,389) (8,464) (20,652) (42,299) (77,600) (139,230) 
Crop div. 
2 
 32,467*** -122,929** -397,955** -1,179,000** -1,007,000 
  (8,886) (55,857) (197,071) (538,965) (1,367,000) 
Crop div. 
3
   117,180*** 575,848* 2,699,000* 2,018,000 
   (41,584) (317,916) (1,400,000) (5,171,000) 
Crop div. 
4
    -246,621 -2,000,000* -1,419,000 
    (169,472) (1,568,000) (9,308,000) 
Crop div. 
5
     994,841 -97,430 
     (638,819) (8,006,000) 
Crop div. 
6
      362,323 
      (2,647,000) 
Constant 48,658*** 53,478*** 51,402*** 50,739*** 50,250*** 50,284*** 
 (1,516) (2,008) (2,138) (2,186) (2,208) (2,222) 
       
Observations 5,695 5,695 5,695 5,695 5,695 5,695 
Adjusted R
2
 0.00013 0.00230 0.00351 0.00371 0.00396 0.00379 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Table 4: OLS Regressions of Expenditure and Income Diversification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure 
       
Income diversification 3,326 -8,240 23,193 98,856*** 243,361*** 325,091*** 
 (2,183) (7,386) (18,127) (36,090) (64,967) (107,015) 
Income div. 
2 
 17,566 -101,534 -624,161*** -2,162,000*** -3,413,000** 
  (10,716) (63,635) (224,774) (617,199) (1,441,000) 
Income div. 
3
   112,312* 1.248e+06*** 6,830,000*** 13,620,000* 
   (59,152) (472,104) (2,140,000) (7,385,000) 
Income div. 
4
    -776,638** -9,141,000*** -25,970,000 
    (320,366) (3,144,000) (17,800,000) 
Income div. 
5
     4,435,000*** 23,880,000 
     (1,658,000) (20,300,000) 
Income div. 
6
      -8,492,000 
      (8,836,000) 
Constant 45,334*** 46,329*** 45,585*** 44,961*** 44,452*** 44,313*** 
 (975.5) (1,149) (1,214) (1,240) (1,254) (1,262) 
       
Observations 5,496 5,496 5,496 5,496 5,496 5,496 
Adjusted R
2
 0.00024 0.00055 0.00102 0.00191 0.00302 0.00301 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 5: Poisson MLE of mean and variance of expenditure (marginal effects at means) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Expenditure V(Expenditure) in 1,000s 
Expenditure t-1 0.385*** 0.385*** 0.387*** 7.407*** 7.334*** 7.347*** 
 
(0.0282) (0.0283) (0.0282) (1.932) (1.915) (1.914) 
Crop diversification 3,364 3,023 3,048 269,800 253,400 240,400 
(4,046) (4,057) (4,084) (217,900) (220,900) (223,900) 
Income diversification -3,236 -3,202 -3,218 -132,500 -130,400 -123,300 
(3,156) (3,158) (3,172) (184,900) (183,900) (183,400) 
Total Income 0.000679** 0.000677** 0.00108** 0.01423 0.01304 -0.04327 
 (0.000331) (0.000331) (0.000514) (0.01593) (0.01575) (0.02723) 
Wage income   -0.00103   0.03134 
   (0.000808)   (0.04411) 
Own income   -0.000344   0.02515 
   (0.000616)   (0.03071) 
Acres under cultivation 275.8 405.2 399.7 37,900* 42,380** 41,450* 
(343.5) (368.9) (367.2) (19,570) (21,610) (21,590) 
Cash crop acres  -1,895 -2,240  -53,900 -37,510 
 (2,039) (2,049)  (95,350) (95,490) 
TLU 272.9 253.6 227.8 -28,740 -29,200 -31,530 
 (789.1) (783.1) (782.8) (44,360) (44,170) (44,100) 
Assets 0.000077** 0.000078** 0.000076** 0.0044*** 0.0045*** 0.0048*** 
(0.000031) (0.000032) (0.000031) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Rainfall (mm) -3.415 -3.523 -3.009 199.84 193.95 176.17 
(6.977) (6.970) (6.988) (541.08) (534.76) (538.29) 
Rainfall difference 1,176 1,207 1,172 28,770 30,520 29,260 
(1,090) (1,090) (1,089) (88,690) (87,700) (88,020) 
Enhanced Vegetation Index -31,755* -31,842** -33,053** -953,500 -927,700 -880,200 
(16,218) (16,235) (16,448) (868,000) (862,100) (871,200) 
EVI difference 498.6 492.3 484.4 1,932 1,013 1,791 
(584.8) (583.0) (580.2) (37,820) (37,580) (37,550) 
Elevation (m) -3.978* -3.945* -3.923* -163,430 -160,197 -156,268 
 (2.371) (2.377) (2.372) (181,957) (180,699) (180,500) 
Shock  2,176 2,175 2,253 63,600 64,830 62,310 
(1,411) (1,410) (1,414) (94,730) (93,920) (95,280) 
HH characteristics
74
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
HH FE (Mundlak) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 
BIC (in billions)
75
 64.33 64.30 64.23 9,060,000 9,038,000 9,032,000 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
                                                 
74
 Characteristics include household size, labor, an indicator for having a male head, the years of education of the 
head, and his/her age. Region dummies are also included.  
75
 Bayesian information criterion (BIC) from the GLM specification (not marginal effects). 
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Table 6: Binomial MLE of resilience (ME*100 at means) for select values of 𝑾 
  (1) 𝑊 = 26,000 USh (2) 𝑊 = 78,000 USh (3) 𝑊 = 130,000 USh 
VARIABLES Resilience Resilience Resilience 
Expenditure t-1 0.00052*** 0.00021*** 0.000019*** 
 
(0.0000031) (0.0000025) (0.00000055) 
Crop diversification 0.0957 2.83*** 0.328*** 
(0.355) (0.327) (0.0716) 
Income diversification -3.50*** -2.33*** -0. 221*** 
(0. 263) (0.218) (0.0371) 
Total Income 0.0000022*** 0.00000059*** 0.000000039*** 
 (0.000000076) (0.000000045) (0.0000000065) 
Wage income -0.0000027*** -0.00000044*** -0.000000017* 
 (0.000000098) (0.000000064) (0.0000000090) 
Own income -0.0000012*** -0.00000016*** 0.000 
 (0.00000012) (0.000000054) (0.0000000065) 
Acres under cultivation -0.315*** 0.390*** 0.0462*** 
 (0.0384) (0.0319) (0.0048) 
Cash crop acres -3.45*** -1.13*** -0.136*** 
(0.179) (0.177) (0.0271) 
TLU 1.27*** 0.0569 0.0051 
 (0.0923) (0.0698) (0.0097) 
Assets -0.000000015** 0.000000037*** 0.0000000053*** 
(0.0000000071) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rainfall (mm) -0.0091*** 0.00043 -0.000058 
(0.00050) (0.00038) (0.000082) 
Rainfall difference 1.55*** 0. 675*** 0.0808*** 
(0.0773) (0.0641) (0.0124) 
Enhanced Vegetation Index -36.7*** -20.0*** -1.73*** 
(1.32) (1.17) (0.172) 
EVI difference 0.742*** 0.186*** 0.0166*** 
(0.0416) (0.0351) (0.0043) 
Elevation (m) -0.0038*** -0.0032*** -0.00035*** 
 (0.00019) (0.00016) (0.000036) 
Shock  2.49*** 1.25*** 0.131*** 
(0.0984) (0.0891) (0.0183) 
HH characteristics
76
 Y Y Y 
HH FE (Mundlak) Y Y Y 
Observations 3,259 3,259 3,259 
BIC
77
 -11687.477 -3884.2259 -13296.851 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
                                                 
76
 Characteristics include household size, labor, an indicator for having a male head, the years of education of the 
head, and his/her age. Coefficients are available on request. 
77
 Bayesian information criterion (BIC) from the GLM specification (not marginal effects). 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Map of Uganda 
 
 
Credit: CC BY-SA 3.0 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=769386 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of monthly expenditure 
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Figure 3: Histograms of crop and income diversification 
  
Figure 4: Scatter plot of crop (y-axis) and income (x-axis) diversification (ρ = 0.0795) 
 
 
Figure 5: Predicted expenditure at various diversification levels 
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Figure 6: Histogram of expenditure resilience 𝝆𝒊𝒕 for 𝑾 = 𝟐𝟔, 𝟎𝟎𝟎 
 
 
Figure 7: Predicted expenditure path dynamics  
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Figure 8: Threshold Analysis 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Winsorization 
Table A1: Unaltered and winsorized summary statistics 
 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Monthly expend. (1,000 of USh) 220 227 8 5,055 175 178 9 3,755 172 146 9 1,902 
Monthly expend., winzorized 213 168 8 892 171 146 9 892 171 135 9 892 
Mo expenditure PAE 53 62 5 1,757 46 47 3 801 45 37 5 369 
Mo expenditure PAE, winzorized 51 36 5 218 45 37 3 218 44 34 5 218 
Acres under cultivation 3.58 14.5 0 406 2.69 3.96 0 101.3 2.25 2.00 0.1 24.5 
Acres under cultivation, winzorized 2.71 2.73 0 14.1 2.55 2.32 0 14.1 2.24 1.91 0.1 14.1 
Cash crop acres 0.20 1.0 0 30 0.19 0.81 0 26 0.20 0.74 0 18.8 
Cash crop acres, winzorized 0.15 0.44 0 2.8 0.17 0.45 0 2.8 0.17 0.42 0 2.8 
Total income (1,000 USh) 1,686 2,243 -6,871 37,100 1,818 2,615 -18,800 27,100 2,029 3,639 -9,782 17,100 
Total income, winsorized 1,674 1,948 -413 12,100 1,806 2,196 -413 12,100 1,920 2,034 -413 12,100 
Wage income (1,000 USh) 957 12,900 0 557,000 627 1,990 0 40,200 431 2,862 0 118,000 
Wage income, winzorized 531 1,163 0 6,734 538 1,226 0 6,734 364 868 0 6,734 
Own income (1,000 USh) 334 3,921 -74,000 51,100 397 3,471 -93,900 52,200 617 3,942 -79,000 69,500 
Own income, winzorized 395 1,263 -1,680 9,240 456 1,404 -1,680 9,240 552 1,543 -1680 9,240 
TLU 356 11,251 0 400,003 1.43 3.52 0 51.6 1.30 3.37 0 50.4 
TLU, winzorized 1.46 2.68 0 17 1.31 2.50 0 17 1.19 2.38 0 17 
Non-ag assets (1,000 USh) 14,100 85,100 0 3,210,000 12,800 40,200 0 610,000 13,700 38,100 0 719,000 
Non-ag assets, winzorized 10,700 23,100 0 163,000 10,900 22,200 0 163,000 12,200 23,900 0 163,000 
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Figure A1: Histograms of PAE monthly expenditure in USh, original (left) and winsorized 
(right) 
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Appendix 2: Diversification Indices 
Transformed Herfindahl index 
Both diversification indices used in this paper are transformed Herfindahl indices, 
typically used as a measure of market concentration, but also used in the ecology literature as a 
measure of ecological diversity (or rather concentration, referred to often as the Simpson Index) 
and in the development literature. For household i in period t, the Herfindahl index H for 
𝛼 ∈ {𝑐, 𝑦} (for crops, c, or income, y) is: 
𝐻𝑖𝑡
𝛼 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
given N types of crops or sources of income each of share (proportion of total) s. Note that 
1
𝑁
≤ 𝐻𝑖𝑡
𝛼 ≤ 1, and so 𝐻𝑖𝑡
𝑐 = 1 if household i is entirely specialized in the production of one crop 
in period t. 
In order to have a measure of diversification, rather than specialization, I calculate the 
crop or income diversification index: 
𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝛼 = 1 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡
𝛼 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝛼 = 0 indicates complete specialization and higher values indicate more diversification, 
such that lim𝑁→∞{𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝛼} = 1. This measure is more appropriate that measures that simply count 
the number of activities that a household in engaged in, as this measure actually weights by 
intensity in a given activity.  
Crop diversification index 
The “share” s of a given activity can be measured in different ways. Here, I am interested 
in area shares. In order to calculate the share of a given crop, I use area under cultivation of that 
crop, divided by the entire area under cultivation by household i.  
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While impressive, the LSMS-ISA crop production data for Uganda needed significant 
cleaning for these purposes. The cleaning dataset is available on request. For intercropped crops, 
the area under cultivation is the area of the plot time the proportion of the plot under that crop. 
Plots under fallow, bush, pasture, forest or trees, or “other” were excluded. 
Income diversification index 
The income diversification measure takes advantage of RIGA aggregates and calculated 
variables, normalized to ensure that all proportions of total income are positive. Types of income 
include agricultural wage income, non-agricultural wage income, crop income, livestock income, 
transfers, self-employment income, and other (which includes remittances). 
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Appendix 3: Robustness 
Table A3: Poisson MLE (marginal effects at lag expenditure = poverty line (26,000 USh)) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Expenditure V(Expenditure) in 1,000s 
Expenditure t-1 0.366*** 0.366*** 0.368*** 7.361*** 7.323*** 7.333*** 
 
(0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0219) (1.211) (1.208) (1.204) 
Crop diversification 2,785 2,503 2,522 224,900 212,700 201,700 
(3,351) (3,360) (3,380) (187,000) (189,700) (191,800) 
Income diversification -2,679 -2,651 -2,662 -110,500 -109,400 -103,400 
(2,612) (2,613) (2,623) (152,400) (152,700) (152,300) 
Total Income 0.000563** 0.000561** 0.000896** 0.012 0.011 -0.0036 
 (0.000273) (0.000273) (0.000426) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) 
Wage income   -0.000855   0.026 
   (0.000670)   (0.037) 
Own income   -0.000284   0.021 
   (0.000510)   (0.026) 
Acres under cultivation 228.3 335.5 330.7 31,590* 35,580* 34,780* 
(284.1) (304.9) (303.3) (16,400) (18,590) (18,550) 
Cash crop acres  -1,569 -1,853  -45,250 -31,470 
 (1,687) (1,695)  (81,290) (80,940) 
TLU 226.0 210.0 188.5 -23,950 -24,510 -26,460 
 (653.9) (648.8) (648.1) (36,800) (36,940) (36,850) 
Assets 0.000064** 0.000064** 0.000063** 0.0037*** 0.0038*** 0.0040*** 
(0.000026) (0.000026) (0.000026) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Rainfall (mm) -2.828 -2.917 -2.489 166.574 162.811 147.806 
(5.790) (5.784) (5.793) (441.398) (439.494) (442.769) 
Rainfall difference 973.7 999.2 969.7 23,980 25,620 24,550 
(906.7) (907.0) (905.2) (75,360) (75,170) (75,360) 
EVI -26,294** -26,360** -27,347** -794.800 -778.800 -738.500 
(13,352) (13,362) (13,528) (711.900) (711.600) (718.400) 
EVI difference 412.8 407.6 400.7 1,610 850.39 1,503 
(484.5) (482.9) (480.4) (31,520) (31,540) (31,490) 
Elevation (m) -3.294* -3.266* -3.246 -136.223 -134.474 -131.107 
 (1.977) (1.982) (1.976) (159.016) (158.787) (158.493) 
Shock  1,802 1,801 1,864 53,020 54,420 52,280 
(1,176) (1,174) (1,177) (80,250) (80,200) (81,210) 
HH char
78
 & Mundlak FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 
BIC (in billions)
79
 64.33 64.30 64.23 9,060,000 9,038,000 9,032,000 
Clustered (HH) standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
                                                 
78
 Characteristics include household size, labor, an indicator for having a male head, the years of education of the 
head, and his/her age. Region dummies are also included. Coefficients are available on request. 
79
 Bayesian information criterion (BIC) from the GLM specification (not marginal effects). 
